Development of a model for the measurement of home loan risk by Powell, Robert John
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR THE 
MEASUREMENT OF HOME LOAN RISK 
by 
ROBERT JOHN POWELL 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF COMMERCE 
in the subject 
BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR: PROF M V KELLY 
NOVEMBER 1994 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Since 1985, the home loan market in South Africa has seen dramatic changes. 
Increased competition caused a relaxation of lending criteria. In addition, lending 
started taking place in areas traditionally classified as "black". These areas are not 
as economically or politically stable as the traditional lending areas. 
The result has been an increase in risk, manifested by increasing arrears and property 
repossessions. Because of the varying risks, home loans can no longer be considered 
of equal risk. 
' This dissertation identifies ways of measuring home loan risk, as well as determining 
the appropriate level of return for that risk. 
A questionnaire was developed for completion by banks. The questionnaire was used 
to test hypotheses in relation to mortgage risk, to identify the need and value of a 
risk measurement model, and to gather any other additional information which may 
be of benefit in developing the model. 
The information supplied by banks who answered the questionnaire has been used 
to facilitate development of the model. 
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Perm for permission to use any of these concepts in the research. Acknowledgement 
is given to Denis Creighton for assistance with the development of the risk matrix, 
and to Des Bowen and Mohammed Dangor for assistance with the development of 
criteria for area ratings. The above mentioned concepts have been modified by the 
writer to reflect the findings of this study and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Perm or any of the above mentioned persons. 
Grateful thanks is given to all the financial institutions who participated in the study 
by completing the questionnaire, as well as to Heather and Daniel of First National 
Bank for the typing and assistance with the graphics. 
Professor Markham of UNISA is thanked for providing assistance with the statistics. 
Alexis Rase is thanked for providing assistance with technical editing, graphic 
importation and printing. 
Sincere gratitude is expressed to Professor Kelly of UNISA for the invaluable 
assistance he provided in his role as supervisor. 
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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of the study was to develop a model which allowed banks to 
measure home loan risk and determine prices accordingly. 
A survey among banks revealed: 
1. belief that the home loan market is more risky than 5 years ago 
2. belief that lending in the "black" market is riskier than lending in the 
"white" market 
3. no model is used which allows risk-measurement for the purpose of home 
loan pricing 
4. mixed feeling as to the value of the proposed model - value, to a large 
extent, would depend on flexibility. 
A practical, flexible model has been developed which allows: 
1. risk classification of loans in terms of geographical areas, product/client 
characteristics, and loan performance 
2. risk measurement in terms of potential losses relating to each loan 
category 
3. determination of appropriate pricing levels for each risk category. 
OPSOMMING 
Die primere doel van die studie was om 'n model te ontwikkel wat banke in staat sal 
stel om die risiko en prys van huis verbandlenings te bepaal. 
'n Ondersoek by banke het die volgende gelewer: 
1. 'n siening dat die huisleningsmark meer riskant is as 5 jaar gelede 
2. 'n siening dat finansiering in die "swart" mark meer riskant is as in die 
"blanke" mark 
3. mod~lle nie gebruik word vir die bepaling van risiko met die doel om die 
prys van huislenings te bepaal nie 
4. gemengde reaksie op die nut van die voorgestelde model -die waarde sal 
tot 'n groat mate oak afhang van die buigsaamheid daarvan. 
'n Praktiese, buigsame model is ontwikkel met die volgende eienskappe: 
1. die klassifikasie van lenings volgens risiko soos bepaal deur geografiese 
grense, produk/klient eienskappe en rekening beheer 
2. die bepaling van risiko in terme van potensiele, verwagte verliese in elke 
lening kategorie 
3. die vasstelling van geskikte prys vlakke vir elke risiko kategorie. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION AND 
OUTLINE 
OF THE STUDY 
- 2 -
CHAPTER 1 
The nature of the study 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the nature and direction of the study. This includes: 
il background information regarding the need for the study 
iil stating the problems and sub-problems 
iii) formulation of hypotheses 
iv) formulation of primary and secondary objectives 
v) outline of the key components of the study plan 
vi) identification of limitations of the study 
vii) outlining the envisaged contributions and benefits of the study. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND 
It is generally accepted in financial theory and management that the taking of 
risk should be rewarded. Risk, in this context, is a condition or situation in 
which loss is possible. The essence of any business or investment decision 
involving risk is that adequate compensation should be obtained for assuming 
risk. Any institution faced with two options, all other things equal, should 
accept the option with the 'best' risk-compensation relationship. 
An analysis of shares listed on a stock exchange would reveal that generally 
shares of low risk yield low returns and higher risk shares yield higher returns. 
' The same principle applies to banks. The higher the risk of lending money, the 
higher the reward the bank will seek in terms of the interest rate charged. 
This is why unsecured loans generally attract higher rates than secured loans 
and why borrowers with good track records will generally be able to obtain 
cheaper finance than borrowers with no track record. 
It follows, logically, that if two home loans were of different risk, different 
interest rates should be charged. 
The writer, after six years of working experience in the housing section of a 
large bank and through monitoring industry figures relating to bad debts and 
repossessions in the home loan market, believed that home loan risk had 
increased substantially in recent years. Competition had increased, lending 
criteria had been relaxed, and banks had started lending in areas of higher risk, 
namely, townships traditionally classified as "black". Home loans were no 
longer all of the low level of risk they had been up to the early 1980's when 
lending criteria were very stringent and lending only took place in low risk 
suburban areas mainly classified as "white". 
Despite the differences in risk between home loans there was very little 
difference in the home loan interest rates charged by banks. Mortgage rates 
continued to be based on similar levels, in relation to the bank rate charged by 
the Reserve Bank, as they were when risks were much lower. It was even the 
practice of many banks to allow discounts on the normal lending rate to 
selected customers. 
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Models relating to the measurement of risk and the management of the risk-
return relationship centred on share investments. There was a need for 
guidelines regarding risk measurement and pricing as it related to home loans 
in the South African situation. 
1.3 THE PROBLEM STATED 
1.3.1 Main problem 
1.3.2 
Over the 5 year period to which the study relates - namely September 
1986 to September 1991 -the socio-political situation in South Africa, 
together with an increase in competition in the home loan market, led to 
an increase in the riskiness of home loans•made by banks (Tucker 1990, 
p5). Banks' compensation in the form of the risk premium component of 
interest rates on home loans did not adjust accordingly. Guidelines were 
therefore needed regarding the measurement and pricing of home loan 
risk. It was the intention of this study to develop a model for the 
measurement of home loan risk. The model would be used by banks to 
assist with the pricing of home loans. 
Sub-problems 
In order to ensure that the model developed would be of value it was 
necessary to establish whether the observations, assumptions and 
expectations of the author were correct. The following sub-problems 
were in turn, identified: 
il what were the trends in home loan risk over the period September 
1986 to September 1991? 
iil Was there a difference in home loan risk between black areas and 
white areas? 
iii) Did banks use any model that measures home loan risk for the 
purpose of pricing loans? 
iv) Would banks value a model that measures risk for the purpose of 
pricing home loans? 
v) What other information might be of value in the development of the 
model? 
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1.4 FORMULATION OF HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses arose out of the sub-problems and provided tentative answers 
for the problems posed. 
Hypothesis 1 - home loan business was more risky in September 1991 than 
it was 5 years prior to September 1991. 
Hypothesis 2 - lending in black areas was more risky than lending in white 
areas. 
Hypothesis 3 - banks did not use a model to measure home loan risk for the 
purpose of pricing loans. 
Hypothesis 4- banks would value a model that allowed the measurement of 
home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. 
1.5 FORMULATION OF OBJECTIVES 
1.5.1 Primary objective 
1.5.2 
The primary objective arose out of the main problem. The primary 
objective was to develop a model for the measurement and pricing of 
home loan risk. 
Secondary objectives 
Secondary objectives which arose from the sub-problems and hypotheses, 
were as follows: 
to establish changes in risk over the past 5 years 
to establish risk in black areas relative to risk in white areas 
to ascertain whether banks used a model to measure home loan risk 
for the purpose of pricing loans 
to ascertain whether banks would value a model which allowed the 
measurement of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans 
to gather any other information which might be of value in the 
formulation of the risk-measurement model. 
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1.6 KEY COMPONENTS OF THE STUDY PLAN 
The problem, hypotheses and objectives of the study having been propounded, 
the study thereafter centred around three key areas: 
• survey of relevant literature 
• survey among banks, and 
• development of the model. 
A. Survey of literature 
The survey relates to two topics: 
il the housing market in South Africa 
' The purpose of the survey here was to analyse trends in the home 
loan market that might help substantiate the hypotheses and provide 
information that might be of assistance in the development of the 
model. 
iil Risk and reward 
The purpose of the survey here was to 
• identify and explain previous research undertaken in respect of 
risk measurement and the relationship between risk and return 
• ascertain the relevance and adequacy of research that existed in 
respect of home loans 
• isolate any findings, concepts or models that might prove of 
assistance in the development of a home loan risk-measurement 
model. 
B. Survey among banks 
This survey was in the form of a questionnaire. Its purpose was: 
• to test the hypotheses 
• to obtain information from the banks that would assist with the 
development of the model. 
The methodology and data analysis of this survey is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
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C. Development of the model 
The risk measurement model developed in the study was based on 
information obtained from the literature and questionnaire surveys, and 
from the knowledge and experience of the writer. 
1.7 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
It was acknowledged at the outset that certain forces and factors, such as 
competition, or accusations of discrimination, might act in the marketplace to 
possibly hamper, to some degree, the implementation of an effective 
differential rate structure for home loans. It was, however, not the intention 
of this study to suggest how these problems might be overcome, but rather 
' to enable banks to measure risk and to determine the appropriate pricing level 
in relation to such risk. 
1.8 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The writer held that there was a lack of guidelines regarding risk-measurement 
and pricing in respect of home loans and that banks did not have a model for 
this purpose. The development of such a model, specifically related to the 
South African situation, would therefore rank as an original concept. 
It was envisaged that the model would be 
• practical - providing banks with a risk measurement and pricing tool 
• flexible - allowing the model to be adapted to the specific needs of 
individual banks 
• relevant- being specifically tailored to home loans in South Africa 
• a basis for further research - in that the model might be criticised, 
enhanced or adapted for other uses. 
In addition, it was conjectured that the literature and questionnaire surveys 
might provide valuable information regarding the home loan market in South 
Africa, the concepts of risk and return, and the attitudes of banks. This 
information might be used as a reference guide for banks or other students of 
these topics. 
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1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The problem has been stated, hypotheses formulated, and objectives set. The 
general direction of the study was thus set. 
In summary, this study posited that: 
home loan business in September 1991 was more risky than 5 years prior 
lending in black areas was more risky than lending in white areas 
banks did not use a model to measure home loan risk for the purpose of 
pricing loans 
banks would value a model which allowed the measurement of home loan 
risk for the purpose of pricing loans. 
The primary objective of the study was to develop a model which allowed the 
measurement of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. Information 
relating to the topic and which might assist in the development of the model 
was gathered via a literature survey (secondary research) as well as a survey 
among banks (primary research). 
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PART II 
SURVEY 
OF THE 
LITERATURE 
The literature surveyed included books, journals, magazines, government gazettes 
and other pertinent available information. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The housing market in South Africa 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
To understand the potential risks facing banks, trends within the housing 
market were analysed as part of the study and possible future demands 
projected. 
This chapter deals with 4 areas: 
' i) current home loan market share and market share trends 
ii) experience of properties in possession and sales in execution 
iii) the lower cost housing market, including the housing need and 
affordability, and 
iv) types of lending instruments. 
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2.2 HOME LOAN MARKET SHARE 
Up until 1985 the home loan market in South Africa was served by five major 
building societies, these being the United, Allied, Perm, Natal and Saambou. 
However the latter half of the 1980s saw increasing business being done by 
banks in the home loan market. 
Figure 2.1 compares home loan market share in 1985 with home loan market 
share in 1990. 1990 figures were used because these were the latest figures 
available when the research questionnaire survey was dispatched to envisaged 
participants. Figure 2.2 shows how banks had eroded the share of building 
I 
societies in the home loan market by the end of 1990. 
FIGURE 2.1 
Home loan market share 
(R million) 
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fNB 4946 
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Dec 85 Dec 90 
Source: (Compiled from BA 9 and BS 11 returns submitted to the Reserve Bank) 
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FIGURE 2.2 
Market share of banks 
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Source: (Compiled from BA 9 and BS 11 returns submitted to the Reserve Bank) 
Banks, in endeavouring to build a large mortgage book, undercut the rate 
offered by building societies. This is shown in Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1 
Interest rates for major banks and building societies, May 1988 
Perm 14,5 
UBS 14.0 
Allied 14,5 
NBS 14,0 
Saambou 14,0 
FNB 13,5 
Standard 12,5 
Volkskas 12,5 
Trust 15,0 
Ned bank 12,5 
Source: (Perm, 1988, p.4) 
Banks' rates were later brought into line with those of building societies. 
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In addition to lower rates, banks granted higher percentage loans at higher 
ratios of repayment-to-income. Traditionally building societies would only 
grant 80% loans (without collateral) at 25% of borrowers' income. In order 
to compete, building societies then offered products similar to those offered 
by the banks. As a result, risk increased (Tucker, 1990, p5). In addition, in 
order to maintain satisfactory growth, building societies started expanding 
their markets, and a great deal more lending was done in the coloured, asian 
and black markets. Such lending was for low cost housing carrying risks 
substantially different to those in the white market. For example, education 
and understanding of the mortgage process was low, and unemployment high. 
The low cost housing market is examined in section 2.4. 
The Banks Act of 1990 brought banking legislation into line with accepted 
international standards in order to afford greater protection to depositors. This 
Act replaces the Banks Act of 1965 and Building Societies Act of 1986. 
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2.3 SALES IN EXECUTION AND PROPERTIES IN POSSESSION 
2.3.1 Sales in execution 
The tables in Appendix summarise details of notices of Sales in 
Execution for various banks as reported weekly in the Government 
Gazette for the period November 1988 - September 1992. 
These figures show a substantial increase in sales in execution since 
1988. In 1989, total monthly average notices were 661. By 1991 this 
had increased to 1 896 and by 1992, to 2 256, 241% up on 1989. This 
trend appeared as relatively common among all the banks. The increase 
I 
was largest among the asian, coloured and black sectors, as shown in 
table 2.2. 
White 
Coloured 
Asian 
Black 
TABLE 2.2 
Sales in execution per race group 
(monthly average) 
1989 1990 1991 
412 702 781 
74 238 318 
29 50 104 
146 423 693 
%INCREASE 
1989- 1991 
90% 
330% 
259% 
375% 
Source: (Government Gazette - summary of tables contained in 
Appendix 1) 
2.3.2 
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Properties in possession 
That properties in possession had increased over the three-year period 
1988 - 1990 is illustrated in figures 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 2.3 shows 
property in possession numbers for the four major "traditional" building 
societies - the Allied, Natal, United and Perm. All four institutions 
experienced increases in properties in possession over the period 1988 -
1990. Since banks are not required to submit figures on properties in 
possession to the Reserve Bank, figures for banks are not reported here. 
Figures are only reported up to 1990, after which many buildings societies 
converted to banks. 
Figure 2.4 shows properties in possession as a percentage of total 
outstanding mortgage balances. The increasing trend for all four 
institutions indicates that growth in properties in possession was higher 
than growth in outstanding mortgage balances. 
FIGURE 2.3 
Properties in possessions, Rand value 
R(million) 
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FIGURE 2.4 
Properties in possession, as a percentage of mortgage book 
% 
1.4r-----------------------------------------------------~ 
1.2 ................................................................................................ . 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0-:t~~·· ~IIIJ-=~ 
ALLIED N.B.S. U.B.S. PERM 
~ 1988 ~ 1989 ~ 1990 
Source: Compiled from various BS 11 returns submitted to the Reserve Bank) 
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2.4 THE LOW COST HOUSING MARKET 
This section examines: 
• trends in the size of the population of South Africa 
• the demand for low cost housing and its affordability 
• employment, and 
• participants in the low cost housing market. 
The low cost housing sector is where the largest need for housing lies, but it carries 
a great deal of risk. It was therefore necessary to examine it for purposes of this 
study. 
2.4.1 The South African population 
Table 2.3 provides projections for the South African population to the 
year 2000 (including the homelands). 
TABLE 2.3 
South African population projections (in thousands) 
1990 1995 2000 
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % 
Black 28 258 75,3 32 515 76,8 37 260 78,3 
White 5 052 13,5 5 249 12,4 5 427 11 ,4 
Coloured 3 244 8,6 3 527 8,3 3 782 7,9 
Asian 978 2,6 1 053 2,5 1 122 2,4 
37 532 42 344 47 591 
Source: (South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), 1990, 
p37) 
According to the Urban Foundation (1990, p 20-21) the growth in the 
population would be centred around the urban and metropolitan areas. 
Steenkamp (SAIRR, 1990, p37) proffers one of the reasons for this as 
out-migration from rural areas; however the bulk of urban growth actually 
derives from natural population increase in the cities and towns 
themselves. In 1985 the black urban population distribution was 53%. 
This is projected, as seen in the table 2.4, to reach 69% by the year 
2010: 
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TABLE 2.4 
Black population distribution 
1985 2010 
SA metropolitan 21% ( 5,2m) 30% (14,3m) 
Homeland metropolitan 14% ( 3,5m) 19% ( 9,3m) 
SA urban 7% ( 1,6m) 7% ( 3,3m) 
Homeland urban 3% ( 0,8m) 5% ( 2,4m) 
Homeland dense settlements 8% ( 1,9m) 8% ( 3,9m) 
Subtotal 'Urban' 53% ( 13,0m} 69% (33,2m} 
SA rural 14% ( 3,4m) 7% ( 3,4m) 
Homeland rural 33% ( 8,0m) 25% (11 ,9m) 
Subtotal 'Rural' 47% (11,4m} 32% (15,3m} 
TOTAL 100% (24,5ml 100% (48,5m} 
Source: (Urban Foundation, 1990a, p20 - 21) 
% 
- 1 9 -
The Institute for Futures Research (IFR) (1990, p98) agrees with this 
projected urbanisation trend and reports that approximately two-thirds of 
the annual third world population growth occurs in urban areas. IFR 
believe that the growth of vast shanty towns and unauthorised 
settlements will continue to be a feature of third world urban growth over 
the coming decade. 
Figure 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate past and projected changes in the South 
African urban population: 
FIGURE 2.5 
Changing composition of the South African urban population 
1oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
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FIGURE 2.6 
Growth of the South African urban population 
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TABLE 2.5 
Regional population increases 
TOWN/CITY 1985 % 2000 % ABSOLUTE 
TOTAL BLACK TOTAL BLACK INCREASE 
PWV metropolitan 7 000 000 58 12 300 00 73 5 300 000 
Durban metropolitan 3 000 000 64 4 400 000 73 1 400 000 
C. T. metropolitan 2 240 000 20 3 300 000 28 1 060 000 
Bloemfontein 525 000 77 1 021 000 84 496 000 
Pietermaritzburg 425 000 67 844 000 77 419 000 
O.F.S. Goldfields 395 000 80 891 000 88 496 000 
East London 380 000 74 823 000 84 443 000 
George/Mossel Bay 91 300 9 118 200 11 26 900 
Kimberley 160 000 46 220 300 51 60 300 
Pietersburg/Seshego 67 800 57 92 300 68 24 500 
Middelburg/Witbank 150 900 56 199 700 66 48 800 
Source: (Urban Foundation, 1990a, p26-33) 
2000 
% 
JNCR 
76 
47 
47 
94 
99 
126 
117 
29 
38 
36 
32 
2.4.2 
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The housing need 
Estimates of the housing backlog and housing requirements varied 
according to assumptions used. 
The South African Housing Trust (SAIRR, 1990, p1 00) estimated the 
shortage at 1 260 000 units. 
The Urban Foundation (1990b, p7) estimated the backlog (including the 
homelands) to be around 1 ,2 million units and that an average of 1 74 000 
housing units per annum are required to house the urban and metropolitan 
black population. This included 61 000 units to resolve the backlog over 
\ 
20 years and 113 000 units to cater for new family formation each year. 
The Institute for Futures Research (IFRl (1990, p131) estimated the 
backlog in housing to be around 1 ,2 million units split as follows: 
Whites 
Coloureds 
Asians 
Blacks 
Source: (IFR, 1990, 131 l 
TABLE 2.6 
Housing backlog 
Thousand 
housing units 
25 
110 
36 
1 050 
1 221 
IFR ( 1990, p137) estimated the annual growth in housing need for blacks 
to be in the region of 137 thousand units per annum. 
Dr T. de Vas of the CSIR (SAIRR, 1990, p1 00) estimated the then current 
housing shortage to be around 2 million units and that around 320 000 
houses would need to be built each year to the year 2000 to eliminate the 
shortage. Around 90% of the need estimated by de Vas is by black 
households. The backlog had increased significantly since 1986 when 
Dr de Vas estimated the annual requirement at around 240 000 units. 
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A fuller breakdown of these figures is given in table 2. 7: 
TABLE 2.7 
Housing requirements, 1986 - 2000 
Housing Housing Housing * Annual 
Stock Backlog Require. Require. 1986-2000 1986-2000 
White 1 336 000 25 000 289 000 19 000 
Coloured 410 000 100 000 227 000 15 000 
Asian 147 000 36 000 87 000 6 000 
Black 486 000 865 000 2 969 000 200 000 
TOTAL 2 379 000 1 026 000 I 3 572 000 240 000 
* Additional including backlog 
Source: (De Vas, 1986) 
Differences in estimates naturally vary according to individual 
assumptions. De Vas for example, defined the backlog as the difference 
between formal housing stock and the number of households at a given 
time, thus excluding informal housing (site and service schemes). 
The Urban Foundation ( 1990b, p7) would include all housing units over 
which secure title is held, which included informal housing stock in site-
and-service schemes. 
Whatever the exact housing need, current building activities were lagging 
required activities as is shown in table 2.8: 
Whites 
Coloureds 
Asians 
Blacks 
Source: 
TABLE 2.8 
Residential buildings completed 1990 
(Central Statistical Services, 1990) 
Thousands 
18 
8 
3 
18 
47 
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2.4.3 Housing affordability 
Table 2. 7 shows income levels of population groups: 
TABLE 2.9 
Monthly household income 
INCOME GROUP o/o o/o o/o o/o 
R/MONTH BLACK COLOURED INDIAN WHITE 
1 - 399 50,9 24,4 6,1 2,6 
400- 699 23,1 18,4 14,5 5,3 
700- 1 199 19,0 25,1 26,8 10,1 
1 200 - 1 999 4,7 19,5 26,3 1 6,1 
2 000- 2 499 0,9 5,1 9,5 11 , 1 
2 500- 3 999 1 , 1 5,3 11,7 24,9 
4 000- 5 999 0,3 1 ,5 4,5 18,9 
6 000+ 0,1 0,6 1 , 1 10,9 
Source: (SAIRR, 1990, p658) 
Appendix 2 shows the percentage of each population group that was able 
to afford to pay a given size loan. Less than 10% of the black population 
was able to afford a loan of R30 000 or more. 
2.4.4 
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Type of solution 
Housing solutions ought to be matched to affordability and need. This 
study has identified that the greatest need for housing is among the black 
population who generally have low housing affordability. Housing 
solutions clearly need to be concentrated around the black population and 
need to be of a low cost nature. 
The Urban Foundation (1990b, p21) has identified four types of housing 
solutions to address the housing need: 
1. Conventional (greater than R35 000)- formal housing with high levels 
of infrastructure and house finishes. 
2. Starter (R 12 500 - R35 000) - a core or shell house with a low level 
of finishes and services which would be upgraded over time. 
3. Informal (less than R12 500)- purchase of a site and construction of 
an informal structure. 
4. Private rental - renting of housing due to preference or economic 
circumstances in any of the first three submarkets, or in flats. 
From the figures provided on population and affordability, if South Africa 
was to satisfy its housing requirements, construction of housing to the 
year 2000 would need to be split approximately as follows: 
conventional 10% 
starter 30% 
informal 60% 
The Business Marketing Institute (BMll (1990} provide estimates of the 
need for housing in table 2.10: 
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TABLE 2.10 
Housing need by type of solution 
HOUSING TYPE SIZE SQ.M. PRICE PER PROJECTED ANNUAL SOLUTION UNIT NEED 1990-2000 
luxury greater than 150 R170 625 4 500 
Standard 100- 150 93 750 10 000 
Standard 70- 100 63 750 13 000 
Conventional 50- 70 39 000 20 000 
Starter 40- 50 20 200 90 000 
Incremental less than 40 10 500 30 000 
Informal/Site and Varying ? 200 000 
Service 
Total 367 500 
Source: (BMI, 1990) 
2.4.5 
2.4.5.1 
2.4.5.2 
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Property rights 
Legislation affecting property rights 
The Group Areas Act of 1950, revised in 1957 and 1966, had a 
major impact on property rights and the pattern of cities in South 
Africa. The Act enforced segregation of trading and residential areas, 
with unprecedented intervention by the State as to where people 
were permitted to live or work. It was, however, not the first 
attempt by whites to impose segregation. Attempts at segregation 
in South Africa date back to the 1880's (Festenstein & Pickard-
Cambridge, 1989, p1). Some of the major attempts at segregation 
I 
legislation preceding the Group Areas Act of 1950 are summarised in 
Appendix 3. 
Black ownership rights 
Prior to 1978, blacks, generally speaking, were not allowed to own 
property in the Republic of South Africa. The Black Lands Act of 
1913 had qualified existing black property rights and legalised 
ownership, transfer and control of land possessed by blacks to the 
sovereign state. (Perm, 1985, p1). 
Until promulgation of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Amendment Act of 
1978, the large majority of blacks paid rent while some held 
unregistered thirty-year leases (Perm, 1986, p1). This legislation 
afforded blacks the right to own property in South Africa under the 
99 year leasehold system. This right was capable of registration and 
was transferable. If sold or bequeathed, the lease would be extended 
for a further 99 years in the new owner's name. 
In 1986 the legislation was changed to allow blacks full ownership of 
land. Full ownership is often referred to as 'Freehold Title'. 99 year 
leasehold could be converted to freehold title if the property complied 
with Section 46 of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937, which lays 
down specific requirements regarding the land itself such as adequate 
survey and general plan approval (Perm, 1985, p6). Transfer duty 
2.4.5.3 
2.4.5.4 
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and stamp duty are payable on freehold property but are not payable 
under the 99 year leasehold system. 
Due to the more stringent regulations and increased costs associated 
with full ownership, the majority of black properties were purchased 
under the 99 year leasehold system, and there was no marked 
eagerness to convert leasehold properties to full ownership. 
Home ownership among blacks 
The number of leaseholds that were registered as at 30 June 1990 
was 61 855, while the number of freeholds registered as at 30 June 
' 1990 was 2 676 (Christian Research, Education & Information for 
Democracy (CREID, 1990, p.56). 
Recent developments 
Recent legislative developments include the Free Settlement Areas 
Act of 1989 which allowed the settlement of all race groups on 
certain areas. The Act was not popular, and was rejected by most 
coloured, indian and black leaders, in line with their opposition to the 
Group Areas Act. 
In 1991, both the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration 
Act were scrapped. South Africa is currently in a transitional period 
towards full democracy. 
The Group Areas Act and other apartheid legislation for many years 
cemented and entrenched areas where different race groups should 
live. According to CREID (1990, p68) townships and homeland 
settlements and poverty that accompanied them would not simply 
disappear with the scrapping of apartheid. 
2.4.6 
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Employment 
The ability to afford housing is a function of employment. This section 
examines employment and unemployment. 
Unemployment is not readily measurable or unambiguously definable for 
South Africa because, especially among the black population, many are 
involved in traditional rural economic activities, are underemployed, or are 
involved at a low level of activity in informal, subsistence and other 
peripheral occupations. Statistics of the registered unemployed published 
by the Department of Manpower (SA Labour Statistics, 1989) indicate 
unemployment levels of less than 1% of the economically active 
population. 
Table 2.11 shows unemployment in various industrialised countries and 
South Africa: 
TABLE 2.11 
Unemployment percentage of various industrialised countries, 
1960 - 1990 and South Africa, 1980 - 1990 
UNITED UNITED SOUTH AFRICA YEAR GERMANY JAPAN STATES KINGDOM CPS BF'90 
1960 6,6 1,4 2,2 1,2 
1965 4,5 1,3 0,6 8,8 
1970 4,4 2,2 0,9 1,2 
1975 8,5 4,6 4,0 1,9 
1980 7,4 7,0 3,2 2,0 8,6 31 
1985 7,2 11 ,8 8,2 2,7 8,0 37 
1990 5,4 6,6 7,1 2,3 10,7 43 
In an attempt to obtain a more realistic picture of levels of unemployment, 
a 'Current Population Survey' (CPS) was instituted by South Africa's 
Central Statistical Services (CSSl but this gives numbers which decline 
strongly over time for an unchanged population sample and is based on 
first world definitions of unemployment. For example, the black 
unemployment rate of 8,0% in 1986 shot up to 19,9% when a new 
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population sample was taken. By January 1990 the unemployment level 
registered for this same sample had declined to 10, 7%. Probably the best 
indication of effective employment levels was given in Business Futures 
1990 (SF's 90). This indicated that 41% of the economically active 
population was not involved in the formal economy. This was not to be 
interpreted, however, as a 41% unemployment rate (IFR, 1990, p202). 
According to the note provided by IFR the current population survey (CPS) 
figures were questionable and the figure provided by themselves was a 
better indicator. 
\ 
Unemployment figures were estimated by Dr Chris Garbers (SAIRR 1990, 
p635) of the CSIR to be approximately 35% in May 1990. This figure 
approximates more closely the estimate of Business Futures than that of 
the C.P.S. 
Regarding those employed, table 2.12 shows the percentage employment 
of the economically active population. 
TABLE 2.12 
Percentage of economically active population employed 
YEAR WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS BLACKS TOTAL 
1960 93 97 79 68 76 
1970 94 97 88 69 77 
1980 91 84 89 61 69 
1990 85 73 83 48 57 
Scenarios for 2000: 
Scenario I 85 68 74 36 44 
Scenario II 93 75 93 45 55 
Scenario Ill 92 90 90 78 82 
Source: (IFR, 1990, p214) 
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It was of significance for this study that there was a decline in 
employment for all race groups from 1970 onwards and a much higher 
unemployment rate in the black sector than in any other sector. 
The figures provided in Scenario I were based on an average annual GOP 
rate of 2,0% which was just less than the average growth rate since 
1975. 
Scenario II was based on a growth rate of 3% equating to the average 
rate for 1950-1975. 
I 
Scenario Ill assumed an average GOP rate of 5% from 1990 onwards. 
Sanlam (Sunday Times, 1991, p1) maintained that only one in every 10 
people entering the workforce would be assured of finding a job in the 
formal sector. Edward Osborne of Nedbank (Sunday Times, 1991, p1), 
endorsed these views, believing that an economic growth rate of 7% 
would be required to relieve the structural economic problem. Osborne 
further believed that under the circumstances South Africans could not 
expect a growth rate in excess of 3% in the foreseeable future. 
This meant that Scenarios I and II for the year 2000 would be more likely 
to transpire than Scenario Ill. 
2.4.7 
2.4.7.1 
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Players in the low cost housing market 
Central government 
This discussion deals with the role of central government prior to 
1994, when housing administration differed in terms of race. This 
would be likely to change under a new future government. 
The role of government in low cost housing was essentially to provide 
funds for township development, and subsidies. 
Authorities administering housing for black communities were the 
Department of Planning and Provincial Affairs, the Department of 
\ 
Development Aid, the Provincial Administrations and their Black Local 
Authorities and various governments of the national states and self-
governing territories. Those administering coloured, asian and white 
communities were: the Houses of Assembly, Representatives and 
Delegates; their Departments of Local Government, Housing and 
Works/Agriculture; the Regional Offices of these Departments; and 
the Local Authorities {Urban Foundation, 1990b, p14). 
The african housing budget {outside of the homelands) for the 
Department of Development planning during 1989/90 is shown in 
table 2.13: 
TABLE 2.13 
African housing budget 1989/90 
Construction programmes - addition 
to capital of the National Housing 
Fund 
Less repaid capital 
Less interest earnings 
Sub Total 
Purchase of land for township 
development 
Subsidies on home loans 
Total 
Source: {SAIRR, 1990, p1 03) 
R220 888 000 
{1 0 000 000) 
(10 000 000) 
R200 888 000 
69 000 000 
8 000 000 
R277 888 000 
2.4.7.2 
2.4. 7.3 
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This R278 million compares with R94,9 million for coloured housing 
budgeted by the Department of Local Government, Housing and 
Agriculture, R39,4 million for indian housing budgeted by the 
Department of Local Government, Housing and Agriculture (Indian 
Own Affairs), and R4 7,9 million for white housing budgeted by the 
Department of Local Government, Housing and Works (White 
housing) (SAIRR, 1990, p1 05). 
A first time home buyers subsidy was available to people who had not 
previously purchased a dwelling. To qualify for the subsidy, the 
house and land was not to cost more that R65 000 and the house 
I 
itself, not more than R45 000. Household income should not have 
exceeded R3 200 per month. The subsidy was paid over a period of 
seven years on a reducing scale and amounted to one-third of interest 
in the first year (CREID, 1990, p69.) 
Regional Services Councils 
The task of regional services councils (RSC's) lay not in the provision 
of housing, but in the provision of infrastructure and services, mainly 
in the black areas (SAIRR, 1990, p1 05.) 
The South African Housing Trust 
The Trust commenced operations in 1987 with an interest free loan 
of R400 million from the Government. A further R300 million was 
invested by business. The funds were used in the purchase of land, 
the building of low cost houses, and the provision of serviced sites. 
The Trust prepared serviced sites at a cost of around R5 000 -
R6 000 per site, and houses for between R15 000 and R16 000 
(CREID, 1990, p68.) 
2.4. 7.4 
2.4.7.5 
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Urban Foundation 
The Urban Foundation was founded in 1977 by a group of 
businessmen whose aim it was to improve the standard of living in 
the black townships, with particular regard to education and housing. 
The Urban Foundation's involvement in housing lies primarily the 
provision of low cost housing and serviced stands. 
In 1989 the Urban Foundation launched a R20 million loan guarantee 
fund. The purpose of the fund was to encourage financial institutions 
to provide financing for housing in the R 12 500 to R35 000 range. 
R8 million was raised from the Swiss, German and British 
governments and the remaining R 12 million from several overseas and 
local companies. The fund insured institutions against certain losses 
they might suffer as a result of payment defaults, while a sum of R3 
billion was committed over three years by financial institutions for 
houses in the R 12 500 to R35 000 category (CREID, 1990, p76.) 
Participating home loan institutions here are Allied, Eastern Province, 
First National, Natal, Nedcor, Provincial, Saambou, Santam, Standard, 
United and Volkskas. 
Banks 
Provision of financing for low cost housing by the private sector has 
been effected through the loan guarantee scheme as discussed 
above. 
Prior to the introduction of the scheme, banks were generally 
unwilling to provide financing of less than R35 000 per house. The 
reasons for this lay partly in the cost considerations and perceptions 
of the high risk involved. Banks' overheads on small loans are 
comparatively higher than those on large loans, while the perception 
of risk has been from a political rather than a commercial point of 
view (Martin, 1989b, p11.) 
The loan guarantee fund addressed both these issues. Concerning 
costs, changes to the Usury Act allow fees to be charged on certain 
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loans. These fees include initiation, valuation and administration fees. 
In addition, debentures may be issued against 5% of these 
outstanding loans to replace reserve requirements. 
As far as risk is concerned, the exposure is reduced in terms of 
guarantees provided. The scheme allows for 15% deposit 
replacement and 1 5% risk reduction cover. 
- 35 -
2.5 TYPES OF LENDING INSTRUMENTS 
2.5.1 Common Lending Instruments 
2.5.2 
2.5.3 
The most common lending instrument is a variable interest rate mortgage 
over 20 to 30 years. Certain institutions have also offered fixed rate 
mortgages over limited periods. 
Progressive annuities 
This is a type of mortgage instrument which has been used in other parts 
of the world, but is not in use in South Africa. In the case of progressive 
annuities, initial repayments are lower than is the case with conventional 
mortgages. The instalments gradually increase over the years and in later 
' years are higher than those of conventional mortgages. (Martin, 1 990b, 
p28.) 
Salary-linked home loan 
The Perm ( 1990) envisaged a new lending instrument- the Perm ( 1991, 
p24) salary-linked home loan would access funds from pension and 
provident funds and the life insurance industry. In terms of this 
instrument funds for housing would be provided via the life funds, with 
the bank acting merely in an administrative capacity, compensated by fee 
income. Repayments of such a loan would be determined as a percentage 
of the borrower's income. This loan-type has a number of advantages: 
• repayments are linked to salary alone and hence freed from interest 
rates- this frees the borrower from fluctuating repayments and hence 
reduces risk to the lender 
• loans up to 100% may be accommodated as the borrower's pension 
fund withdrawal rights will be used as collateral security - this does, 
however, place the borrower's pension at risk in the event of default 
• the mechanism more than doubles the loan size for which the 
borrower may qualify (it allows the borrower to pay 42 x monthly 
salary, as opposed to around 1 7 x under a conventional loan) 
• it frees up life funds for investment in housing 
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• repayments may start well below the conventional home loan 
(approximately 17% as compared to the usual 25% on a conventional 
loan) 
• it has a benefit to the bank in that the risk is borne by the 
pension/provident fund and not the bank. 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Major changes have occurred in the home loan market since the latter 1 980s. 
More competition arose (see section 2.2) and new markets were entered (see 
' 
section 2.4). Sales in execution and properties in possession increased 
considerably (see section 2.3). 
This chapter has also shown that the main housing need lies in the black 
sector with a large demand for low cost housing (see section 2.4.2). Most 
financial institutions have been unwilling to lend in this sector because of 
increased costs and perceived risks (see section 2.4. 7 .5). The Urban 
Foundation Loan Guarantee Scheme has contributed towards addressing the 
risks and costs associated with this type of lending (see section 2.4.7.4). If, 
however, the housing needs in South Africa are to be met, the extent of 
lending on low cost housing needs to be substantially increased. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter: 
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CHAPTER 3 
Risk and reward 
• discusses previous research that has been undertaken in respect of risk 
measurement and the relationship between risk and reward 
• discusses the relevance and adequacy of previous research in respect of 
home loans 
• identifies findings, concepts or models that may be of assistance in the 
development of a home loan risk-measurement model. 
In this regard the chapter will deal with three broad areas: 
• provide definitions of risk and the related concepts of uncertainty and 
probability 
• identify the types of risk referred to in the literature that affect banks 
• discuss ways of assessing and managing risk, including the risk/return 
relationship. 
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3.2 DEFINITIONS: RISK. UNCERTAINTY AND PROBABILITY 
3.2.1 Risk 
3.2.2 
3.2.3 
A number of definitions of risk occur in the relevant literature - for 
example: 
• Collins dictionary ( 1 98 6) defines risk as "the possibility of incurring 
a misfortune or loss", and 
• Henning, Pigott and Scott (1988, p476) refer to risk as "the fact that 
the outcome of an action may vary". 
Uncertainty 
' The literature also distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. According 
to Correia et al. ( 1989, p64). 'uncertainty implies either that all the 
alternative possible outcomes cannot be identified or that no probability 
can be attached to the alternative possible outcomes. Risk implies that 
it is possible to attach probabilities to identified expected outcomes'. 
The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers ( 1 98 7, p606) hold that 
'whereas risk is the probability that foreseen events will not occur, 
uncertainty is the probability that unforeseen events will occur'. 
Albers ( 1974, p37) says that 'risk exists when an action leads to one of 
a set of possible outcomes, each outcome occurring with a known 
probability. Uncertainty prevails if the probabilities of possible outcomes 
are completely unknown or are not even meaningful'. 
Probability 
Probability is defined by Redlinghuys, Julyan, Steyn & Benade ( 1989, 
p62) and by Brigham and Gapenski (1988, p171) as the chance that a 
certain outcome will occur. 
3.2.4 
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Brigham and Gapenski (1988, p171) set up the following example of a 
probability distribution for a weather forecast: 
Outcome Probability 
Rain 0,4 = 40% 
No rain 0,6 = 60% 
1,0 = 100% 
Probabilities must always add up to 1 ,0 or 100%. 
Summary of definitions 
In general risk refers to the fact that the actual outcome of an event or 
situation may differ from the expected outcome thereof. Risk differs from 
uncertainty in that risk exists when the outcome has a known probability 
and uncertainty exists when the probability is unknown. 
Probability is the chance that a certain outcome will occur. 
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3.3 TYPES OF RISK 
A number of different types of risk are discussed in the literature. Some of 
the risks referred to are very general in nature or are specific to shares traded 
on stock exchanges. This section will refer to those risks which have been 
identified as being specific to financial institutions. The following risks are 
accordingly identified: 
• interest rate risk 
this stems from assets or liabilities maturing (or being repriced) at 
different times (United Building Society, 1989, p37). Earnings may be 
substantially reduced if a bank with fixed interest assets encounters a 
' sharp rise in short term borrowing costs, commonly known as 
"mismatching the book" (Meek, 1989, p4) 
• liquidity risk 
the risk of not being able to generate sufficient cash to pay off financial 
commitments (Finansbank, 1989, p78) 
• currency risk 
the risk of the relative values of currencies changing detrimentally (Meek, 
1989, p4) 
• investment risk 
changes in interest rates or values of investments (Meek, 1989, p4) 
• capital risk 
the risk of an institution's own capital reserves (i.e. total shareholders' 
interest) being adversely affected by unfavourable external developments 
(Volkskas Merchant Bank, 1989, p49l 
• settlement risk 
the risk that arises at the time of liquidation of an asset when a bank pays 
out funds before it can be certain it will receive the proceeds from the 
counterpart (Bank of International Settlements, 1989, p 164) 
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• country and transfer risk 
the risk that all or most economic agents (including the government) in 
a particular country (country risk) will for some reason become unable to 
fulfil international financial obligations. More specifically, it is the risk that 
a given country will find itself unable or unwilling to service international 
financial obligations because of an overall shortage of foreign exchange 
(transfer risk) (Bank for International Settlements, 1989, p164) 
• political risk 
this refers to the political stability of the country involved (Senbank, 
1989, p207) 
• force majeure risk 
this includes risk of storm and fire damage or earthquakes and is usually 
covered by insurance (Senbank, 1989, p207). This is particularly relevant 
to the home loan industry where the debt is secured by a fixed property 
• credit risk 
Meek (1989, p4) defines credit risk as the risk of the borrower being 
unable to repay his loans. Henning et al. ( 1988, p4 77) refers to this type 
of risk as default risk and defines it as the failure to meet the terms of the 
particular agreement. To default on a bond is to fail to pay the interest 
when due or to fail to pay the full amount of the principal at maturity. 
Ned bank ( 1 989, p 1 8) refers to credit risk as the risk of a debtor failing to 
meet punctually the financial commitments stemming from a credit agreement 
- i.e. he must be able to service the interest and be in a position to repay the 
capital when it falls due. 
Generally, therefore, credit risk is concerned with the borrower timeously 
meeting financial commitment in terms of interest and capital, and it is this 
risk that is of primary importance to this study. 
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3.4 MANAGEMENT OF RISK 
3.4.1 
This study relates specifically to home loans and was accordingly directed at 
the risks involved in home loan transactions, and the management of the 
home loan portfolio. The risks relevant to this study were, accordingly, those 
affecting the ability of the client to make home loan repayments, and those 
affecting the property against which the home loan might be secured. These 
risks fall mainly under the umbrella of credit risk. 
The assessment and management of each of the risks identified in section 3.3 
is dealt with in detail by many writers and researchers and it was, in the 
I 
nature of things, not within the scope of this study to discuss the 
management of all of the identified risks. 
The study included research relating to the following aspects of risk 
management: 
• adequate "up front" assessment of the client, i.e. credit risk assessment 
• management of the risk-return relationship including risk and return 
measurement, diversification and portfolio management. 
Credit risk assessment 
Nedbank (1989, p20) provide comprehensive guidelines on the 
assessment of credit risk - this section accordingly summarises these 
guidelines. 
Guidelines are provided concerning individual borrowers, corporate 
borrowers and borrowers in the foreign sector. 
It is necessary to consider individuals and corporate bodies since home 
loans may be given in the names of individuals, corporate bodies, or to 
individuals whose incomes depend on the performance of corporate 
bodies. Foreign sector credit assessment is beyond the scope of the 
study. 
3.4.1.1 
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Credit risk assessment in the personal sector 
Bank credit is offered in a number of different guises, including 
mortgage finance, lease or suspensive sales finance, instalment sale 
finance, and personal loans. 
Whatever the type of financing, or the use to which it is put, the 
critical question from the bank's point of view is whether the 
individual will timeously meet his financial obligations. 
In assessing the individual's financial position, it is usual to consider 
what are traditionally known as the "five Cs". These are: 
I 
• character of the individual 
reliability, sincerity, trustworthiness, honesty, past credit history 
• capital 
the net worth of the applicant; the personal stake the applicant 
has in the venture (in the case of a home loan this would refer to 
the individual's deposit) 
• capacity 
the amount of the borrower's income that can be committed to 
the servicing of repayments; security of employment; spouse 
income; the bank must ensure the individual is not 
overcommitting himself 
• conditions 
the business and economic conditions of the applicant's 
environment; the possibility of his being retrenched; the 
condition of the asset purchased; cyclicality of the property 
market; and the terms, conditions and pricing of the credit 
facility 
• collateral 
provision by the prospective borrower of security such as fixed 
property or life insurance benefits; the assessment of supporting 
3.4.1.2 
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security documentation; and the margin between the fluctuating 
market price of security and its price under a forced sale. 
The final assessment of the credit risk is done by a credit officer of 
the bank who must make his own subjective judgement based on 
years of experience and on assessment of the above factors. 
Credit risk assessment in the corporate sector 
The credit risk assessment of a business may incorporate criteria 
similar to the 5 C's, but should also take into account the additional 
risks faced by businesses. This may be achieved via: 
• sectoral research 
industry's dependence on imports, exports, consumption 
expenditure, fixed investments; impact on industry of changing 
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of government; 
effect of scarcity of raw materials; dependence on technological 
developments; monopolistic powers in the industry; industry risk 
of strikes and labour problems 
• financial analysis 
this would based on the analysis of 3 - 5 years of audited 
financial statements 
It is not within the scope of this study to detail the methods of 
financial statement analysis and the financial ratios to be used. 
It is sufficient to say that the assessment must take account of 
asset structure; funding structure; solvency and liquidity 
structure; profitability structure; trading activity structure; 
composition and distribution of profits 
• stock market analysis 
it is necessary to consider how investors on a stock exchange 
evaluate the company if listed 
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• cash flow projection 
a projection of cash flow for at least one year or the duration of 
the project (this is important in home loans involving property still 
to be built) 
• management 
the quality , expertise and honesty of management. 
It is important for individuals and corporates, for home loans or 
any other type of finance, to assess both the client and the 
security. A bad loan will not be turned into a good one by taking 
' security. Security is taken against the improbable event that it 
will be needed to effect repayment of the debt. Collateral 
provides insurance for the bank, which will always hope that the 
security will not have to be called on. 
In the case of home loans, it is not beneficial to the client or to 
the bank for a property to be repossessed. A bank is not a 
property broker and there is the real risk that the sale of a 
repossessed asset might result in the realisation of a loss for the 
bank. 
Repossession also involves legal and administrative costs for the 
bank. There would also be a "holding" cost to the bank in that 
no current return would be generated on these repossessed 
assets. A capital loss would result for the bank when market 
value or sale price of the asset is below the debtor's outstanding 
debt. Although the borrower is liable for these costs, borrowers 
are very often unable to meet them and a loss is consequently 
incurred by the bank. 
3.4.2 
3.4.2.1 
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Risk and return 
The literature researched suggests that there is a need for banks to 
diversify their risk. 
Nedbank (1989, p35) have reported that in general, banks follow the 
actuarial principle of risk diversification in establishing lending criteria. 
Their aim, therefore, ought to be to spread the risk over a wide spectrum 
of population groups (e.g. income, cultural, language), areas (countries, 
provinces, towns), products (consumers, producers), purposes 
(balance of payments, project financing) and achieve an even spread of 
the debt over time (balancing short- and long-term credit). 
However, the literature survey did not reveal any guidelines or models on 
the diversification, measurement, or risl</return relationship regarding 
home loan credit risk. 
Much of the literature regarding risk measurement, diversification, or risk-
return measurement relates specifically to investments in portfolios of 
shares listed on the stock exchanges. It is nevertheless useful to analyse 
this literature because the investment models described therein provide 
certain concepts to form a basis on which to develop the home loan risk 
measurement model (chapter 5). 
Expected rate of return from an investment 
The expected rate of return from an investment is obtained by 
multiplying each possible outcome of return by the probability of that 
outcome occurring and obtaining a weighted average of the 
outcomes. The following example and discussion is provided by 
Correia et al. ( 1989, p63-91), where returns are given for different 
states of the economy: 
3.4.2.2 
( 1) 
State of the 
economy 
Super boom 
Boom 
Normal 
Recession 
Severe recession 
Risk measurement 
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(2) (3) 
Probability of this Return 
state occurring R 
0,10 (10%) 0,50 (50%) 
0,20 (20%) 0,35 (35%1 
0,45 (45%) 0,20 {20%1 
0,15 {15%) 0,10(10%) 
0,10(10%) -0,05 (-5%) 
Re = expected return = 
Expected return = 22% 
(2)x(3) 
0,050 
0,070 
0,090 
0,015 
-0,005 
0,220 
From the definition of risk (section 3.2) given in chapter 3 it may be 
seen that risk is the difference between the expected outcome and 
actual outcome. Commonly-used statistics for measuring the 
magnitude of this difference are the variance, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation. 
Variance is calculated as follows: 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (41 
State of the Probability Deviation Deviation Variance 
economy Squared 
p (R-Re) {R-Re)x(R-Re) (1 )x{3) 
Super boom 0,10 0,28 0,0784 0,00784 
Boom 0,20 0,13 0,0169 0,00338 
Normal 0,45 -0,02 0,0004 0,00018 
Recession 0,15 -0,12 0,0144 0,00216 
Severe recession 0,10 -0,27 0,0729 0,00729 
Variance = 0,02085 
Standard deviation is simply the square root of the variance. 
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Standard deviation and variance represent a weighted average of 
possible deviations from the expected value, thereby giving an idea 
of how far above or below the expected value the actual value is 
likely to be. The larger the variance and standard deviation, the 
greater the degree of risk. 
The coefficient of variation shows the risk per unit of return, and 
provides a more meaningful basis for comparison when the expected 
returns on two alternative investment proposals are not the same 
CV = standard deviation 
expected return 
= 0,144 
0,22 
= 0,656 
This statistic indicates that the standard deviation is 65,6% of the 
expected return. 
Once the expected return and the risk have been determined, a 
general rule known as the mean-variance rule becomes apparent. 
The rule holds that investment A will always be preferable to 
investment B providing that one of the following two conditions exist: 
either the mean expected variance of A is equal to or less than that 
of B, or the mean expected return on A exceeds or is equal to the 
expected returns on B and the variance of B is greater than that of A. 
This is shown graphically in figure 3.1: 
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FIGURE 3.1 
The mean-variance rule 
Expected return % 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ ~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
X : ·------------------------------------------------------~-------------------------~ )( 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
•z I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
04-----------------~--------------~~----------------~--------
0 10 20 
Variance% 
30 
Source: (Correia et al., 1989, p70) 
In terms of the diagram 
Investments W and X are always preferred to investments Y and Z 
respectively as they offer superior returns for the same risk in each 
case 
Investment X is superior to investment Y because it offers the same 
expected return but is subject to less risk. 
The results of the example may be summarised by means of a normal 
distribution curve as in figure 3.2. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
Continuous probability of rates of return: normal distribution 
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----r <4 ...... ___, __ ...,. __ 99 7% --+----+---+ 
-40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 
Rate of return 
Std. deviation -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Source: (Correia et al., 1989, p73) 
3.4.2.3 
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The curve peaks at 22%, the expected rate of return. There is 
therefore the highest likelihood that a return of 22% will be achieved. 
There is a 68,3% chance that the return will be between -1 std. 
deviation and + 1 std. deviation. Because the standard deviation has 
been calculated to 14,4%, this means that there is a 68,3% chance 
that the expected return will be between 7,6% (22% - 14,4%) and 
36,4% (22% + 14,4%). Conversely there is a 31,7% chance that 
the return will be outside this range. As risk is the probability that the 
outcome will be worse than expected, the chance of the return being 
below 7,6% is only half of 31,7%, that is 15,85%. 
There is a 95,5% chance that the actual return will fall between + 2 
std. deviations and -2 std. deviations that is, between 50,8% and-
6,8%. Looking at the adverse side of the risk, we can say that there 
is 2,25% chance, half (1 00-95,5%), that the actual return will be 
below -6,8%. Similar numbers can be generated for the range -3 std. 
deviations to + 3 std. deviations. 
Multiple Assets 
The above analysis is restricted to one asset only. 
When more than one asset is introduced into a portfolio, the expected 
return will simply be the weighted average of expected return of the 
individual assets in the portfolio. 
However, when introducing more than one asset into a portfolio, the 
calculation of risk becomes more complex. Not only does account 
have to be taken of individual returns, but also of the relationships 
between returns. A portfolio's risk will be smaller than the weighted 
average of its shares because variations in the shares' returns will 
offset one another to some degree. This is illustrated in figures 3.3 
and 3.4. 
FIGURE 3.3 
Returns in near perfect unison 
Return 
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FIGURE 3.4 
Near-perfect negative correlation 
60,----------------------------. Return 60~---------------------------. 
10 10 
- P - Portfolio PQ - - Q -p -Porlfollo PQ ·- Q 
oL---------------------------~ oL---------------------------~ 
Time Time 
Source: (Correia et al., 1989, p78) Source: (Correia et al., 1989, p79) 
The measurement of movement between variables is called the 
correlation coefficient. The returns in figure 3.3 are positively 
correlated and in figure 3.4 are negatively correlated. 
By allocating funds to more than one investment, risk may be 
reduced. This process is known as diversification. 
The risk of a multishare portfolio is complex to calculate and it is not 
the intention of this study to explain these calculations. Suffice is to 
say that for each share held, its variance (weighted by the square of 
the proportion invested in that share), plus its covariance with every 
other share in the portfolio (weighted by the product of the 
proportions invested) has to be calculated. 
The "best" combinations of risk and yields (i.e. the highest returns 
with given degrees of risk) were termed by Markowitz to be the 
"efficient frontier". 
Exactly where on the efficient frontier an investor will be positioned 
will depend on the risk-averseness of the individual investor. 
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An investor who is extremely risk averse may opt for lower risk and 
lower returns. An investor who is risk indifferent may opt for higher 
risk and higher returns. 
The combination of assets selected by an investor in terms of his risk 
aversity has been termed the utility function. 
The work of Markowitz was supplemented by that of Sharpe and is 
commonly known as modern portfolio theory. Sharpe introduced the 
concept of a risk free asset together with the assumption that 
investors may borrow and lend at the risk free rate. 
Sharpe also devised a measure which reflects the sensitivity of an 
individual share to fluctuations in the market, thus measuring the 
shares non-diversifiable risk. This measure is known as beta. 
Beta is represented by the term b in the straight line equation y = a 
+ bx. It is the measurement of the slope of a line representing 
returns on an individual share when comparing it to returns of the 
share market as a whole. This is illustrated in figure 3.5. 
FIGURE 3.5 
Graphic representation of beta 
Return on Share Beta•1 
Return on Market 
Source: (Correia et al., 1989, p92) 
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The beta of a portfolio of shares is simply the weighted average of 
the individual share betas. 
Investors will manage their portfolios by selecting a portfolio which 
has a beta which provides them with maximum utility. As beta is a 
linear concept it is possible to graph a security market line (SML) 
which is used for displaying the risk-return relationship for individual 
shares. The formula for SML is 
Ri = Rf + Pi (Rm - Rf) 
where: 
' Ri = The required return on share i 
Rf = The risk free rate 
Pi = The beta of share i 
Rm = The return on the market as a whole 
This is illustrated in figure 3.6 
FIGURE 3.6 
The security market line 
Expected Return 
Risk 
Source: (Correia et al.. 1989, p94) 
Beta i 
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The expected returns of all shares fall on the SML. This pricing model 
is known as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Any share that 
does not plot along the SML is either underpriced or overpriced, thus 
requiring a price adjustment to restore its price to equilibrium. 
Much research has been done on market efficiency and a body of 
theory known as the efficient market hypothesis has evolved over 
time. This, however, does not have real relevance for this study and 
will not be expanded upon. 
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3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The literature reveals little regarding risk measurement and risk-return 
relationships as these relate to credit risk, particularly regarding home loans, 
and more specifically to the South African situation. 
In terms of credit risk, the literature was restricted to client assessment (see 
section 3.4.1) and did not extend in any comprehensive degree to portfolio 
and risk-return management. 
Discussion of risk-measurement and risk-return management was essentially 
' related to share investments on a stock exchange (see section 3.4.2). These 
discussions do, however, provide certain valuable concepts and models which 
are used as a starting base (in chapter 5 of this study) to develop a home loan 
model aimed at risk measurement and the management of the risk-return 
relationship. 
The lack of any existing model relating to the measurement and management 
of home loan risk in the South African situation implies that the development 
of any such model will be an original concept. 
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PART Ill 
EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
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CHAPTER 4 
The survey questionnaire 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the questionnaire survey undertaken among banks was 
twofold: 
i) to test the research hypotheses, namely: 
hypothesis 1 - home loan business was more risky in September 1991 
I 
that it was 5 years prior to September 1991 
hypothesis·2 -lending in black areas was more risky than lending in white 
areas 
hypothesis 3 - banks did not use a model to measure home loan risk for 
the purpose of pricing loans 
hypothesis 4 - banks would value a model that allowed the measurement 
of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans; 
ii) to gain information which may be valuable in the development of the 
model. 
This chapter deals with: 
i) definition of the population 
ii) sample selection 
iii) questionnaire design 
iv) method of data analysis 
v) presentation of results 
vi) conclusions drawn from the results. 
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4.2 METHODOLOGY 
4.2. 1 Definition of the population 
4.2.2 
4.2.3 
4.2.3.1 
The population was all the home loan mortgage lending banks in South 
Africa. Thirteen such banks were identified at the time of the survey: 
- Standard 
- First National 
- Nedcor (including Nedbank and Perm) 
-Trust 
-Allied 
- United 
- Kayelethu Home Loans 
- Natal 
- Saambou 
- Volkskas 
- Grahamstown 
- Eastern Province 
- Provincial 
Sample selection 
To ensure as large a sample as possible, each of these thirteen institutions 
were sent a questionnaire. 
Questionnaire design 
Overall structure 
A copy of the questionnaire appears as Appendix 4. The 
questionnaire comprised two major categories of questions: 
i) questions aimed at testing the hypotheses, and 
ii) questions aimed at obtaining information that might assist in the 
development of the model. 
The questionnaire was divided into 5 sections: 
Section 1 - comprised questions related to changes in risk over the 
past five years and designed to test hypothesis 1. 
4.2.3.2 
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Section 2 - comprised questions related to risk in the black market 
and designed to test hypothesis 2. 
Section 3 - comprised questions relating to risk measurement and 
pricing and designed to test hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Section 4 - comprised questions related to bad debt procedures, the 
purpose of which was to gain an insight into the method of handling 
bad debts and repossessions by banks and which might assist in the 
development of the model. 
Section 5 - This section invited financial institutions to provide any 
comment on home loan risk not specifically included in sections 1 to 
4. 
Types of questions used 
The nature of the questions used in the questionnaire were: 
• open ended questions 
• structured questions, and 
• screening questions. 
Open ended questions 
The open ended questions allowed respondents a certain amount 
of freedom. Such questions are used where a wide range of 
replies is expected, responses are likely to be detailed and it is 
not wished to limit the range, or all possible responses are not 
known. The majority of open ended questions in the 
questionnaire were used to probe (e.g. "Please provide reasons 
for your answer to the previous question") or to ensure that all 
relevant aspects of the topic were covered (each section 
concluded with an open-ended question allowing the respondent 
to provide general comment about any aspect related to the topic 
not covered by the questions). 
4.2.3.3 
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Structured or closed ended questions 
Structured or closed ended questions are used to offer a list of 
acceptable answers from which respondents may choose. Three 
types of structured questions were used in the questionnaire: 
i) Dichotomous questions - two alternatives were offered, 
generally "yes/no" or "agree/disagree" 
ii) Multiple choice questions - in which more than one 
alternative was offered 
iii) Scaled questions - respondents were asked to provide an 
opinion on a 5 point scale, e.g. in response to questions 
regarding risk, the alternatives were that risk was "much 
more", "more", "similar", "less" or "much less". A major 
advantage of structured questions is that they offer ease of 
coding and analysing. The five point scales used in this 
study were -2, -1, 0, + 1, + 2, where -2 indicated strong 
negative support (much less) and + 2 strong positive support 
(much more). This allowed statistical analysis of the data. 
Screening questions 
Screening questions were used where relevancy depended on the 
respondent's answer to a previous question, e.g. "If you 
answered 'yes' to question 1 then ..... " 
Section 1 
Questions in this section were designed to test hypothesis 1, i.e., 
that home loan business is more risky than it was 5 years ago. 
The following topics were covered: 
i) perceptions of changes in risk - this included a five point rating 
scale to determine the magnitude of changes, and open ended 
questions to clarify responses 
ii) perceptions of changes in competition -a five point rating scale 
was used to determine the magnitude of change 
4.2.3.4 
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iii) changes in lending criteria - this included: 
- dichotomous scales requiring agreement/disagreement with 
statements in respect of percentage loans, repayments-to-income 
and general lending criteria 
- structured multiple choice questions to evaluate current 
percentage loans and repayments-to-income as compared to 5 
years ago 
- open ended questions to discover reasons for changes and 
circumstances under which criteria might be exceeded 
ivl changes in arrears, sales in execution, properties in possession 
• 
and provisions -this included a five point rating scale to evaluate 
the magnitude of changes and an open ended question to 
ascertain reasons for increases 
vl general comment regarding changes in risk - an open ended 
question. 
Section 2 
Questions in this section were designed to test hypothesis 2, i.e. that 
lending in black areas is more risky than lending in white areas. 
The following topics were covered: 
i) perception of differences in risk - included were a dichotomous 
scale to test whether risks are different, a five point rating scale 
to determine the magnitude of difference and open ended 
questions to determine reasons for perceived differences 
iil level of lending in the black market- this included an open ended 
question to determine percentage lending in the black market, 
five point rating scales to determine the magnitude of changes in 
past and proposed levels of lending, and open ended questions to 
discover reasons for changes in lending to this market 
4.2.3.5 
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iii) comparison of arrears, sales in execution and properties in 
possession to the white market - the magnitude of differences 
was measured in terms of five point scales 
iv) effectiveness of home loan guarantee scheme - a dichotomous 
scale, "yes/no", was used to determine if the scheme was 
effective and an open ended question to determine reasons for 
answers 
v) general comments on the black market - open ended questions 
were used to 
I 
a) ascertain risk factors needing to be addressed to encourage 
greater participation in the black market 
b) give suggestions for encouraging greater participation in the 
black market 
c) provide general comment on the black market. 
Section 3 
Hypothesis 3, i.e. that banks do not use a model to measure home 
loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans was tested in terms of a 
dichotomous "yes/no" question. 
Details of any models used were requested in terms of an open ended 
question and perceived effectiveness of any models used was tested 
in terms of a dichotomous "yes/no" question. 
Supporting information in terms of current rate differentiation and use 
of client/area and other measurement scales was requested using a 
variety of question types. 
Hypothesis 4, i.e., that banks would value a model which allowed 
measurement of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans was 
tested using two direct dichotomous "yes/no" questions. The first 
question related to the perceived value of a flexible, standardised risk-
measurement model and the second related to the perceived value of 
a flexible, standardised pricing model. 
4.2.3.6 
4.2.3.7 
4.2.4 
4.2.5 
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General comment relating to risk measurement and pricing was 
invited in terms of open ended questions. 
Section 4 
The purpose of this section was to obtain any additional information 
that might be of value in the development of the model. 
A variety of questions was asked relating to procedures in terms of 
bad debts, provision formulation, legal action, treatment of interest 
and properties in possession. 
Section 5 
This was an open ended question which invited respondents to 
provide any additional comment they would like to make regarding 
home loan risk or return that was not incorporated elsewhere in the 
questionnaire. 
Questionnaire responses 
Seven banks responded to the questionnaire. They represented 54% of 
mortgage lending institutions by number and 70% in terms of value of 
mortgage balances. 
All banks who did not respond were followed up and asked again to 
consider participating in the study due to the obvious benefits of the 
study for the industry. This resulted in the original five responses being 
increased to seven. 
Two institutions gave confidentiality of information as the reason for non-
response and the remaining non-respondents would not furnish any 
reasons. 
Method of data analysis 
The questionnaire contained questions that are not numerically measurable 
(qualitative) as well as questions which can be numerically evaluated 
(quantitative). 
4.2.5.1 
4.2.5.2 
4.2.5.2.1 
4.2.5.2.1.1 
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Qualitative questions 
This category consisted mainly of multiple choice or open ended 
questions which could not be numerically evaluated. These were not 
subjected to statistical tests. Responses were summarised and 
similar responses grouped together. For example, if two financial 
institutions believed that political instability was a major risk factor 
and one institution believed that affordability was a major risk factor 
the responses were summarised as: 
Major risk factors 
Political instability 
Afford ability 
No of respondents 
(2) 
( 1 ) 
Responses were not used to test hypotheses statistically but to lend 
support to any conclusions made or to provide direction in the 
formulation of the model. 
Quantitative questions 
Responses were analysed using a specially constructed Ouattro-Pro 
package. The data input in terms of the package is contained in 
Appendix 5. 
Measurement scales 
Five point rating scale 
Responses in terms of the five point rating scale were coded 
on a scale of -2 to + 2. For example, question 1.1 which 
asked respondents to give their perceptions of changes in 
risk over the previous five years was coded as follows: 
much less risky -2 
less risky -1 
of similar risk 0 
more risky +1 
much more risky +2 
4.2.5.2.1.2 
4.2.5.2.2 
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Dichotomous scales 
"Yes/no" and "agree/disagree" choices were coded as 
follows: 
Yes or agree: 
No or disagree: 2. 
Descriptive statistics 
Types of descriptive statistics used for the 5 point rating scales 
were: 
i) frequencies and percentages - the number of times each 
value occurred was counted and the corresponding 
' percentage for each frequency was computed. These figures 
were used to give a measure of the relative size of each 
category. 
ii) Measures of central tendency - three measures were 
computed for the 5 point scales: mean, median and mode. 
Mean: to show the arithmetic average of the scores 
median: to obtain the score dividing the distribution into 
halves; (for example the median in the distribution 1, 5, 7, 
11, 20 is 7 as it is the score with an equal number of 
responses on each side) 
mode: to determine the most frequently occurring score. 
iii) Measures of variability 
These were only computed for the 5 point scales. Dispersion 
about the mean was measured in terms of the range, the 
standard deviation and the variance. The range is considered 
in most literature as being simplistic as it only takes the 
extreme values into account, ignoring the dispersion of 
values between them. For this reason analysis of dispersion 
in this study placed far greater reliance on the variance and 
standard deviation as they take all values and their relation to 
the central value into account. 
4.2.5.2.3 
4.2.5.2.3.1 
4.2.5.2.3.2 
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Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis testing is a systematic method of decision making 
based on sample results. This study used procedures and tests 
outlined by Ben-Horim and Levy ( 1984, p349-391 ). 
Establishing the decision rule 
This involved the establishment of two mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive sets. 
Five point rating scales: A mean of zero divided the sets. 
For example, in question 1.1 the decision rule was to accept 
the claim that risk had increased over the past 5 years if the 
mean of the results was greater than 0 (where the scale used 
is -2 = much less risky; -1 = less risky; 0 = of similar risk; 
1 = more risky and 2 = much more risky) and to reject the 
claim if the mean was not greater than 0. 
Dichotomous "yes/no", "agree/disagree" scale: the decision 
rule was to accept the claim if more than 50% of responses 
supported the claim and to reject the claim if not more than 
50% of responses supported the claim. 
The null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis 
The stand was taken that the claim made was "disbelieved" 
unless otherwise substantiated. Two distinct hypotheses 
were formulated, with an initial stand taken favouring the null 
hypothesis. The null hypothesis (H 0 ) for question 1 . 1 stated 
that the home loan business was not more risky than 5 years 
ago. The alternative hypothesis (H 1 ) stated that the home 
loan business was more risky than 5 years ago. 
Null hypothesis: mean was less than or equal to zero 
(H 0 :JJS0) 
alternative hypothesis: mean was greater than zero 
(H 1 : JJ>O). 
4.2.5.2.3.3 
4.2.5.2.3.4 
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The null hypothesis would be accepted unless the test 
substantiated a mean greater than zero. 
Level of significance 
Levels of significance (a) identified the probability of rejecting 
the null hypothesis when, in fact, it was true. A significance 
level of 0,05 (a = 0.05) meant that there was a 5% 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact it 
was true. A significance level of 0,1 (a = 0.1) meant that 
there was a 10% probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when in fact it was true. 
Due to the fact that the questionnaire was only being used 
in relation to secondary objectives (the primary objective 
being the development of the model), the level of significance 
was set at the 0,1 level. 
When doing significance testing, a critical value was obtained 
off a set of statistical tables for the level of significance 
required. The test described in the following two sections 
resulted in a test statistic. The claim might be accepted if the 
test statistic exceeded the critical value at the 0.1 level of 
significance. 
Types of tests used 
The following tests (described in section 4.2.5.2.3.5) were 
used to analyse the questionnaire responses: 
-a test for equal proportions was applied to the responses of 
the dichotomous "yes/no", "agree/disagree" questions 
- a one-sided t test was applied for the mean of 5 point 
ratings 
4.2.5.2.3.5 
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- a chi-square test was applied for the independence of 
variables in contingency tables relating to the dichotomous 
"yes/no", "agree/disagree" questions 
- a t test was applied to test hypotheses concerning the 
difference between the means of five point scales. 
Description of tests 
It is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed 
description of the type of tests used. A brief description is 
given together with references where more detailed 
descriptions may be found in' Ben-Horim and Levy ( 1984). 
Test for equal proportions 
A test for equal proportions tests for proportionate 
differences between different sets of responses. 
For example, if it was predicted that more than 50% of 
respondents would answer "yes" to a question asking 
whether risk in black areas is higher than risk in white areas, 
and less than 50% would answer "no", then was a "yes" 
response of 55% significant enough to accept the prediction? 
The null hypothesis stated that the number of respondents 
answering "yes" was less than or equal to 50%, the 
alternative hypothesis stated that the number of respondents 
answering "yes" was greater than 50%. The null hypothesis 
would be rejected only if the test substantiated a "yes" 
proportion of greater than 50%. The test is described in 
greater depth in Ben-Horim and Levy (1984, p376-378). 
t test 
A one sided t test is used to test whether the mean of a 
distribution is greater than or smaller than a predetermined 
number. For example, if it was hypothesized that home loan 
risk had increased over the past 5 years and the five point 
scale used to measure the increase was: 
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-2 = much less 
-1 = less 
0 = same 
+1 = more 
+2 = much more, 
then a one sided t test was used to measure whether the 
mean is significantly greater than zero, i.e. p> 0. The test is 
described in greater detail in Ben-Horim and Levy (1984, 
p370-371 ). 
A t test was used in the study for testing whether two 
means were equal to, or different from each other. For 
• 
example, was a mean repayment-to-income ratio of 25% in 
1985 significantly different from a mean repayment-to-
income ratio of 30% in 1990? If it was predicted that there 
had been an increase in the ratio then: 
H0 : Jl, :SJ12, and 
H,: p,>J12 
This test is described in greater detail in Ben-Horim and Levy 
( 1984, p372-375). 
Dependence between variables 
Where it is desired to test for dependence between variables, 
two-by-two contingency tables may be constructed. For 
example, the study tested whether there was any 
dependence between what a bank believed and what a bank 
actually did in relation to risk. The responses to the questions 
were placed in two-by-two contingency tables as contained 
in Appendix 5 of this study and a chi-square test used to 
determine whether it was likely or unlikely that there was 
dependence between the two sets of classifications. The null 
hypothesis that the two variables were independent and the 
alternative hypothesis that the two variables were 
dependent, were tested, i.e. 
H0 : the two variables are independent 
H1 : the variables are dependant 
A more detailed description of these tests can be found in 
Ben-Horim and Levy (1984, p401-409). 
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4.3 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 - Home loan business is more risky than 5 years ago 
4.3.1.1 Perceived risk increase 
Banks were requested to state their perception of the change in risk 
over the past five years in terms of the scale "much less risky", "less 
risky", "of similar risk", "more risky" and "much more risky". The 
question was phrased exactly the same as the hypothesis, i.e. home 
loan business is ___ than 5 years ago. All respondents felt risk 
was either "more" or "much more". The results are summarised in 
figure 4.1. 
FIGURE 4.1 
Perceptions of current home loan risk as compared to 5 years ago 
or·u~m~b·~·~o~·~··~·p~o~·d~·~··~·----------------~ 
·2 
mode median mean 
(1) (1) (1.280) 
0 '-./ /.2 6 ••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••• 
-1 
4 •••.....••..•................ 
no of 
responses 0 0 0 5 2 
1 •.•.......................... 
" 
0% 0% 0% 71% 29% 
variance 0.238 
•uoh 1111 1111 aln~llar •ore muoh •ore standard devlatlon0.488 
level of rlak 
H0 : J.l ~ 0 
H, : J.1. > o 
critical value: 1.440 
t: 6.971 
significant (0: •0.1): Yea 
71% felt risk was more and 29% felt it was much more. All 
measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode) fell towards 
the right end (increased risk) of the risk scale. The standard deviation 
of 0,488 showed a low level of dispersion about the mean. 
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The test statistic exceeded the critical value and the null hypothesis 
of no increase in risk could be rejected at the 0,1 level of significance. 
An open ended question asked banks to give reasons why they 
believed risk had increased over the past five years. 
All the replies could be summarised under 3 headings: 
i) Competition (reported by 4 respondents) 
Replies included responses that in order to match competition and 
meet growth targets, banks had relaxed lending criteria and 
undertaken riskier lending. 
ii) Economic conditions (reported by 4 respondents) 
Included in the responses were reports of generally depressed 
economic conditions, high interest rates, unemployment, 
depressed property prices and increased insolvencies. 
iii) Lending in the black market (reported by 4 respondents) 
This included reports of political and social turmoil, lack of 
understanding of home loan principles, mindless destruction of 
properties, lack of government support in the townships, and 
difficulty in enforcing the law. 
4.3.1.2 
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Perceived changes in competition 
Banks were asked their opinions as to the changes in competition 
over the past five years. The measurement scale used was "much 
less", "less", "same", "more", and "much more". 
All respondents felt that the home loan market was "more" or "much 
more" competitive. The results are summarised in Figure 4.2. 
FIGURE 4.2 
Perceptions of increases in competition 
number of reepondtntl mean median mode 
(1.887) (2) (2) 
-2 -1 0 ~\{ 
2 •••••••.•••.•••••••••.••••••• no of 
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1 ..••............••••......... 
" 0% 0% 0% 
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33% 
4 
67% 
variance 0.267 
•uoh 1111 leal aln~llar •ore much •ore standard devlatlon0.516 
oompetltion 
H0 : J.1 ~ o critical value: 1.4 76 
t: 7.906 significant (0: •0.1): Yea H . II > o , . ,.... 
33% of the respondents felt competition was "more" and 67% 
"muc:h more". The measures of central tendency (mean, median, 
mode) all fall towards the extreme right (much more) end of the scale. 
The standard deviation of 0,516 indicates a low dispersion about the 
mean. 
The test statistic exceeded the critical value and the null hypothesis 
of no increase in competition was rejected at the 0,1 level of 
significance. 
4.3.1.3 
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Changes in lending criteria 
Banks were asked to "agree" or "disagree" with the statements that 
currently as compared to 5 years ago, banks were generally 
i) prepared to advance loans of a higher percentage of the property 
valuation 
iil prepared to advance loans of a higher repayment-to-income 
percentage 
iii) more lenient in their lending criteria. 
The results are summarised in figure 4.3. 
FIGURE 4.3 
Changes in lending criteria 
no of respondents 
6~--------------------------------------------------~ 
83% 
5 
4 
3 
33% 
2 
1 
higher % loan higher % repayment more lenient 
EZZ;l yes EEEtB no 
H 0 : proportion of respondents who agree! 0.5 
H 1 : proportion of respondents who agree > 0.5 
z: 1.63 0.82 0.82 
critical value: 1.28 1.28 1.28 
83% agreed with higher percentage loans 
67% agreed with higher repayment-to-income ratios 
67% agreed with more leniency in lending criteria. 
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The null hypothesis could be rejected for statement (i) only, higher 
percentage loans. 
Two by two contingency tables were formed and a chi-square test 
was used to test for dependence between each of these approaches. 
The null hypothesis stated that there was no dependence and the 
alternative hypothesis stated that there was dependence. The 
contingency tables can be found in Appendix 5. Table 4.1 
summarises the results. 
TABLE4.1 
Contingency table results relating to key lending criteria 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance: 2,706 
Reject null 
Test statistic hypothesis at 0,1 level of 
significance 
Row: Agree with higher % 2.400 no 
loans 
Column: Agree with higher 
repayment-to-income % 
Row: Agree with higher % 2.400 no 
loans 
Column: Agree with more 
leniency in lending 
criteria 
Row: Agree with higher 6.000 yes 
repayment-to-income % 
Column: Agree with more 
leniency in lending 
criteria 
The chi-square test statistic at the 0,1 level of significance showed: 
i) there was no dependence between those who agreed that 
percentage loans had increased and those who agreed that 
repayment-to-income criteria had increased; 
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ii) there was no dependence between those who agreed that 
percentage loans had increased and those who agreed with more 
leniency in lending criteria in general; 
iii) there was dependence between those who agreed that 
repayment-to-income criteria had increased and those who agreed 
with more leniency in lending criteria in general. 
In order to numerically evaluate changes in percentage loans and 
repayment-to-income ratios, banks were asked, under normal 
circumstances, what their maximum allowable percentages were both 
currently and 5 years ago. Figure 4.4 summarises the results. 
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FIGURE 4.4 
Comparison of current key lending criteria ratios to 5 years ago 
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a) Loan as percentage of property value 
Current maximum ratios for percentage loans showed the 
majority of respondents around the 90% level: 
90%:- 83% of respondents; 
80%:- 17% of respondents. 
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Measures of central tendency (mean, median, mode) all tended 
toward the 90% level. The current standard deviation of 4,082 
showed a low level of dispersion about the mean. 
This was rather different from five years ago where the 
percentage showed the majority of respondents around the 80% 
level: 
90%:- 17% of respondents; 
80%:- 83% of respondents. 
Measures of central tendency (mean, median, mode) all tended 
toward the 80% level. The standard deviation of 4,082 for five 
years ago showed a low level of dispersion about the mean. 
The null hypothesis stated that there was no increase in loans as 
a percentage of the property value. 
The alternative hypothesis stated that there was an increase. 
The test statistic exceeded the critical value and the null 
hypothesis of no increase was rejected at the 0,1 level. 
b) Repayment-to-income criteria 
Current maximum ratios for percentage loans showed the 
majority of respondents around the 30% level: 
30%:- 83% of respondents; 
25%:- 17% of respondents. 
Measures of central tendency all tended toward the 30% level. 
The current standard deviation of 2,041 showed a low level of 
dispersion about the mean. 
Responses to repayment-to-income criteria 5 years ago were 
more varied: 
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30%:- 50% of respondents 
25%:- 50% of respondents 
The mean was 27,500. The standard deviation of 2, 739 showed 
greater dispersion about the mean. 
The test statistic did not exceed the critical value and there was 
no reason to reject the null hypothesis of no change. 
An open ended question asked respondents to give reasons why 
lending criteria had been relaxed. 
Replies all centred around the fact that competition had increased. 
Limited quality loans were available, yet banks were still pursuing 
growth. The result was riskier lending. 
An open ended question asked banks to provide reasons according to 
which clients would be allowed to exceed maximum lending criteria 
in terms of repayment-to-income and percentage loans. The replies 
were as follows: 
elite customers with high net assets and high income/income 
potential (reported by four respondents); 
additional security (reported by three respondents); 
long-time client of bank (reported by one respondent); 
employment stability (reported by one respondent); 
strategic decision (reported by one respondent). 
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4.3.1.4 Risk indicators 
Banks were asked to rate increases in arrears, sales in execution, 
properties in possession and bad debt provisions in terms of "much 
lower", "lower", "same", "higher" and "much higher". 
The results are summarised in figure 4.5. 
FIGURE 4.5 
Changes in key risk indicators 
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The test statistic for all four risk indicators exceeded the critical value 
and the null hypothesis of no increase was rejected in terms of all 
four indicators at the 0,1 level. 
Arrears and provisions - 100% indicated "higher" or "much higher". 
4.3.1.5 
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Sales in execution and properties in possession -five out of 6 (83%) 
indicated "more" or "much more". One bank indicated "much less". 
It is doubtful that the response by this bank was correct as indicated 
by figures (Appendix 1) for this bank in the literature survey. 
However, this did not affect the decision to reject the null hypothesis. 
An open ended question asked respondents to identify reasons for 
increased sales in execution, properties in possession, arrears, and 
bad debts. 
Replies were similar to those received when asking banks to give 
' reasons for increased risk (section 4.3.1.1 of this chapter), i.e. 
competition, economic conditions, and instability in the black market. 
No further reasons were uncovered. 
General comment on home loan risk over the past five years 
Six banks commented. The replies were as follows: 
Respondent 1: "Affordability is the main risk factor. Retrenchments 
and unemployment are a concern. There is little understanding of 
mortgages in the third world. 
vandalised". 
Vacant properties are being 
Respondent 2: "Risk has dramatically increased over the past five 
years". 
Respondent 3: "New products coupled with rising rates have 
increased risk. Cost of building and home improvements have 
increased. Valuation methods have changed with the political 
situation". 
Respondent 4: "Sound lending principles such as affordability and job 
stability have been ignored in misguided endeavours at social 
responsibility. Financial institutions have tried to make home owners 
of people whose economic circumstances dictate should be renters". 
4.3.2 
4.3.2.1 
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Respondent 5: "Areas reliant on single or few industries are higher 
risk. Rural migration to urban areas causes problems". 
Respondent 6: "There has been an increase in unrest and political 
instability. Problems are caused by rates boycotts, physical 
prevention of evictions and vandalising of empty houses". 
Hypothesis 2: Lending in black areas is more risky than lending in white 
areas 
Perceptions of risk in the black market 
\ 
Banks were asked their opinions of risk in the black market, by 
completing a sentence phrased exactly the same as the hypothesis, 
i.e. Lending in black areas is ___ than lending in white areas. 
The choice of responses was "much less risky", "less risky", "of 
similar risk", "more risky", and "much more risky". 
All respondents felt that the level of risk in black areas was "more" 
or "much more". The results are summarised in figure 4.6. 
FIGURE 4.6 
Perceptions of risk in the black market as compared to the white market 
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86% of respondents felt risk was "much more" in black areas and 
14% felt it was "more". 
All measures of central tendency (mean, median, mode) fell towards 
the right end (high risk) of the risk scale. The standard deviation of 
0,378 showed a low level of dispersion about the mean. 
At test was conducted. The test statistic exceeded the critical value 
and the null hypothesis of less or equal risk could be rejected at the 
0,1 level of significance. 
' An open ended question asked respondents to provide reasons why 
they felt lending in black areas is more risky. 
Reasons provided are shown in table 4.2. 
TABLE 4.2 
Reasons why lending in black areas is more risky 
Reason 
Political/social turmoil 
Collecting of instalments often impossible 
Eviction almost impossible 
Poor economic conditions in black areas 
Lack of understanding of mortgages 
Breakdown of legal process 
Unrest 
Boycotts or threat of boycotts 
Mindless destruction of property 
Lack of infrastructure 
No secondary market 
Political profiteering 
Government not adequately involved 
Removal of Group Areas Act 
Number of 
respondents 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4.3.2.2 
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Difference in risks in black market 
Figure 4. 7 shows responses {yes or no) to the question as to whether 
risks in black areas were different to those in other areas. 
FIGURE 4.7 
Perceptions as to whether risks are different in black areas from other areas 
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The test statistic exceeded the critical value and the null hypothesis 
of no difference in risk was rejected at the 0,1 level. 
Reasons given were similar to those given in section 4.3.2.1. 
Additional reasons given were: 
"mortality rate higher and administration of deceased estates 
non-existent" ( 1 respondent) 
"failure to pay for services associated with home ownership" 
(1 respondent) 
"lack of suburban infrastructure" (1 respondent) 
"limited job opportunities/high retrenchments'' (1 respondent). 
4.3.2.3 
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Lending activity in black areas 
Table 4.3 shows lending in black areas as a percentage of total 
lending for the 1 2 months preceding the answering of the 
questionnaire. 
TABLE 4.3 
Lending in black areas as a percentage of total lending 
Bank A 
Bank B 
Bank C 
Bank D 
BankE 
Bank F 
Bank G 
10% 
18% 
1% 
16% 
10% 
statistics not kept on a racial basis 
100% 
Respondents were asked to state their level of lending over the past 
1 2 months as compared to the previous 1 2 months. 
Banks were also asked to state intentions regarding lending in the 
black market over the next 1 2 months. Results are shown in figure 
4.8. 
same 
2 
mean 
median 
mode 
variance 
less 
2 
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FIGURE 4.8 
Lending activity in the black market 
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The study expected lending levels to be on the decrease due to higher 
risks in the black market. However, a wide range of responses were 
received. 
Measures of central tendency were around the 0 and - 1 mark. The 
standard deviations of 1 ,345 indicated a high level of dispersion 
about the mean. 
Tests showed the results to be insignificant at the 0,1 level of 
significance and there was no reason to reject the null hypothesis of 
an increase in lending activity. 
Those banks that did indicate a decrease in lending, gave similar 
reasons (in response to an open ended question) as those mentioned 
in section 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 of this chapter. Additional reasons 
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given were withdrawal of developers, more selective assessment 
policy, and a cooling in demand due to less activity in the market. 
4.3.2.4 Risk indicators 
Banks were asked to compare the black market to the white market 
in terms of arrears, sales in execution and properties in possession. 
The scale used was "much lower", "lower", "same", "higher" and 
"much higher". 
The results are summarised in figure 4.9 
FIGURE 4.9 
Risk indicators in the black market 
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4.3.2.5 
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No bank reported arrears to be less in the black market than the white 
market. Only one bank reported sales in execution and properties in 
possession to be lower in the black market. However, this was the 
bank where lending in the black market was reported as being only 
1 % of total lending. This may indicate that only highly selective 
lending was taking place in the black market and may account for the 
lower level of sales in execution and properties in possession. The 
mean, median and mode for all three indicators lay close to one on 
the scale. Properties in possession and sales in execution had a 
higher dispersion about the mean than arrears as indicated by 
measures for standard deviation and variance. 
Results for all three indicators were significant, in terms of a t test, 
at the 0, 1 level and the null hypotheses of less risk as measured by 
these indicators could be rejected. 
Qualifying criteria for black borrowers 
Banks were asked whether their qualifying criteria was different for 
blacks. Figure 4.10 summarises the responses. 
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FIGURE 4.10 
Response as to whether qualifying criteria are different for blacks 
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4.3.2.6 
It was expected that qualifying criteria would be the same as it is the 
general expectation of this study that banks do not differentiate 
adequately in terms of risk. 86% of respondents reported no 
difference in qualifying criteria. In terms of a test of equal 
proportions, this was significant at the 0,1 level. 
In response to an open ended questionnaire, the bank that reported 
a difference in criteria said that blacks' affordability was assessed in 
terms of disposable income as opposed to 30% of total income for 
other clients. 
Minimum new loans 
Three banks reported no minimum loan. Other minimum loans 
reported were R30 000, R25 000, R 12 500 and R8 500. 
4.3.2.7 
4.3.2.8 
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Reasons for introducing a minimum were that the structure bonded 
had to meet certain minimum requirements, the price of serviced erf 
had to be met, legal fees as a percentage of smaller loans was higher, 
and margin had to be sufficient to cover costs. 
Home Loan Guarantee Scheme 
This fund (at the time of the questionnaire) was for loans under 
R35 000. The following were given as percentage of loans under 
R35 000- 1.5%, 15%,0%, 4%, 0,5% and 100%. 
67% of respondents felt that the scheme was effective in reducing 
' risk. Replies as to the effectiveness of the scheme were not found 
to be significant at the 0,1 level in terms of a test of equal 
proportions. 
Factors needing to be addressed 
Table 4.4 shows the factors that banks stated needed to be 
addressed to encourage banks to participate in the black market. 
TABLE 4.4 
Factors needing to be addressed in the black market 
Factor to be addressed 
Peace and stability 
Return to law 
Guarantees, incentives by government 
Further collateral security 
Education of potential home owners 
Remove threat of bond boycotts 
Unemployment insurance 
Co-operative effort by financial institutions 
Support from black political parties and civic 
associations 
Employers to provide training of home ownership 
and collateral support 
National housing forum to reach agreement with 
communities satisfactory to all parties 
No of 
respondents 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4.3.2.9 
4.3.3 
4.3.3.1 
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General comment on risk in the black market 
Five banks commented: 
Respondent 1: concerns were "lack of conceptual understanding of 
home ownership and finances related thereto and unscrupulous 
practices of certain participants". 
Respondent 2: "The breakdown of normal society and law in the 
township is the biggest problem. It must be acknowledged we are in 
a transitionary phase. A massive reconstruction effort is required". 
I 
Respondent 3: "In relation to income the risk is not more, only the 
knowledge to do financial planning does not exist. It is generally 
known lower income earners are better payers". 
Respondent 4: "Political, economic and legal stability factors need to 
be resolved". 
Respondent 5: "The largest risk factors are no secondary market, 
lack of understanding of rights and obligations, failure of the legal 
systems for recoveries, unsophistication (in terms of stop orders, 
debit orders and communication)". 
Hypothesis 3 - Banks do not use a model to measure home loan risl< for 
the purpose of pricing loans. 
Use of a model 
Banks were asked to answer yes or no to a question phrased exactly 
the same as the hypothesis, i.e. 
"Does your organisation make use of any model to measure home 
loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans?" 
The results are summarised in figure 4.11: 
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FIGURE 4.11 
Use of a risk measurement model by banks 
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Six out of the seven respondents said they did not use any model. 
The bank that said "yes" was using of some of the concepts 
developed by the writer. 
The result was significant at the 0,1 level in terms of a test of equal 
proportions. 
Banks that did have a model were asked whether the model was 
adequate to sufficiently measure and price for home loan risk. The 
only bank that uses a model replied "yes". 
4.3.3.2 
4.3.3.2.1 
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Risk measurement and pricing 
Banks were asked a range of questions to test their measurement of 
risk and pricing for risk. The results are shown in table 4.5. None of 
them were significant in terms of tests of equal proportions at the 0,1 
level. 
TABLE 4.5 
Risk measurement and pricing by questionnaire respondents 
Do you differentiate by interest rate? 
Do you charge rates below normal rate? 
Do you charge rates above normal rate? 
Do you believe in the principle that clients 
of higher risk should pay higher rates? 
Are circumstances present which prevent 
effective implementation of differential 
rates? 
Do you rate geographical areas on a scale 
according to risk? 
Do you rate clients on a scale according to 
risk? 
Yes 
67% 
67% 
29% 
71% 
71% 
43% 
43% 
No 
33% 
33% 
71% 
29% 
29% 
57% 
57% 
Responses to the above questions are expanded on in the remainder 
of section 4.3.3.2. 
Rate determination 
The following criteria were given when determining rate: 
- other accounts with the bank (4 respondents) 
- part of a housing scheme 
- credit history 
-area 
-%loan 
- part of housing scheme 
- arrears/loss history 
- prestige clients (high income/net assets) 
(2 respondents) 
( 1 respondent) 
( 1 respondent) 
(2 respondents} 
(4 respondents) 
(1 respondent) 
(3 respondents) 
4.3.3.2.2 
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The principle of pricing for risk 
The two banks that did not believe in the principle that home 
loans should be differentiated by price gave the following 
reasons: 
• if risk is not acceptable no loan should be granted 
• risk should be regulated in terms of the deposit. 
The following factors were cited as preventing effective 
implementation of differential rates: 
• sensitivity - rich pay less than poor (4 respondents); 
• competitive forces (1 respondent). 
Contingency tables were formed and a chi-square test applied to 
determine whether there was any dependency between whether 
a bank believed that home loans should be differentiated by price 
and whether a bank actually did differentiate by price. The 
contingency tables are contained in Appendix 5. The null 
hypothesis stated that there was no dependency. The alternative 
hypothesis stated that there was dependency. The results in 
table 4.6 show that at the 0,1 level of significance there was a 
rather small dependence between what a bank believed and what 
a bank did in relation to home loan pricing. 
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TABLE 4.6 
Results of contingency tables relating to the belief that higher 
risk clients should pay higher rates 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance: 2.706 
Reject null 
Test hypothesis 
statistic at 0,1 level 
of significance 
Row: Do charge different 0,375 no 
interest rates 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
Row: Do charge rates below 6,000 yes 
normal rates 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
Row: Do charge rates above 1 '120 no 
normal rates 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
Row: Do rate areas on a scale 2,100 no 
according to risk 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
Row: Do rate clients on a scale 0,058 no 
according to risk 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
Row: Believe market 1,120 no 
circumstances prevent 
different rates 
Column: Believe higher risk clients 
should pay higher rates 
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Contingency tables were also formed and a chi-square test 
applied to determine whether there was any dependence between 
whether a bank believed that there were market circumstances 
preventing different rates and whether a bank actually did 
differentiate by price. The contingency tables are contained in 
Appendix 5. The null hypothesis stated that there was no 
dependence, while the alternative hypothesis stated that there 
was dependence. The results in table 4. 7 show that there was 
no dependence. 
TABLE 4.7 
Results of contingency tables relating to the belief that market 
circumstances prevent different rates 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance: 2. 706 
Row: Do charge different interest 
rates 
Column: Believe market circumstances 
prevent different rates 
Row: Do charge rates below normal 
rates 
Column: Believe market circumstances 
prevent different rates 
Row: Do charge rates below normal 
rates 
Column: Believe market circumstances 
prevent different rates 
Row: Do rate areas on a scale 
according to risk 
Column: Believe market circumstances 
prevent different rates 
Row: Do rate clients on a scale 
according to risk 
Column: Believe market circumstances 
prevent different rates 
Test Reject null 
statistic hypothesis 
1,500 
1,500 
0,630 
2,100 
0,058 
at 0,1 level of 
significance 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
4.3.3.2.3 
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Area ratings 
Those banks which rated areas on a scale according to risk gave 
the following criteria: 
Declining property values ( 1 respondent) 
Unemployment ( 1 respondent) 
Single economic activity ( 1 respondent) 
Physical condition of areas ( 1 respondent) 
Arrears and repossession history ( 1 respondent) 
This excludes the bank that used concepts developed by the 
writer. The criteria for this bank were similar to those put 
forward in Chapter 5. 
Contingency tables were formed and a chi-square test applied to 
determine if there was any dependence between whether a bank 
rated areas on a scale according to risk and whether a bank did 
charge different interest rates. The contingency tables are 
contained in Appendix 5. The null hypothesis stated that there 
was no dependence. The alternative hypothesis stated that there 
was dependence. The results in table 4.8 show that there was 
no dependence. 
TABLE 4.8 
Results of contingency tables relating to whether a bank does 
rate areas on a scale according to risk 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance 2.706 
Reject null 
Test hypothesis at 0,1 
statistic level of 
significance 
Row: Do rate areas on a 0,375 no 
scale according to risk 
Column: Do charge different 
interest rates 
Row: Do rate areas on a 1,500 no 
scale according to risk 
Column: Do charge rates below 
normal rates 
Row: Do rate areas on a 0,058 no 
scale according to risk 
Column: Do charge rates above 
normal rates 
4.3.3.2.4 
4.3.3.2.5 
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Client ratings 
Those banks which did rate clients on a scale according to risk 
gave the following criteria: 
% Loan to property value 
Client profile.- net assets and income 
Repayment record 
Credit record 
Age 
(2 respondents) 
(3 respondents) 
(2 respondents) 
(2 respondents) 
(1 respondent) 
Table 4.9 shows that there was no dependence between whether 
a bank rated clients on a scale according to risk and whether a 
I 
bank did charge different interest rates. 
TABLE 4.9 
Results of contingency tables relating to whether a 
bank did rate clients on a scale according to risk 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance: 2,706 
Test Reject null 
statistic hypothesis at 
0,1 level of 
significance 
Row: Do rate clients on a scale 0,000 no 
according to risk 
Do charge different 
interest rates 
Row: Do rate clients on a scale 0,000 no 
according to risk 
Column: Do charge rates below 
normal rate 
Row: Do rate clients on a scale 0,058 no 
according to risk 
Column: Do charge rates above 
normal rates 
Other risk measurement methods 
Respondents were asked whether there were any other methods 
they have for measuring risk. The only reply was that risk could 
4.3.3.2.6 
4.3.4 
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be measured in terms of value for money (is the purchase price 
worth it?). It was not necessary to incorporate this feature into 
the model as it is the standard practice of all banks to value 
properties used as security. 
General comment regarding risk measurement and pricing relating 
to home loans 
The following comments were received from the four 
respondents who answered this question. 
Respondent 1 -"Risk measurement and pricing are critical. There 
is considerable logic to this but it is hampered by competitive 
forces". 
Respondent 2- "Measurement and pricing should be the same as 
for overdraft clients as security does not lessen risk. It is 
important to measure a client's track record and take a viewpoint 
to the client's future". 
Respondent 3 -Important factors are "affordability, valuation and 
marketability of property, and future economic stability of area". 
Respondent 4 - "Risk should not be adjusted by price but by 
deposit size. Differential rates are used only as a marketing 
ploy". 
Hypothesis 4: Banks would value a standardised flexible model which 
allowed measurement of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans 
Banks were asked two questions to test the hypothesis: 
i) Do you believe it would be valuable to financial institutions if a 
standardised, flexible model could be developed which allowed 
measurement of risk on home loan accounts? 
- 100 -
ii) Do you believe it would be valuable to financial institutions if a 
standardised flexible model could be developed which assisted 
financial institutions in pricing home loans according to risk? 
The results are summarised in figure 4.12. 
Figure 4.12 
Value of a risk measurement and pricing model 
no of respondents 
6.------------------------------------------------------. 
71% 
5 
57% 
43% 
29% 
2 ..... . 
1 ..... . 
0 
Ho: 
H 1: 
risk measurement pricing 
proportion of respondents who agree ! 0.5 
proportion of respondents who agree > 0.5 
Z: 
critical value: 
1.13 0.38 
1.28 1.28 
71% saw value in a model which allowed risk measurement and 57% 
saw value in model which allowed pricing. Neither of these were 
significant in terms of a test of equal proportions and there was no reason 
to reject the null hypothesis of no value. 
Those banks that believed the model would not be valuable gave the 
reason that all banks had different circumstances and markets. The term 
'flexible' may have been overlooked by these banks. 
4.3.5 
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Contingency tables were formed and a chi-square test applied to 
determine whether there was dependence between those banks that saw 
value in a model which allowed risk measurement and those banks that 
saw value in a model which allowed pricing. The null hypothesis stated 
that there was no dependence and the alternative hypothesis stated that 
there was dependence. The contingency tables are contained in Appendix 
5 and the results are summarised in table 4.1 0. 
TABLE4.10 
Contingency tables relating to risk measurement and pricing models 
Critical value at 0,1 level of significance:, 2.706 
Test Reject null hypothesis 
statistic at 0,1 level of 
significance 
Row: Agree risk measurement 2.917 yes 
model would be valuable 
Column: Make use of risk 
measurement model for 
pricing 
Row: Agree pricing model would 1.556 no 
be valuable 
Column: Make use of risk 
measurement model for 
pricing 
Row: Agree pricing model would 3.733 yes 
be valuable 
Column: Agree risk measurement 
model would be valuable 
Additional information 
Section four of the questionnaire was not intended to test any hypothesis, 
but simply to gather information that might have been useful in the 
development of the risk-measurement model. As such, the responses 
were not subjected to any form of statistical testing but have been 
summarised in table 4. 11. 
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TABLE 4.11 
Information relating to home loan doubtful debt procedures 
No of 
Subject Reply 
respondents 
Stage at which a provision for Judgement taken or loss 
doubtful debts is made established 1 
2 months arrear 2 
Balance owing equals current 
valuation 1 
3 months arrear 1 
Balance outstanding equals 
total debt 1 
Simple percentage of all loans 1 
Method of determining Amounts in excess of 90% of 
provisions property valuation 1 
Formula taking into account 
the debt, further costs and 
security 1 
Assets x 0,5% per month 1 
Excess of balance over value 1 
Balance to value, allowing for 
costs 1 
Expected percentage defaults 1 
Stage at which legal action is 2 months arrear 3 
,. implemented 3 months arrear 4 
Average length of time from 8 months 3 
legal action to sale in 3,5 months 1 
execution 4 months 1 
Whether or not interest is Yes 2 
suspended on potential bad No 5 
debt accounts 
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No of 
Subject Reply 
respondents 
Stage at which interest is Balance reaches value of 
suspended property or it is established 
that a loss will be made 1 
Depends on loss potential 1 
Whether or not provision is Yes 3 
made for losses on properties No 4 
in possession 
Method of making provision for Difference between book debt 
losses on properties in and valuation 1 
possession Per area, in accordance with 
previous experience 1 
Whether or not provision is Yes 2 
made for holding interest on No 5 
properties in possession 
How holding interest on Notional figure calculated at 
properties in possession is existing mortgage rate 1 
calculated Only calculated if believed 
recovery is possible 1 
4.3.6 
- 104-
General Comment 
Section 5 of the questionnaire was an open ended question allowing 
banks to provide any additional comment they would have liked to make 
regarding home loan risk or return and which was not incorporated 
elsewhere in the questionnaire. 
The only reply received was that care should be taken when implementing 
any rate structure. If unable to withstand tests in a court of law, the 
structure could collapse. 
Note: The housing loans department of a large bank obtained legal 
opinion in this regard that any rate might be charged for any category of 
loan providing that the maximum limits as set out in the Usury Act were 
not exceeded, and that the category might be shown to be of a definite 
different risk profile to any category charged a different rate. These 
maximums allowed more than sufficient scope for the purposes of this 
study. 
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that home loan business was more risky than 5 years 
ago. 
The formulation of conclusions will be facilitated by a summary of results 
relating to the hypothesis in question. This is done in table 4.1 2. 
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TABLE4.12 
Summary of results relating to hypothesis 
Hypothesis in relation % of replies % of replies Significant 
to perceptions over not supporting supporting at the 0,1 
the past 5 years hypothesis hypothesis level 
Risk has increased 100% Yes 
Competition has increased 100% Yes 
Arrears have increased 100% Yes 
Sales in execution have 17% 83% Yes 
increased 
Properties in possession 17% 83% Yes 
have increased 
Provisions have increased 100% Yes 
Higher percentage loans 17% 83% Yes 
Higher repayments to 33% 67% No 
income 
Generally relaxed criteria 33% 67% No 
The change in percentage loans was also found to be significant at the 
0,1 level when subjected to at test. Higher repayments-to-income was 
not found to be significant at the 0,1 level in terms of a t test. No 
dependence was found between those who agreed that percentage loans 
had increased and 
those who agreed repayment-to-income criteria had increased 
those who agreed with more leniency in lending criteria in general. 
There was dependence between those who agreed that repayment-to-
income criteria had increased and those who agreed with more leniency 
in lending criteria in general. 
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There was strong evidence to support the research hypothesis. In terms 
of banks' perceptions, the following could be deduced: 
i) risk had increased 
ii) competition had increased 
iii) arrears had increased 
iv) sales in execution had increased 
v) properties in possession had increased 
vi) bad debt provisions had increased 
vii) percentage loans had increased. 
It was not conclusively shown that the 'majority of banks had relaxed 
repayment to income criteria or lending criteria in general. However, it 
could be said that the majority of banks surveyed (67%) felt that 
repayment-to-income criteria and general lending criteria had been relaxed. 
Due to the low numbers of banks and hence the low numbers in the 
survey, care should be taken not to reject statements on the basis of a 
test statistic alone. Furthermore, at least four banks had relaxed their 
repayment-to-income criteria. 
The fact that risk over the past five years had increased was not only 
supported in terms of the statistical data, but also in terms of general 
comments made by respondents, e.g. 
"Risk has dramatically increased over the past 5 years" 
"New products coupled with rising rates have increased risk" 
"Sound lending principles have been ignored", and 
"There has been an increase in unrest and political instability". 
The major reasons for increased risk were identified as: 
i) increased competition 
ii) poor economic conditions 
iii) lending in black areas 
Strong positive support for hypothesis 1 therefore appeared to exist. 
4.4.2 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated that lending in black areas was more risky than 
lending in white areas. 
Table 4.1 3 summarises the responses in respect of hypothesis 2. 
TABLE4.13 
Summary of results relating to hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis in relation % replies % replies Significant 
to risk in the Black not suppor1ing supporting at 0,1 level 
market hypothesis hypothesis 
Lending is riskier than in 100% Yes 
white areas 
Risks are different 100% Yes 
Arrears are higher 100% Yes 
Sales in execution are higher 17% 83% Yes 
Properties in possession are 17% a3% Yes 
higher 
There was, then, substantial evidence to support the hypothesis. 
Furthermore: 
the increased risks were not being reflected in lending patterns- some 
banks were reducing activity in the black market and others were 
increasing such activity, and 
there was no significant difference between lending criteria for blacks 
and whites. 
4.4.3 
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Factors influencing risk in black areas: 
political and social turmoil and political profiteering 
breakdown of the legal process 
poor economic conditions (high unemployment/retrenchments) 
lack of understanding of the mortgage process 
lack of infrastructure 
lack of a secondary market 
government not adequately involved 
threat of bond boycotts. 
There was, then, strong positive support for hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 stated that banks did not use a model to measure home loan 
risks for the purpose of pricing loans. 
Apart from the bank for which the writer worked and which did use 
certain of the concepts outlined in this study, no bank was using any 
model. Hypothesis 3 was therefore accepted. 
Banks were in varying degrees differentiating by interest rate, although 
this was mainly by way of reduced rates to upper-value clients. Only two 
of the banks surveyed were charging rates above the normal lending rate 
in relation to the risk of the client. 
71% of banks surveyed believed in the principle that clients of higher risk 
should pay higher rates but that there were circumstances, such as 
competition and fear of accusation of discrimination, which were 
preventing the effective implementation of interest rates. 43% of banks 
surveyed had some method of client rating and 43% had some form of 
area rating. 
Tests for dependence showed very little dependence between whether a 
bank believed in the principle of pricing for risk and whether a bank 
actually did price for risk. There was no dependence between whether a 
bank believed that there were market circumstances which prevented 
4.4.4 
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price differentiation and whether a bank actually did price for risk. There 
was also no dependence between whether a bank priced for risk and 
whether it rated areas or clients on a scale according to risk. 
The overall conclusion was that the majority of banks did not price 
according to risk and that banks had no model with which to measure 
home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 stated that banks would value a model which allowed 
measurement of home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. 
71% saw value in a model which allowed risk measurement and 57% 
saw value in a model which assisted with pricing. 
Although the differences were not found to be significant, this evidence 
was not sufficient to reject the fact that the model would be valuable for 
two reasons: 
i) although in terms of the tests it could not be claimed conclusively 
that the majority of banks would value such a model, it could be 
claimed that there were some banks who would value such a model, 
and 
ii) those banks who rejected the value of such a model gave the reasons 
that each bank had different circumstances. This might mean that 
the word "flexible" was overlooked in the question and that if a model 
was developed which was flexible enough to incorporate the 
circumstances of that bank, the model might be of value. 
Dependence was found between those who agreed a risk measurement 
model would be valuable and those who agreed a pricing model would be 
valuable. 
The conclusion concerning this hypothesis was that it could not be said 
that all banks would value such a model, but that there were some that 
4.4.5 
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would. The value of such a model would depend to a large extent on the 
flexibility of the model and its ability to be adapted to the particular 
circumstances of each bank. 
Overall Conclusion 
There was strong support for the following hypotheses: 
hypothesis 1: home loan business was more risky than five years ago 
hypothesis 2: lending in black areas was more risky than lending in 
white areas, and 
hypothesis 3: banks did not use a model to measure home loan risk for 
the purpose of pricing loans. 
There was only limited support for hypothesis 4 which stated that banks 
would value a standardised, flexible model that allowed measurement of 
home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. The value of such a 
model would to a large degree depend on the flexibility of the model and 
its adaptability to the particular circumstances of each bank. 
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PART IV 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE 
MODEL 
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CHAPTER 5 
Development of the model 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study was to provide a model that might be used by banks 
for measuring risk, for pricing loans in terms of risk and for assisting in the 
overall management of the loan portfolio. 
To be effective, the model should have the following characteristics: 
i) simplicity - ease of understanding would facilitate implementation 
iii practicality -the model should not be a theoretical exercise but should be 
of a nature readily usable in practice 
iii) relevance - the model should take into account the problems faced by 
mortgage lending institutions in South Africa in present times 
ivl academic value - the model should be mathematically and scientifically 
sound and lend itself to further research, criticism and enhancement 
v) flexibility -the model should be adaptable according to the specific needs 
and requirements of each bank. 
The model would take into account all information accumulated by means of 
the housing and risk-return surveys, as well as the responses of banks to the 
questionnaire. The model would also draw on the knowledge of the writer, 
gained over six years of practical experience in working with home loans in a 
bank. 
The model functions in five stages: 
il the risk categorisation of loans 
ii) measurement of risk 
iii) measurement of return 
ivl risk-return measurement, and 
vl overall portfolio measurement. 
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5.2 RISK CATEGORISATION 
Chapter 4 of this study identified several variables considered by banks to 
have an impact on risk. 
Because there were so many variables, many varying risk combinations could 
result for different home loans. It would have been impractical to endeavour 
to provide measurements for each of these criteria and to expect a bank to 
implement a model based on all of these measurements. 
To render the model practical and useable it was therefore necessary to 
reduce the various combinations. This would be achieved by grouping the 
various risk elements into risk categories. 
The model would allow flexibility in the risk categories. 
The most commonly reported variables influencing risk in the banks' opinions 
were: 
i) the area in which lending takes place, e.g. black areas were regarded as 
being more risky than white areas 
ii) political factors (violence, boycotts) 
iii) economic factors (retrenchments, unemployment, interest rates) 
iv) equity (cash deposits at the outset of loans) 
v) affordability 
vi) client profile (in terms of income and net assets), and 
vii) additional collateral/security. 
The difficulty in providing risk measurements was that the above risk 
indicators were not always quantifiable. Factors iv) - vii) were fairly easy to 
provide measurements for: 
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Client profile may be measured in terms of rand values of income or net 
assets. 
Affordability may be measured in terms of instalments relative to income. 
Equity may be measured in terms of the size of the cash deposit, e.g. 
20% cash deposit. 
Collateral security may be valued and expressed as a proportion of the 
property value. 
It was not as easy to provide measurements for political activity, economic 
downturn and areas in which properties were situated. 
Certain factors would affect all areas - for example, all clients might be 
affected by increased interest rates and other economic factors. It was true, 
however, that certain areas might be more severely affected by economic 
downturn. Lower income earning areas, or areas reliant on one industry might 
be harder hit by economic downturn. It was also true that certain areas might 
be more subject to political activity than other areas. The questionnaire 
survey in Chapter 4 showed that areas traditionally classified as black were 
of greater risk in terms of bond boycotts and political violence. 
Due to the importance accorded by the questionnaire on areas, this variable 
should feature significantly in any model developed to measure risk. 
The model would, therefore, centre around the two major categories of area 
and product: 
i) area - is that in which bonded property is situated and which does not 
have a scientific measurement (area ratings are described in section 
5.2.1 ); 
iil product - a designation used in the lending industry to incorporate all the 
other major identified quantifiable variables (equity, affordability, client 
profile, additional collateral and security). The advantage of grouping all 
5.2.1 
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quantifiable variables on one scale was that the model might be computer-
programmed to allocate loans to product categories (product ratings are 
described in section 5.2.2). 
Area ratings 
In terms of the model, areas in which an institution lends would be rated 
on a scale. The number of different area categories used might vary 
according to the lending spread of the bank. The number of categories 
used should be small enough to be practically manageable, yet large 
enough to adequately differentiate between the areas. 
It was suggested that three ratings would be practical for area 
measurement: 
i) low risk areas 
ii) medium risk areas, and 
iii) high risk areas. 
A number of factors needed to be taken into account when assessing an 
area. The survey highlighted that, generally, lending in black areas was 
more risky than lending in other areas. Area ratings should, however, 
take all aspects of each area into account. Some black areas were likely 
to be high risk, while others might have a more acceptable risk profile. 
There might be many white classified areas in remote places or reliant on 
one industry which might also be considered of high risk. White areas 
might also be affected by political unrest, for example Dawn Park, 
Boksburg (events of April, 1993- the murder of Mr Chris Hani). 
Table 5.1 (Perm division of Nedcor Bank, unpublished criteria developed 
by Bowen, Creighton, Dang or and Powell, 1991) provides useful 
guidelines when classifying an area. Generally a low risk area would rate 
well on all the criteria. Examples of low risk areas might be Rosebank and 
Sandton in the Northern Suburbs of Johannesburg. Medium risk areas 
would rate average on most of the criteria or well on some and only 
average on others. Examples of medium risk areas might be lower income 
white areas such as Mayfair or Rossettenville, coloured areas such as 
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Mitchell's Plain, or upper class black areas. High risk areas, in the main, 
would be black townships, remote white areas such as towns surrounding 
the Karoo or areas reliant on one industry, such as Welkom (mining) and 
Saldhana (fishing). 
TABLE 5.1 
Area assessment criteria 
a) Future growth potential 
Growth of an area would be directly related to population growth 
within the area and migration patterns from and to the same area. 
' 
The growth potential would indicate the investment potential within 
the area, i.e. demand for housing. A fully developed area is desirable 
if it represents a balanced community. 
b) Economic growth 
The long term nature of mortgage contracts would necessitate that 
the area had potential to grow and prosper. 
Any area should have a diversity of industries to ensure long term 
economic viability and concomitant employment opportunities. 
Any area dependent largely upon one industry might be susceptible 
in varying degrees to changing economic conditions which might 
adversely affect demand for housing. 
c) Local government 
The role of local government in the maintenance and development of 
townships is important in maintaining or enhancing the security of the 
financial institutions and the lives of the residents of the area. 
The ability of the local authority should be assessed to determine their 
past record and their planning for the future. 
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d) Balanced development 
Balanced development would include provision for residential, 
business, commercial and industrial, public open space, educational 
and government land usage. 
The extent to which planning in the new areas for community 
facilities had been implemented, would affect the desirability of the 
area. 
e) Transport 
The availability of a good transport infrastructure, including public 
transport networks between work and home enhances the value of 
an area. 
The cost of public transport is an issue in markets where people are 
dependant upon this for travel. 
Distances between the workplace and home should be reasonable -
generally a distance of 20 km is the maximum desired distance 
(individual examples of where a person voluntarily travels to a 
workplace further away is a separate issue). 
f) Surrounding land uses and general environment 
The effects of the use made of surrounding land will influence the 
value of a housing area. For example, areas of high pollution or the 
proximity of noxiously-inclined industries would be undesirable. On 
the other hand, the general environment might have intrinsic natural 
beauty which would enhance demand. 
g) Market stability 
Areas that have shown long term trends of increasing property values 
and the ready marketability of houses for sale are indicators of a 
stable market. Low turnover of properties is generally an indication 
of a stable market. Levels of social and political violence need careful 
consideration. 
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h) Geotechnical conditions 
A geotechnical risk-appraisal of an area should be undertaken to 
confirm feasibility and desirability for residential purposes. 
i) Banking facilities 
Areas should be in reasonable proximity to banking outlets to 
facilitate repayment collection and client interaction. 
j) Urban profile 
Lending activity is focused in the urban areas in the Republic of South 
Africa, with remote rural areas being less desirable for mortgage 
' purposes. Proximity to major metropolitan areas and intrinsically 
desirable areas needs individual assessment. 
k) Historical lending performance 
The experience in terms of arrears, losses, and repossessions needs 
to be taken into account. 
I) Civic associations 
The activities and capabilities of civic associations or other residents' 
representative structures impact on lending areas. 
m) Integration with towns/cities 
The extent to which areas integrate into existing towns and cities in 
a logical way - for example, remote suburbs such as those created 
during the era of the Group Areas era are undesirable in the main. 
Proximity to major employment opportunities is essential. 
Because of the subjective nature of area ratings, they should be done by 
people knowledgeable of the areas. It is suggested that each lending 
branch does their own ratings as they are closest to the areas and familiar 
with the areas in which they operate. Allowing each branch to rate their 
area also spreads the workload involved in rating areas and allows the 
exercise to be completed in a short period. 
5.2.2 
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In order that area ratings be computer-captured, each area would need to 
be allocated a code number. This number would be indexed onto the loan 
data base for each loan and the computer could then be programmed to 
automatically allocate the applicable rating to that suburb. This means 
that at any time, the computer could be requested to produce information 
by area categories, for example, number of loans in low risk areas or value 
of arrears in high risk areas. 
Product ratings 
Each loan should be allocated to a "product" category according to the 
characteristics of that loan. The following are examples (product A and 
' B are special classes of loans; products C 1 - C4 are "man in the street" 
classes of products): 
• product A- achiever/elite: clients having a certain level of net assets 
and income/income potential 
• product B- collateral schemes: housing scheme or public-servant-type 
loans where collateral of approximately 20% is usually offered 
• product C1 -high equity, high affordability, e.g. equity exceeds 20%, 
repayment-to-income is less than 25% 
• product C2- high equity, low affordability, e.g. equity exceeds 20%, 
repayment-to-income is greater than 25% 
• product C3 -low equity, high affordability, e.g. equity less than 20%, 
repayment-to-income is less than 25% 
• product C4 - Low equity, low affordability, e.g. equity is less than 
20%, repayment-to-income is greater than 25%. 
20% equity and 25% repayment-to-income criteria were used because 
these are the average levels used prior to 198 5 in terms of the survey in 
Chapter 4. These criteria were subsequently relaxed and were among the 
- 120 -
reasons cited by banks in the survey as contributing to increased risk. 
The amounts are flexible and open to adjustment by banks. 
Once loans have been placed into product categories, these products 
might also be placed into risk categories, for example: 
i) low risk product A (achiever/elite) 
product C1 (high equity, high affordability); 
ii) medium risk product 8 (collateral schemes) 
product C2 (high equity, low affordability) 
• product C3 (low equity, high affordability) 
iii) high risk product C4 (low equity, low affordability). 
The model allows flexibility in terms of products. The eventual structuring 
of the products would be left to the discretion of the user bank. The 
combinations of variables might be changed and variables increased or 
reduced. 
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5.2.3 Risk matrix 
p 
R 
0 
D 
u 
c 
T 
Once all products and areas have been risk categorised (see section 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2), each loan category is placed on a matrix of product/area risk 
combinations. Each loan would then be allocated an overall risk rating. 
The matrix, according to our product and area examples is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. Area ratings are on the horizontal axis and product ratings on 
the vertical axis. 
FIGURE 5.1 
Area product risk matrix 
A R E A 
low medium high 
risk risk risk 
low A 
risk C1 
medium B C2 
risk C3 
high C4 risk 
default 
This matrix is flexible. Categories may be added to or deleted from the 
matrix, so increasing or reducing complexity. 
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5.3 RISK MEASUREMENT 
Once all loans have been placed on the matrix, a measurement can be 
provided for each loan category. Two types of measurement are proposed: 
1. simple matrix measurement, and 
2. potential loss measurement. 
5.3.1 Simple matrix measurement 
This type of measurement simply allocates an overall risk rating on a 
scale. The scale size would depend on how many different risk categories 
' had been incorporated into the matrix. The example given would yield a 
measurement scale of 1 - 6 as shown in figure 5.2. An example of the 
application of the matrix is given in section 5.6. 
p low 
risk 
R 
0 medium risk 
D 
u high risk 
c 
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FIGURE 5.2 
Simple matrix measurement 
low 
risk 
1 
2 
3 
A R E A 
medium. 
risk 
2 
3 
4 
T default 6 
Overall risk measurements are obtained as follows: 
1 - low risk on both axes 
2 - low risk on one axis, medium risk on the other axis 
3 - low risk on one axis, high risk on the other axis, 
or 
medium risk on both axes 
4- medium risk one axis, high risk on the other axis 
5 - high risk on both axes 
6 - loans in default. 
high 
risk 
3 
4 
5 
5.3.2 
5.3.2.1 
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Potential loss method 
The potential loss method is an extension of the simple matrix method. 
It not only places loans on a measurement scale, but also provides an 
estimate of potential losses resulting from bad debts. This method takes 
account of the amount of the potential loss, weighted by the probability 
of that loss occurring. The potential loss formula is: 
Amount of potential loss x probability of loss occurring. 
Amount of potential loss 
This measurement estimates the loss that would occur, should the 
loan default immediately and legal action be instituted to repossess 
the property. 
This measurement should incorporate: 
i) interest loss - loss of potential interest income 
ii) recovery expenses - expenses relating to the bad debt process 
and asset recovery 
iii) capital loss - loss resulting from the resale value being less than 
the outstanding capital balance. 
These items are discussed further, as follows: 
i) Interest loss 
Risk was defined in chapter 3 as the actual outcome differing 
from the desired outcome. The desired outcome of a home loan 
is that the loan be repaid at the full interest rate. A risk 
measurement must therefore take the full interest income into 
account. There are two portions to this loss, actual interest cost 
and opportunity cost: 
• actual interest cost - this is the funding cost of the loan 
which will continue to be a real cost until the asset is realised 
(the bank borrowed funds from savers and investors to fund 
the loan and they are paying interest to these clients). It is 
measured by the funding rate, and 
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• opportunity cost - this is the margin income that would have 
accrued to the financial institution had the debt not gone 
bad. It is measured by the margin rate {difference between 
funding and lending rate). 
The funding rate and the margin rate together make up the 
lending rate, and it is at this rate that the total interest loss must 
be measured. 
The survey described in Chapter 4 showed that the average time 
from default to sale in execution {loss period) was approximately 
6 months. It is over this period that the interest loss occurs. 
Interest loss should therefore be measured as follows: 
Outstanding balance x lending rate x 6/12. 
The 6 month period could be altered by the user-bank if its 
experience found the period to be different. 
iil Recovery expenses 
This portion of the equation must take into account all expenses 
related to the legal process, bad debt administration, and the sale 
of the asset. Agents' commissions will generally be related to 
the property value while outstanding rates and taxes are related 
to property size. There might also be a portion of costs not 
variable with property value such as administration and certain 
legal expenses. It is not feasible to propose a uniform cost 
measurement - each bank has its own cost structure which will 
differ according to the type of areas in which it operates. Costs 
would generally be higher in black areas due to problems 
regarding recovery, eviction and vandalism as reported by banks 
in the questionnaire survey. 
Banks must therefore estimate their own cost amount based on 
their historical experience. 
5.3.2.2 
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The formula for recovery expenses would be: 
Fixed recovery cost + (property value x variable cost 
percentage). 
When programming the computer, the programme used should 
allow for differing cost structures according to area. 
iii) Capital loss 
The capital loss is calculated as the difference between the net 
outstanding debt and the property value. All banks have property 
valuers to value properties used as security according to the 
physical attributes of the property and prevailing market 
conditions. 
The net outstanding debt is the outstanding balance reduced by 
additional collateral (including guarantees or sureties). 
The formula for the capital loss is as follows: 
Outstanding balance minus collateral minus property 
valuation. 
iv) Overall potential loss amount 
The overall formula for calculating the amount of the potential 
loss is: 
Interest loss + recovery expenses + capital loss. 
The amount of the potential loss can never be positive, because 
banks are legally obligated to return to the client any profit 
portion arising out of the sale of the property. The computer 
programme should therefore reflect a loss minimum of zero. 
Probability 
The potential loss formula calculates the loss that would occur should 
the loan go into default and be taken to a sale in execution. Only a 
percentage of defaulting loans will result in sales in execution and it 
is necessary to take account of the probability of the potential loss 
occurring. 
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In order to calculate the probability of the potential loss occurring, it 
is necessary to have an understanding of the past performance of a 
category of loans. If through experience it is determined, for 
example, that a loan category A had twice the loss experience of loan 
category 8, we could infer (simplistically) that category A has twice 
the probability of loss as category B. This is simplistic in that past 
experience does not always repeat itself - it is simply an indicator. 
The probability factor should therefore be adjusted for past 
extraordinary events that may have skewed the historical results, as 
well as for any known future events that may have a bearing on risk. 
Until such time as an historical data base has been accumulated for 
each category, it may be necessary to make a prediction from current 
default figures. It is assumed that all banks are able to ascertain the 
default status of each account (this is a fairly valid assumption as it 
is one of the primary tasks of a bank to monitor the performance of 
its loans in order to take action on default). Once loans have been 
categorised we need to find the default rate of each category. This 
ought to be a relatively simple operation if the loans data have been 
computerised as one would simply ask the computer to perform a few 
arithmetical calculations. 
The following example shows the current theoretical default rate for 
various categories of loan: 
No of loans in No of loans in % No of loans in 
category default default 
Category A 1 050 74 7% 
Category B 2 500 250 10% 
Category C 932 47 5% 
Category D 2 100 252 12% 
6 582 623 9,5% 
Not all loans in default culminate in sales in execution. Many default 
situations are rectified through rearrangements with clients. We 
cannot therefore say that category A has a 7% probability of a sale 
5.3.2.3 
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in execution occurring. If it is the bank's experience, for example, 
that only 50% of loans in default end up as a sale in execution then 
the above factors would need to be weighted by 0,5: 
Category A 
Category B 
Category C 
Category D 
Overall risk measurement formula 
Probability of 
potential 
loss occurring 
3,5% 
5% 
2,5% 
6% 
4,8% 
In order to take account of varying balances between categories, the 
potential loss (amount x probability) must be related to the value of 
balances in that category. 
The measurement for risk (ri) will therefore be as follows: 
potential loss for category x 1 00 
balance in category ri = 
If, for example, the potential loss for a category 
balance in that category = R 1 000, 
ri = 100/1000 x 100 
= 10 
R 100 and the 
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5.4 RETURN MEASUREMENT 
5.4.1 Returns defined in terms of the model 
Returns on home loans are received in the form of interest margin. Gross 
margin is the difference between the rate at which funds are lent (lending 
rate) and the rate at which loans are funded (funding rate paid to savers 
and investors and for funds obtained from the Reserve Bank). Net margin 
is residual after expenses have been deducted. 
The model developed in this study is based on neither the net margin nor 
the gross margin. It is based on the additional margin that would be 
gained from an increase in the lending rare. 
Consider the following theoretical example: 
A bank has a funding rate of 16% and a lending rate of 20%. Net 
margins are 50% of gross margins. 
In this example: gross margin = 4% 
net margin = 2%. 
If the lending rate were increased by 1 %, both gross margin and net 
margin would increase by 1 %. 
Portfolio theory as outlined in Chapter 3 of this study centres around the 
concept that additional levels of risk must be compensated for by 
additional levels of return. 
These additional levels of return will be measured in terms of additional 
margin gained through increases in the lending rate and are defined as 
deviations from the normal lending rate of a bank. 
5.4.2 
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Measurement of returns in terms of the model 
If returns are defined as deviations from a bank's normal lending rate, 
then measurement of return for a loan is simply the difference between 
the normal lending rate and the lending rate of that particular loan, or 
category of loan, i.e. 
re(a) = i(a) - i(n) 
where re(a) = return for loan a 
i(a) = lending rate for loan a 
i(n) = normal lending rate 
Consider the following example: 
Normal lending rate for bank 
Lending rate for loan a 
Lending rate for loan b 
then 
re(a) = 0 and re(b) = 1. 
= 20% 
= 20% 
= 21% 
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5.5 RISK-RETURN MEASUREMENT 
5.5.1 Simple matrix measurement 
5.5.2 
The simple matrix method outlined in section 5.3.1. ranks risk on an 
ordinal basis. We know one category is riskier than the other, but we do 
not know by how much. Our example in section 5.3.1 ranks the 
categories on a scale of 1 - 6 with 1 being the lowest risk and 6 being the 
highest. 
As this method does not accurately measure the level of risk, we cannot 
accurately measure a desired level of return. Returns in this instance are 
allocated subjectively. It might be that the bank feels that due to 
competition, or political sensitivity, the market is likely to bear a rate 
differential of, say, 0,5% on new loans and that this differential should be 
evenly spread over the matrix categories, 
i.e. 
risk category 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Potential loss method 
return (in terms of 
additional lending rate) 
0,1 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
In terms of the potential loss method, the risk in each category is 
measured in terms of the losses that are likely to result. 
The model is based on two critical concepts: 
il the bank's normal lending rate should be applied to categories which 
have a "normal" or "acceptable" level of risk. This level of risk will 
be defined as the "acceptable risk level" -ria -, and 
ii) any additional risk above the acceptable risk level should be 
compensated for in terms of additional income or return. 
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Consider the following example: 
Category A represents the acceptable risk level. 
Loan balances in category A are R 1 million. Potential losses are calculated 
to be R 1 000. 
ri (a) = 1 000 x 100 = 0,1 
1 000 000 
Loan balances in category B are R 1 ,5 million. 
Acceptable losses for category B would be 
R1 500 000 X 0,1% = R1 500. 
If potential losses for category B were R4 500 (ri = 0,3) then it follows 
that the additional R3 000 must be compensated for by additional interest 
revenue. 
The additional rate (required return) that needs to be charged to generate 
the R3 000 is R 3 000 x 100 i.e. 0,2 
1 500 000 
The additional return (required return) that must be generated to 
compensate for the additional level of risk for loans in category B may 
also be calculated as follows: 
rre(x) = ri(x) - ria 
where 
rre(x) = required return for loan x 
ri(x) = risk measurement for loan x 
and ria = acceptable risk level. 
In terms of our example, 
rre = 0,3 - 0,1 = 0,2. 
The return shortfall (the amount by which the interest rate does not 
compensate for risk) may be calculated as follows: 
res = rre - re 
where 
res = return shortfall 
rre = required return 
re = actual return 
by substitution: res = ri - ria - re. 
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The model may be represented in similar terms to the portfolio theory 
outlined in the literature survey in chapter 3. "Acceptable risk level" is a 
similar concept to the "risk free rate" of modern portfolio theory 
developed by Sharpe (see section 3.4.2.3 of this study). Sharpe 
maintained that there is a "risk free rate" applicable to risk free assets 
such as government bonds. Riskier assets require additional 
compensation. In similar vein, this study posits that there is an 
acceptable level of risk for which "normal" mortgage rates are acceptable 
and that riskier loans require additional compensation. This model will 
measure the risk-return relationship in terms of a straight line. 
Consider the following example (depicted diagrammatically in Figure 5.3) 
where matrix category 1 is considered the acceptable risk level: 
Matrix re ri ria rre res 
Category (return) (risk) (acceptable (required (return 
risk level) return: shortfall: 
ri - ria} rre - re} 
0 0,1 0,1 0 0 
2 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,2 +0, 1 
3 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,2 -0,1 
4 0,6 0,7 0,1 0,6 0 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
rre(ri-ria) 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Straight line risk-return measurement 
0~----~------~------~----~------~----~------~----~ 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
re 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
The quality line is where risk is equally compensated for in terms of 
return. Any slope falling above the quality line is where there is a return 
shortfall (loans are under-priced) and loans falling below the quality line is 
where there is a return excess (loans are over-priced). 
5.6 OVERALL PORTFOLIO MEASUREMENT 
The model, thus far, has been concerned with individual loans and categories 
of loans. The literature survey in terms of risk and return stresses the 
importance of the overall performance of the portfolio. 
A bank needs to know that its overall portfolio is being soundly managed in 
terms of risk and return. Measurements therefore need to be developed which 
would enable a bank to assess the quality of the portfolio (in terms of risk and 
return) at any one time as well as to judge whether the portfolio quality is 
improving or deteriorating over time. 
In terms of this model, five quality measurements are suggested. 
p 
R 
0 
D 
u 
c 
T 
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The first four quality measurements are described in terms of the matrix 
example (see section 5.3) for Bank A shown in figure 5.4. 
FIGURE 5.4 
Theoretical example of risk matrix for Bank A 
low 
risk 
medium 
risk 
high 
risk 
default 
total 
low 
risk 
50 
80 
40 
10 
180 
medium 
risk 
70 
100 
50 
14 
234 
A R E A 
high 
risk 
20 
\ 
30 
10 
5 
65 
total 
140 
210 
100 
29 
479 
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The numbers entered in the matrix are hypothetical money balances of 
outstanding loans (in R millions, say), for illustrative purposes. 
The quality measurements are: 
• average area rating 
• average product rating 
• average overall matrix rating 
• default as percentage of total balances 
• return shortfall. 
These are now discussed in further detail as follows. 
Quality measurement 1: average area rating 
The first step is to assign rankings to the areas: 
low risk = 1 
medium risk = 2 
high risk = 3 
The area ratings are multiplied by the balance in each area category. 
These are then added together and divided by total portfolio balances. 
180x1 = 180 
234 X 2 
65 X 3 
= 468 
195 
843/479 
1,76 
If all balances were in low risk areas, the average area rating would be 1. 
If all balances were in high risk categories, the average rating would be 3. 
The spread of balances in this matrix gives a rating of 1, 7 6. 
Quality measurement 2: average product rating 
This is exactly the same concept as for area ratings. Products are rated, 
multiplied by balances in each category, and divided by total portfolio 
balances. 
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140 X 1 = 140 
210 X 2 = 420 
100 X 3 = 300 
29 X 4 = 1..1.§. 
976/4 79 
= 2,04 
If all loans fall into the low risk product category, the average product 
rating would be 1 . If all loans were in default, the average product rating 
would be 4. 
Quality measurement 3: average overall mat11ix rating 
This is obtained in the same manner as the product and area ratings. 
Overall matrix ratings are allocated as per section 5.3.1 of this report, and 
illustrated in figure 5.2. 
50 X 1 = 50 
80 X 2 = 160 
70 X 2 = 140 
40 X 3 = 120 
100 X 3 = 300 
20 X 3 = 60 
50 X 4 = 200 
30 X 4 = 120 
10 X 5 = 50 
29 X 6 = 174 
1 374/479 
= 2,9 
This measurement will lie somewhere between 1 and 6 depending on the 
level of risk. 
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Quality measurement 4: default as percentage of total balances 
This rating shows, as a percentage of the overall portfolio, those loans 
already in default: 
29/479 = 6,1% 
Quality measurement 5: return shortfall 
This measurement is obtained by calculating the return shortfall for the 
entire portfolio in exactly the same way as it is obtained for each 
category, 
i.e. res (P) = ri (P) -ria (Pr- re(P) 
where 
res (P) = return shortfall for the portfolio 
ri(P) = risk measurement for the portfolio 
ria(P) = acceptable risk level 
re(P) = return for portfolio 
Where res is greater than 0, risk is under-compensated for. 
Where res = 0, risk is compensated for. 
Where res is less than 0, risk is over-compensated for. 
The overall aim of portfolio management is that the portfolio should fall 
on the quality line as shown in figure 5.3. 
There are two basic strategies to ensure the portfolio falls on the quality 
line, i.e. res = 0: 
i) change the pricing structure (increase return on risky loans) 
ii) incorporate more low risk loans (res is less than 0) to balance the 
portfolio. 
Exactly where on the quality line the portfolio falls, depends on the risk-
averseness or utility (as discussed in the survey of the literature in 
Chapter 3) of the bank. This is shown in figure 5.5. 
- 139 -
FIGURE 5.5 
Risk averseness 
rre(ri-ria) 
Quality line 
res•O 
risk averse 
re 
A detailed summary of information provided by the model is conveyed by 
Appendix 6. 
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5. 7 SUMMARY OF THE MODEL 
The model may be summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Risk categorisation of loans 
a) All loans are assigned ratings for area and product. This is done in terms 
of 
i) area - all areas in which lending is done are ranked, e.g. high risk, 
medium risk and low risk 
ii) product - all loans are categorised into products in terms of client 
profile, equity, affordability or any other factor that might materially 
affect risk. Product categories are ranked, e.g. high risk, medium 
risk, low risk, default. 
b) Area and product ratings are combined into a matrix, e.g. as shown in 
figure 5.2. 
Step 2: Risk measurement 
This may be done in two ways: 
i) risk matrix method -this simply assigns a ranking to each category 
ii) potential loss method 
potential loss for each loan in the applicable category is obtained 
i.e. where potential loss = extent of potential loss x probability 
and extent of potential loss = capital loss + interest loss + 
expenses 
risk measurement - ri - is calculated by summing potential losses 
for each individual loan in that category and expressed as a 
percentage of total balances in that category. 
Step 3: Return measurement 
Returns are defined as deviation from the normal lending rate of a bank and 
are calculated as the difference between the normal lending rate and the 
lending rate for the loan category in question. 
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Step 4: Risk-return measurement 
An acceptable risk level (ria) is determined and the required rate of return (rre) 
for that level of risk is calculated as the difference between the risk 
measurement (ri) and ria. 
The return shortfall (res) is the difference between the actual return (re) and 
the required return (rre). 
The straight line on a risk-return axis that summarises all loans or categories 
of loans where risk is adequately compensated for in terms of return - res = 
0 - is called the quality line. 
Step 5: Overall portfolio measurement 
Five measurements that indicate overall portfolio quality are the average area 
rating, average product rating, average overall matrix rating, default category 
as a percentage of total portfolio, and the return shortfall (res) for the 
portfolio. 
The aim of home loan portfolio management is to ensure the portfolio falls on 
the quality line. The position on the quality line will depend on the risk 
averseness of the bank. 
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5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
5.8.1 
The aim of this study was to develop a model for the measurement of home 
loan risk by banks. 
A model was accordingly developed in terms of information derived from a 
literature survey, a questionnaire submitted to banks and the relevant practical 
experience of the writer. 
The model complies with the aims as set out in the introduction to this 
chapter in terms of the following advantages and benefits: 
Advantages and benefits of the model 
i) Simplicity: 
The model is readily usable, the concomitant tasks of the user being: 
- rating of areas 
- categorisation of products 
- development of a computer programme to run the model. 
ii) Practicality: 
The model may be used by banks to measure risk, price loans 
according to risk, and for monitoring the overall performance of the 
loans portfolio. 
iii) Relevance: 
The model applies specifically to the South African market, and is 
based on the trends in risk over the period September 1986 -
September 1991 and the diversity of products and areas in the South 
African market. 
iv) Academic value: 
The model is, as far as may be ascertained, original in its concept and 
application. Although based on investment models, it has been 
specifically tailored to deal with home loans in the South African 
market. The model might be enhanced or adapted by users where 
necessary. 
5.8.2 
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v) Flexibility: 
The model is flexible in a number of ways. The criteria used to 
classify areas or products are at the discretion of the particular user 
bank. The number of categories on the matrix may be expanded or 
reduced. The risk measurement formulae and probability estimates 
are all flexible in terms of the needs and experience of the particular 
bank. Different options are given in terms of the simple matrix 
method and the potential loss method. 
Disadvantages 
i) It might not always be possible to vary the risk-return trade off to the 
extent required by the model due to competitive forces and possible 
implications of being seen to be discriminatory. 
The solution would appear to lie in either some form of co-operation 
between banks or the avoidance of those loan categories where the 
model indicates that reward is not sufficient to compensate for risk. 
ii) The model requires historical data for the compilation of probability 
predictions which might take time for banks to develop. The model 
does, however, offer alternative predictions from current default 
statistics. 
The writer submits that the advantages and benefits of the model 
convincingly outweigh its disadvantages (see above) and that the model 
should prove invaluable to banks and other interested parties (for example, 
insurance companies). 
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CHAPTER 6 
Final summary and conclusions 
6.1 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
The study was initiated as the result of a view that risk in the home loan 
market had increased in recent years and that banks were not being 
adequately compensated for the increased risk. 
The primary objective of the study was to develop a model that measured 
home loan risk for the purpose of pricing loans. 
A survey relating to the home loan market in South Africa, conducted as part 
of the study, showed increasing activity by banks in the home loan market. 
Sales in execution and properties in possession were shown to be increasing. 
The housing need was found to be predominantly in the black market where 
affordability was low and risks high. 
A literature survey relating to risk and reward revealed very little as regards 
risk measurement and risk-return management as it relates to home loans in 
South Africa. The majority of work regarding risk was related to share 
portfolios. The model developed in the study appeared to be original in its 
concept and application. A questionnaire survey conducted among banks 
revealed the following: 
i) the view that home loan business is more risky than 5 years ago 
ii) the view that lending in black areas is more risky than lending in white 
areas 
iii) banks do not use any formal model to measure home loan risk for the 
purpose of pricing loans 
iv) the value of a formal model would depend largely on flexibility in terms of 
the particular circumstances of each bank. 
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6.2 THE MODEL 
The model has the following characteristics: 
i) risk categorisation of loans (section 5.2): the risk matrix allows various 
combinations of area and product ratings 
ii) risk measurement (section 5.3) in terms of either: 
the risk matrix method:- assigning rankings to each category, or 
the potential loss method i.e. calculation of the extent of the potential 
loss (in terms of interest, capital and expenses) multiplied by the 
probability of such loss occurring 
iii) return measurement (section 5.4) in terms of deviations from normal 
lending rates 
iv) risk-return measurement (section 5.5) where required rates of return are 
calculated as the difference between the risk measurement and the 
acceptable risk level and where adequate compensation is reflected on the 
quality line 
v) overall portfolio measurement (section 5.6) in terms of area ratings, 
product ratings, overall matrix ratings, default percentages and portfolio 
return shortfalls. 
The model has advantages and benefits in terms of relevance, simplicity, 
practicality, flexibility, and academic value. 
Disadvantages of the model involve difficulties in price variation arising from 
competitive forces and implicit or explicit discrimination. 
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6.3 PROPOSED FURTHER RESEARCH 
The writer believes the model to be original in concept and that scope exists 
for critique and enhancement. The following research is suggested: 
il possible ways in which the model might be improved 
iil ways in which the model might be adapted to portfolios other than those 
of home loans 
iii) ways of overcoming problems in the marketplace regarding competition 
and charges of discrimination, thus allowing effective rate differentiation 
iv) ways of overcoming the problems reported by banks in black areas, 
thereby enabling banks to address the critical shortage of housing in these 
areas. 
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Appendix 1 
NOTICES OF SALES IN EXECUTION 
Notices of sales in execution per Government Gazette IQ 
., 
(/) 
Total November 1988- September 1989 l> r 
m White % Coloured 0/o Asic:n % Black % Total % (/) 
United 1,288 28.4% 495 60.4% 54 16.7"'A.. 356 22.~A. 2,193 30.1% H 
Perm 1,159 25.6% 99 12.1% 74 22.8% 856 53.3% 2,18f? 30.1% 
z 
Allied 1,091 24.1% 121 14.8% 153 47.~A.. 243 15.1% 1,608 22.1% ~ 
NataJ 323 7.1% 34 4.2% 22 6.8% 92 5.7% 471 6.5% e Saambou 299 6.6% 55 6. 7"'A.. 3 0.9% 27 1. 7"'A.. 384 5.3'% -t 
Provincial 4 0.1% 2 o.~A.. 2 0.6% 0 O.O"A.. 8 0.1% § 
E.P 95 2.1% 3 0.4% 0 O.O"A.. 1 0.1% 99 1.4% 
Trust 17 0.4% 0 0.0"/o 0 O.Oo/o 0 0.0"/o 17 0.2% 
F.N.B 171 3.8% 9 1.1% 9 2.8% 14 0.9% 203 2.8% l> 
"0 
Standard 39 0.9% 0 0.0"/o 7 2.2o/o 9 0.6% 55 O.SOio "0 (I) 
Bolc:nd 16 0.4% 1 0.1% 0 0.0"/o 8 0.~~ 25 0.3% :J a. 
Volkskas 30 0.7'Yo 0 0.0"/o 0 0.0"/o 0 0.0"/o 30 0.4% f-J· ...... 
>< ~ 
Total 4,532 100.0"/o 819 100.0"/o 324 100.0"/o 1,606 100.0"/o 7,281 100.0"/o OJ 
...1. 
...... 
B~month Nov88 Dec Jan 91 Feb Mar ~ May 
f-J• 
June July August ~ Total % 
United 174 88 215 177 204 193 126 191 218 248 359 2,193 30.1% 
Perm 146 121 159 150 220 173 173 163 226 235 422 2,188 30.1% 
Allied 105 101 123 166 143 140 152 148 182 163 185 1,608 22.1% 
NataJ 27 17 13 38 33 45 42 58 49 47 102 471 6.5% 
Saambou 16 23 9 37 60 35 47 33 33 43 48 384 5.3% 
Provincial 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 8 0.1% 
E.P. 7 2 8 6 6 0 8 8 11 29 14 99 1.4% 
Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 7 17 0.~/o 
F.N.B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 50 56 62 203 2.SO/o 
Standard 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 20 12 7 55 0.8% 
Bolc:nd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 6 4 25 0.3% 
Volkskas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 7 9 30 0.4% 
Total 475 352 527 574 607 587 550 677 801 851 1 220 7281 100.0"A. 
Source: (Goverment Gazette, compiled from weekly issues by Perm) 
Notices of sales in execution per Government Gazette 
Total October 1989- September 1990 
\Nhite % Coloured % Asicn % Black % Total % 
United 1,816 21.SO/o 2,091 73.3% 78 13.1% 632 12.SO/o 4,617 27.2% 
Penn 2,247 26.7% 249 8.7% 190 31.9% 2,602 51.3% 5,288 31.2% 
Allied 1,401 16.6% 184 6.4% 170 28.SO/o 624 12.3% 2,379 14.0% 
Natal 673 8.0% 149 5.2% 92 15.4% 258 5.1% 1,172 6.9% 
Saambou 615 7.:JO/b 45 1.6% 15 2.5% 159 3.1% 834 4.9% 
Provincial 21 0.2% 12 0.4% 4 0.7% 0 0.0% 37 0.2% 
E.P 112 1.:JO/o 15 O.SO/o 2 O.:JO/o 2 0.0% 131 0.8% 
Trust 141 1.7% 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 2 0.0% 145 0.9% 
F.N.B 805 9.6% 81 2.8% 19 3.2% 34 0.7% 939 5.5% )> '0 
Standard 450 5.3% 23 0.8% 26 4.4% 181 3.6% 680 4.0% '0 CD 
Bolcr1d 38 0.5% 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 5 0.1% 45 0.3% ::l Q. 
f-'· 
__.. 
Volkskas 110 1.3"/o 0 0.(]% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 111 0.7% X ~ 
S.A. Housing Trust 0 0.0'% 0 0.0'% 0 o:oo.1o 572 11.3% 572 3.4% <.0 ..J. 
Total 8,429 100.00/o 2,853 100.0o/o 596 100.0% 5,072 100.00/o 16,950 100.00/o 
....... 
f-'· 
f-'· 
-By month Oct89 Nov Dec Jan 91 Feb Mar ~ May June July August ~ Total o/o 
---
United 298 347 185 333 371 445 284 362 444 496· 552 500 4,617 27.2% 
Penn 454 378 364 436 492 639 379 400 488 428 417 413 5,288 31.2% 
Allied 181 182 134 151 163 263 149 135 200 273 274 274 2,379 14.00/o 
Na1:al 76 77 63 71 117 108 92 129 108 111 89 131 1,172 6.9% 
Saambou 37 53 39 49 55 80 62 68 93 89 107 102 834 4.9% 
Provincial 1 2 4 0 3 10 1 5 5 0 3 3 37 0.2% 
E.P. 14 11 8 5 16 10 8 14 9 14 11 11 131 0.8% 
Trust 3 3 11 1 3 17 8 12 19 28 29 11 145 0.9% 
F.N.B 58 71 50 61 81 98 66 82 98 97 98 79 939 5.5% 
Standard 12 9 16 18 10 12 43 53 63 187 144 113 680 4.00/o 
So lend 8 3 6 0 5 5 1 2 3 4 1 7 45 O.:JO/o 
Volkskas 6 8 8 12 11 14 7 11 8 7 11 8 111 0.7% 
S .A. Housing Trust 0 134 0 0 93 83 18 12 70 4 130 28 572 3.4% 
Total 1,148 1,278 888 1,137 1,420 ____!284 LJ 1_~ __ L285 1,608 1,!_38 _1 ,866 1,680 16,950 100.00/o 
Source: (Goverment Gazette, compiled rrom weekly issues by Penn) 
Notices of sales in execution per Government Gazette 
Total October 1990- September 1991 
White % Coloured % Asia1 o/o Black % Total o/o 
l.Xlited 1,972 21.1% 2,469 64.7o/o 136 1 0.9"A. 912 11.00/o 5,489 24.1% 
Perm 2,408 25.7o/o 575 15.1% 541 43.5% 3,512 42.2% 7,036 30.9"/o 
Allied 1,642 17.5% 241 6.3"A. 100 15.3% 817 9.8% 2,890 12.7'0k 
Natal 892 9.5% 312 8.~/0 227 18.~A. 1,029 12.4% 2,460 10.8"'/o 
Saambou 572 6.1% 37 1.00/o 18 1.4% 646 7.8% 1,273 5.6% 
Provincial 7 0.1% 10 0.3"A. 5 0.4% 1 O.OOA. 23 0.1% 
E.P 114 1.~A. 7 o.~A. 13 1 .OOA. 5 0.1% 139 0.6% 
Trust 244 2.6'% 5 0.1% 4 0.3% 0 0.00/o 253 1.1% 
F.N.B 634 6.8"'A. 97 2.5'% 26 2.1% 76 0.9% 833 3. 'j'OA, l> 
"0 
Standard 699 7.f!PA. 60 1.6% 83 6.7'0A. 332 4.0% 1,174 5.2% "0 (1) 
Bolmd 59 0.6% 1 0.0% 2 0.~/o 4 0.00/o 66 0.3% :3 0.. 
Volkskas 125 1.3% 3 0.1% 0 0.0% 3 0.00/o 131 0.6% t-'• X 
SA Housing Trust 0 O.Oo/o 0 0.0% 0 0.00/o 979 11 .8"'/o 979 4.3% ...1. (J' 
Total 9,368 100.00A. 3,817 100.0% 1,245 100.00/o 8,316 100.00A. 22,746 100.00A. _.... c 
t-'• • 
12 Months ended t-'• 
t-'· 
September 1990 Year to date 
October 00 
-By monttl No % Oct90 Nov Jan91 Feb Mar ~ ~ June July August ~ Total % 
United 4,617 23.1% 457 478 303 429 439 453 477 532 470 480 535 436 5,489 24.1% 
Perm 5,288 26.5% 426 602 315 404 498 540 659 756 700 741 775 620 7,036 30.9"/o 
Allied 5,379 27.00A. 211 317 133 195 196 268 264 228 271 250 325 232 2,890 12.7'0/o 
Natal 1,172 5.9"/o 143 204 108 137 218 212 219 228 214 281 260 236 2,460 10.8% 
Saambou 834 4.2o/o 75 109 42 53 98 109 144 165 122 156 132 68 1,273 S.SOA. 
Provincial 37 o.~A. 2 1 1 4 4 0 2 1 2 4 1 1 23 0.1% 
E.P. 131 0.7% 7 11 7 2 13 4 23 17 10 10 20 15 139 0.6% 
Trust 145 0.7'0/o 20 19 6 18 26 15 12 31 17 30 27 32 253 1.1% 
F.N.B 939 4.7% 85 103 53 57 83 76 59 73 67 53 84 53 846 3.7% 
Standard 680 3.4% 105 94 66 51 .65 107 99 157 88 97 130 104 1,161 5.1% 
Bolmd 45 0.2o/o 4 4 3 8 8 2 16 3 5 9 3 2 67 0.3% 
Volkskas 111 0.6% 8 10 4 12 6 15 9 12 13 17 16 8 130 0.6% 
S.A. Housing Trust 572 2.9"/o 74 124 2 15 65 110 69 100 46 35 215 124 979 4.3% 
Total 19,950 100.00/o 1,617 2,076 1,043 1,385 1,719 1 ,911 2,052 2,303 2,023 2,163 2,523 1,931 22,746 100.00/o 
Source: (Goverment Gazette, compiled from weekly Issues by Perm) 
Notices of sales in execution per Govemment Gazette 
Total October 1991 - Se2tember 1992 
White o/o Coloured % Asian ,~ Black % Total % 
United 1,997 19.5% 2,125 51.5% 165 10.9% 1,174 10.5% 5,461 20.2% 
Allied 1,623 15.9% 244 5.goA. 261 17.3% 1,216 10.8% 3,344 12.3% 
Bankorp 466 4.6% 11 0.3% 12 0.8% 6 0.1% 495 1.8% 
VolkskaS 160 1.6% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 162 0.6% 
Total 4,246 41.5% 2,380 57.7% 439 29.0% 2,397 21.4% 9,462 34.9°/o 
Ned cor 2,905 28.4% 855 20.7% 614 40.6% 5,515 49.1% 9,889 36.5% 
Natal 936 9.2% 553 13.4% 286 18.9% 1,334 11.9% 3,109 11.5% 
Standard 794 7.8% 57 1.4% 72 4.8% 619 5.5% 1,542 5.7% 
F.N.B 535 5.2% 151 3.~0 47 3.1% 108 1.0% 841 3.1% )> 
Boland 76 0.7% 13 0.3% 4 0.3% 10 0.1% 103 0.4% "C 
"C 
Saambou 560 5.5% 91 2.2% 16 1.1% 705 6.3% 1,372 5.1% C'D ::I 
Provincial 10 0.1% 4 0.1% 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 16 0.1% c. _. 1-'· (J1 E.P. 161 1 .6"';0 21 0.5% 33 2.2% 8 0.1% 223 0.8% >< 
S.A. Housing Trust 0 0.0"';0 0 0.0"';0 0 0.0"'/o 525 4.7% 525 1 ,goA, ..J. 
........ 
Total 10,223 100.()% __ ~125 J_QQ"Q% J ,513 100.0%. 11,221 1 00.0"';0 27,082 1 OO.O"'A. 1-'· < 
Year to date 
October 91 
B~ month Oct 91 Nov Dec Jan92 Feb Mar 812! May June July August ~ Total % 
United 380 583 322 430 489 470 467 463 423 551 514 369 5,461 20.2% 
Allied 272 326 165 283 282 234 333 260 328 341 294 226 3,344 12.3% 
Bankorp 31 37 11 33 45 23 36 36 55 74 57 57 495 1.8% 
Volkskas 11 13 3 23 18 14 20 16 9 12 11 12 162 0.6% 
Total 694 959 501 769 834 741 856 775 815 978 876 664 9,462 34.9% 
Ned cor 785 1,129 443 979 663 711 780 771 888 1,096 843 801 9,889 36.5% 
Natal 229 263 137 208 293 231 284 283 305 335 245 296 3,109 11.5% 
Standard 103 130 52 180 118 184 138 120 91 1n 122 127 1,542 5.7% 
F.N.B 65 79 27 64 70 68 88 72 61 110 66 71 841 3.1% 
Boland 3 5 3 15 13 7 7 12 9 13 7 9 103 0.4% 
Saambou 145 125 73 80 121 125 144 119 111 136 107 86 1,372 5.1% 
Provincial 1 1 2 2 1 0 4 2 3 0 1 0 17 0.1% 
E.P. 23 17 13 16 21 15 18 25 9 35 17 13 222 0.8% 
S.A. Housing Trust 29 98 20 28 25 77 44 27 61 36 38 42 525 1.gc>A, 
Total 2,0n 2,806 1,271 2,341 2,159 2,159 2,363 2,206 2,353 2,916 2,322 2,109 27,082 1 00.0"'/o 
Source: (Goverment Gazette, compiled from weekly issues by Perm) 
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Appendix 2 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION THAT CAN 
AFFORD A GIVEN LOAN 
"tl 
~ 
~ 
Mi 
0 
~ Coloured 
, 
~ 
L-nAmount Loan Amount m 
Interest R10.000 R20,000 A30.000 A40.000 
First lime Firat Time Firetlime Firat Time 
Alllte No. Home No. Home No. Home No. Home 
Subaicly Buyer Subllicly Buyer Subaidy Buyer Subaicly Buyer 
Inter eat R10.000 R20.000 A30,000 R40,000 
Fi1'11tlime First lime Firat lime Firat lime 
Rate No. Home No. Home No. Home No. Home 
Subsidy Buyer Subsidy Buver Subsidy Buyer Subaiclv Buver 
~ 
~ 
20% 92.8% 96.8% 80.4% 87.9% 68.9% 80.2% 19.3% 33.0% 20% !52.1% 68.9% 23.4% 36.4% 1 !5.1% 23.1% 1.2% 2.3% ~ 
18% 93.9% 97.3% 81.2% 89.7% 73.8% 80.9% 20.9% 40.7% 
16% 9lU% 97.8% 84.1% 91.2% 78.2% 81.7% 32.7% 48.1% 
14% 96.4% 98.3% 87.1% 92.~% 79.8% 8::0.8% 42.4'ro ~~-2% 
18% !56.0% 70.!5% 24.3% 41.8% 18.1% 24.0% 1.3% 3.9% 
16% 60.2% 74.1% 28.1% 46.9% 21.0% 24.9% 2.3% 0.8% 
14% 6:5.3% 77.0% 33.9% ~1.1% 22.8'ro 30.7% 4.3% 7.2%t 
~ 
~ -6" "C ct> :I 
12% 97.3% 98.7% 89.7% 93.7% 80.9% 87.8% ~1.8% 82.3% 
- ·---- -···----·--
A a ian 
12% 70.:1% 80.0% 41.8% ~0.3% 24.0% 36.1% 6.4% 10.9%• 
---- --------·-
Black 
)> a. , 1-'· _. 
2J >< (Jl (g 1\) 
w 
....... 
1-'• 
Loan Amount Lean Amount )> 
Inter eat R10,000 R20,000 A30,000 R40.000 
Firat Time Firat Time Firat Time Fir&tlime 
lnteroet R10,000 R20.000 R30,000 R40,000 
First Time Firat 11mo Firat lime Fir&t limo 
G) 
~ 
Rate No. Home No. Home No. Home No. Home 
Subaicly Buyer Subsidy Buyer Subaicly Buyer Subaidy Buyer ' 
Rate No. Home No. Homo No. Homo No. Homo 
Subsidy Buyer Subsidy Buyer Subaidy Buyer Subeidy Buyer ~ 
' 
20% 79.8% 90.9% +4.8% 62.4% 32.8% 44.2% 4.3% 7.6% 20% 32.8% ~4.0% 6.1% 18.1% !5.1% 7.9% 0.2% 0.6% 5 ~ 
18% 83.2% 92.8% 4~.9% 89.0% 37.1% 4ll.4% 4.7% 12.1% 18% 37.7% 07.8"k 8.6% 22.0% 6.0% 8.4% 0.2% 1.2% 
I 
18% 86.0% 94.1% !52.0% 78.8% 41.3% 46.7% 7.8% 16.11% 18% 43.7% 61.0% 11.6% 28.0% 7.0% 8.9% 0.8% 1.9% 
14% 89.8% 9!5.!5% !59.!5% 78.9% 43.8% !56.0% 13.1% 20.9% 14% !51 .!5% 84.3% 16.2% 31.9% 7.7% 13.7% 1.4% 2.!5% 
12% 92.6% 96.4% 89.0% 82.6"k 4ll.4% 82.1% 18.7% 26.8% 12% !57.8% 88.8% 22.7% 36.8% 8.4% 17.9% 2.2% 3.7% 
Source: (DeVos, 1990,p12) 
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HISTORY OF SEGREGATION LAWS, 
1885-1952 
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HISTORY OF SEGREGATION LAWS, 1885 - 1952 
1----··--·--............ ~ .... -........ ~~ .......... ----------------·------· ····-· 
DATE I HISTORY OF SEGREGATION LAWS 1885 • 1952 Cll 
1--·--···----1········································································--···············--·······--~··· 
I 
I 1455 I TraJ!.l!!UI forbade Aalana from owning property out-aida apaclal atraata, locatl0111 or baura. 1---------·---------------------------------...;.------------.__ _________ _ 
1891 I o.F.S. forbade Aalana from owning prop•rty or occupying 1117 property within Ita bordara. Thl• waa 
I later extended to five Northern Natal dl•~rlct1 In 1927 1nd only lifted In 1986. 
·-----·---------------------------------------· 
I 
I 
r 
I 
1194 In tha C1pa Colony tha gonrnmant undar premluahlp o1 Cacti Rhod .. ,lntroducad tha Glen Gray Act, 
creating aaparata 'r•••rvea' tor Afrlctna. O.F.s. had alrtady paaaad , .. , prohibiting Black• fraD 
owning or laaalng flxad proptrty I town council• ware ampowartd to ••tablleh aaparata loc•tlona tor 
81acka. , _____ , ____________ _;_ _________________ ~ 
---------1 
1905 I Trannul Municipal Ordinance allowtd '-nlclpalltlu to "tabllah arua tor Aalana and to eject 
I I lltgal occupanta. 
I 
l-----l-------------------------------------·--------------------------1 
1901 I Tranavaal Gold Law barrad Black• In cartaln araaa fr0111 occupying land outalde artaa aaalgned to them I 
I by the 111lnlng commlnlon. I 
l----l------------------------------------------,-----------1 
I 
I 
1913 Hatlvaa Land Act llatar Black Land Act) prevantad Afrlcana nationwide fr0111 acquiring rural land out-
aida 10m morgen lchtduled raaarvta. Thla act lagall:ad Tranaftr of ownarahlp and control of all 
land pouauad by Blacka to tha aouralgn atata.l2l 1---1------------------------------ --- ---------------1 
I 
I 
1923 Natlvea !Urban Araaa) Act provldad for nationwide aegregatlon o1 urban Afrlcana. Explicitly lmpoaed I 
tegregatlon aimed to claar African• out of 111lxtd raaldentlal araaa and rahouat thalli In locatlona. 
Aleo provided for a ayahm of ~&gragatad local gonr1111111nt. Black advlaory boarda ware to ,b• nhb• 
llaad by white ~nuclpalltlaa. 1------·------·--- ------·-----·---------------· 
I 
I 
1938 Davelopm.nt Truat and Land Act rtltaaad a further 7,25 morgen for purchaaa • atttlamant by Afrlcana. 
Together with Black Landa Act anforcad eagrtgatlon In rural ar•••• Thla act Created th• South 
African Truat baaed In Pretoria which controlled all atata owned land.(2) 
----1-----------·--------·-------- ,----------1 
19•3 I Trading and Occupation of Land !Tranavaal and Natal) Raatrlctlon Act !known aa 'Pegging Act'>. 
I Proptrty tranuctlona batwaan Indiana and Whit" placa4 undtr official c011trol. 
1------1----------
---------------------
--------· 
1 
I 
I 
19•5 Natlvu (Urban Areu) COIItOIIdatlon Act. A conaolldatlon of tha above ~et to tnaura control our 
'I _n,..nt and ruldantlal rlgllta of 81acka. Notorloua Section 10 of thla act rtltrlctad Individual 
Blacka fro• 11aklng work outaldt apaclflad arua and wu the rujor hutr~~~Mnt ot Influx control 
I unt II I 985. (3) 
·---1---------------
------------------·-----------
I 
I 
1946 I Aalatlc Land Tanura Act preYantad Indiana from purchaalng or occupying 'White' fixed property 
I wIthout a p ar1111 t. 
I 
·----1------- .. ... --------,·--------------------------1 1--
1S50 
I 
I 
Group Artaa Act ravlaad In 1957 and 1966 anaurad all South African• could I!Ya and trade only In 
aegragatad araaa. Thla act ~rought Coloured peopl• under aagragatlon lawa tor tht flat tl~. 
Ownarahlp of property could not ba tranafarrad fro~ ona pompulatlon group to another. The act 
followad tha Population Ragl•tratlon Act ot l9SO. 1---1-------.-,---- ---·-· -··------------,---------
1951 Illegal aquattlng Act~ anti aquattlng provlalona.C3l 
------ ---------~------------~--,---- -------1 
1952 Native Lewa,~nd.ant Act gavt the 1tata complata control over whtra Black• could llva- Introduced 
'afflux control' whereby par111lul011 w" nqulrad fro111 labour bureaux In rural ara11 to apply for 
work In any araa or to ua• batw••n araaa.Cll 
l--------~·----------------------~------~------------.~------------~-----------------------------------------1 
Source: l. 
2. 
3. 
(SAIRR, l987,Pl-l05) 
(Perm, 1985, pl) 
(CREID, l990,pl-76) 
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Appendix 4 
HOME LOAN 
RISK QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer this questionnaire as it 
relates to you home loan business only 
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PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK OR- FILL IK THE REQUIRED DETAILS 
. 
. 
ORGANISATION : 
POSITION HELD : 
SECTION ONE 
1.1 Home loan business is 
than 5 years ago. 
much less risky 
less risky 
of similar risk 
more risky 
much more risky 
1. 2 If your answer to question 1.1 is "more risky" or "much more 
risky" please state what you believe to be the reasons for the 
increased risk. 
1.3 The home loan market today is 
than 5 years ago. 
1.4 Financial institutions today are 
generally prepared to advance 
loans of a higher percentage of 
the .property valuation than 
they were 5 years ago. 
8 
much less competitive 
less competitive 
as competitive 
more competitive 
much more competitive 
agree 
disagree 
1.5 
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Financial institutions are 
generally prepared to advance 
loans of a higher repayment to 
income percentage than 5 years ago. 
1.6 Financial institutions are 
generally more lenient in their 
lending criteria than 5 year~ ago. 
8 agree disagree 
I I :::::ree 
1.7 If you agree with any of the statements in questions 1.4, 1.5 or 
1. 6 please state the reasons why you believe financial 
institutions have changed their criteria. 
1.8 Under normal circumstances (i.e. 
to the average man in the street) 
what is the maximum loan as a 
percentage of the valuation of the 
property your organisation is 
prepared to advance without 
collateral? 
80% 
85% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
other (specify) 
1.9' Under what circumstances would a client be allowed to exceed the 
maximum stated in question 1.8 above? 
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1.10 Under normal circumstances (i.e. 
to the average man in the street) 
what was the maximum loan as a 
percentage of the valuation of the 
property your organisation is 
prepared to advance without 
collateral 5 years ago? 
1.11 Under what circumstances would a client 
maximum stated in question 1.10 above? 
1.12 Under normal circumstances (i.e. 
to the average man in the street) 
what is the maximum repayment 
as a percentage of joint income 
allowed to a client by your 
organisation. 
less than 80% 
80% 
85% 
90% 
95% 
100% 
Other (specify) 
be allowed to exceed the 
25% 
30% 
33% 
Other (specify) 
1.13 under what circumstances would a client be allowed to exceed the 
maximum stated in question 1.12 above? 
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1.14 Under normal circumstances {i.e. 
to the average man in the street) 
what is the maximum repayment 
as a percentage of joint income 
allowed to a client 5 years ago 
by your organisation. 
25% 
30% 
33% 
other (specify) 
1.15 Under what circumstances would a client be allowed to exceed the 
maximum stated in question 1.14 above? 
1.16 Arrears as a percentage of 
your organisation's loan balances 
are 
than 5 years ago. 
1.17 sales in execution as a percentage 
of your organisation's loan 
balances are than 
5 years ago. 
1.18 Properties in possession as a 
percentage of your organisation's 
loan balances are 
than 5 years ago. 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
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1.19 Bad debt provisions as a 
percentage of your organisation's 
loan balances are 
than 5 years ago. 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
1.20 If you answered "higher" or "much higher" to any of the 
statements in questions 1.16, 1.17, 1.18 or 1.19, please provide 
reasons why you believe these increases have taken place. 
1. 21 Please provide general comment regarding risk in the home loan 
market over the past five years. 
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SECTION TWO 
2.1 Lending in Black areas is 
than lending in White areas. 
much less risky 
less risky 
of similar risk 
more risky 
much more risky 
· 2. 2 If your answer to 2.1 is "more risky," or "much more risky" please 
state what you believe to be the reasons for the increased risk. 
2.3 Are the types of risks in Black 
areas different to those in other 
areas? Byes no 
2.4 Please provide reasons for your answer to question 2.3. 
2.5 What percentage of your lending 
over the past 12 months was in 
Black areas ? 
2.6 Lending in Black areas by your 
organisation over the past 
12 months as compared to the 
previous 12.months 
decreased substantially 
decreased 
remains constant 
increased 
increased substantially 
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2. 7 If your answer to question 2. 6 is "decreased" or "decreased 
substantially", please provide reasons for this decrease. 
· 2.8 Arrears for your organisation 
are proportionately 
in Black areas than White areas. 
2.9 Sales in execution for your 
organisation are proportionately 
in Black areas than 
White areas. 
2.10 Properties in possession for 
your organisation are 
proportionately in 
Black areas than White areas 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
much lower 
lower 
no different 
higher 
much higher 
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2.11 Your organisation intends to 
activity in Black 
areas over the next year. 
2.12 Are your qualifying criteria 
different for Blacks than 
Whites? 
.stop 
substantially reduce 
reduce 
not change 
increase 
substantially increase 
yes 
no 
2.13 If you answered Yes to question 2.12, please state- rtJhat the 
differences are. 
2.14 What is your minimum new loan 
for housing purposes? R 
2.15 What is the reason for this minimum? 
2.16 What percentage of your new lending 
(by value) over the past 12 months 
was on loans under R35,000? 
2.17 What percentage of your loans 
under R35,000 are incorporated 
under.the Urban Foundation's 
Loan Guarantee Scheme7 
2.18 Do you believe the Urban Foundation 
Home Loan Guarantee scheme 
effectively reduces the risk of 
lending in the Black market? B 
% 
% 
yes 
no 
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2.19 Please provide reasons for your answer to question 2.18 above. 
2. 20 What factors do you believe need to be addressed to encourage 
financial institutions to participate in the Black market? 
2.21 Please provide any suggestions you may have for encouraging 
financial institutions to participate in the Black market. 
2.22 Please provide general comment regarding risk in the low 
income/Black market. 
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SECTION THREE 
3.1 Does your organisation make 
use of any model to measure home 
loan risk for the purpose of 
pricing loans? B yes no 
If your answer to this question is Yes, please answer questions 
3. 2, 3. 3 and 3. 4. If your answer to this is question is No, 
please proceed to question 3.5. 
3.2 Please provide summarised details of the model. 
3.3 Do you believe the model is 
adequate to sufficiently measure 
and price for home loan risk? B yes no 
3.4 If your answer to question 3.3 is No, please provide reasons. 
3.5 
3.6 
Do you believe it would be valuable 
to financial institutions if a 
standardised, flexible model could 
be developed which allowed 
measurement of risk on home 
loan accounts? 
B yes no 
comment =----------------------------------------------------------------
Do you believe it would be valuable 
to financial institutions if a 
standardised, flexible model could 
be developed which assisted 
financial institutions in pricing 
home loans according to risk? 
Comment·: 
B yes no 
-----------------------------------------------------------
3.7 
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Do you differentiate 
by interest rate amongst 
home loan borrowers? B no yes 
3.8 If your answer to 3.7 is yes, please state your range of interest 
rates for new loans (e.g. 19.25%- 20%). 
3.9 If you do have a differential rate for new loans, please tick all 
the criteria you consider in determining the rate. 
other accounts client has with organisation 
area in which property is situated 
repayment to income percentage 
loan as a percentage of property valuation 
race 
wh~ther or not the lo~n is part of a housing scheme 
credit history of client 
arrears/loss history of category of loans 
other (please specify) 
3.10 Besides a general rate change, under what circumstances would a 
client's interest rate be changed? 
3.11 Do you grant any loans at an 
interest rate below your 
normal lending rate? B yes no 
- 168 -
Appendix 4(xii) 
3.12 If your answer to question 3.11 is ye~, state under what 
circumstances a client would recieve a loan which is below your 
normal lending rate. 
3.13 Do you grant loans at an interest rate 
above your normal lending rate? B yes no 
3.14 If your answer to question 3.13 is 'yes, please state under what 
circumstances a client would receive a loan which is above your 
normal lending rate. 
3.15 Do your believe in the principle that clients 
who present a higher risk to your organisation 
than other clients should pay a higher interest 
rate? B yes no 
3.16 If your answer to question 3.15 is no, please provide reasons why 
not. 
3.17 Are there circumstances present in the 
market place which prevent your organisation 
from effectively implementing a differential 
interest rate on home loans? Byes no 
3.18 If your answer to question 3.17 is yes, please state what these 
circumstances are. 
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3.19 Do you rate the geographical areas 
in which you lend on a scale according 
to risk (e.g. o = best possible 
risk, 5 =worst risk)? B yes no 
3.20 If your answer to 3.19 is yes, please state details of your 
criteria and scale of measurement. 
3.21 Do you rate your clients on a scale 
according to risk? B yes no 
3. 22 If your answer to 3. 21 is yes, please provide details of your 
criteria and scale of measurement. 
3. 23 Please provide details of any other method you may have for 
measuring risk and potential losses. 
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3. 24 Please provide general comment regarding risk measurement and 
pricing for risk as it relates to home loans. 
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SECTIOH 4 
4.1 At what stage do you normally make a provision for doubtful debt 
on an account? (eg. the client is 2 instalments in arrear) 
4.2 Please describe how 
potential bad debts. 
you determine the specific provision 
Incorporate any formula you might use. 
for 
4.3 At what stage do you implement legal action? (eg. the client is 2 
instalments in arrear). 
4.4 What is the average length of time from when you implement legal 
action until date of sale in execution. 
months. 
4.5 Do you suspend interest on 
potential bad debt accounts? B yes no 
4.6 If your answer to question 4.5 is yes, please state at what stage 
you suspend interest (eg. account is 2 months in arrear). 
4.7 
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Do you make a provision for losses 
on properties in possession? 8 yes no 
4. a If your answer to question 4. 7 is yes, please state how you 
calculate this provision. 
4.9 Do you make a provision for holding 
interest on properties in possession? 8 yes no 
4.10 If your answer to question 4. 9 is yes, please state how you 
calculate this provision. 
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SECTION 5 
Please provide any additional comment you would like to make regarding 
home loan risk or return and which has not been incorporated elsewhere 
in this report. 
- 174 
Appendix 5 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULT STATISTICS 
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5 POINT RATING SCALES 
MnlbrJr per category t per category 
Question No. of ---------------------- ------------------------ ~wMt Highest 
No Input Responses -2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2 Value V~lue Range 
-------- ______________________ ... ___ 
--------- --- --· --· .......... _ ... _ 
--- --- --- --- --- ------- ------- -----
l.l 2 1 1 1 1 2 7 0 0 0 5 2 ~ Ot ot m 29' .1 2 2 
1.3 2 2 2 2 1 1 6 0 0 0 i. 4 ~ Ot ot 3Jt 67t 1 2 2 
U6 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 4 2 ~ 0' ot &n m 1 2 2 
1.17 2. 2 -2 2 1 1 6 1 0 0 2 3 m Ot at 33t 5~ -2 2 5 
1.18 f. 2 -2 2 l 1 6 l 0 0 2 3 l7t Ot at J:lt 50't -2 2 5 
1.19 2 . 2 1 2 I 1 6 0 0 0 3 3 Ot Ot Ot SOt 5ot 1 2 2 
2.1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 7 0 0 0 1 6 Ot Ot Ot 14\ 96\ 1 2 2 
2. 6 2 . 0 . 0 -2 -1 1 -1 7 1 2 2 1 1 14t 29t 29t 14t 14t -2 2 5 
2.8 2 2 0 1 1 0 6 0 0 2 2 2 Ot ot m JJt JJt 0 2 3 
2.9 1 2 -1 1 1 0 . 6 0 1 1 3 I at l7t 17t 5at 17t -1 2 4 
2.10. '1 2 -1 1 1 0 6 0 1 1 3 1 Ot l7t 17\ 50t 17t -1 2 4 
2.11 2 -1 0 -2 -1 1 0 7 1 2 2 1 1 14t 29t 29% 14' 14t -2 2 5 
Significant 
1).1estion Standard Critical at 0.1 
No Mean Median KC>de Devlat lon Variance Value level 
--- ------ ---- --------- -------- -----·- -------- ---------
l.l 1. 286 1 1 0.460 0.238 1.440 6.971 yes 
1.3 1.667 2 2 0.516 0.267 1.476 7.906 yes 
1.16 1.333 1 1 0.516 0. 267 1.476 6.325 yes 
1.17 1.000 1.5 2 1.549 2.400 1.476 1.581 yts 
1.19 1.000 1.5 2 U49 2.400 1.476 1.581 yes 
1.19 1.500 1.5 2&1 0.548 0.300 1.476 6.708 yes 
2.1 1.857 2 2 0.376 0.143 1.~40 13.000 yes 
2.6 -0.143 0 -1&0 1.345 1.810 1.440 -0.281 r1o 
2.8 1.000 1 0'1&2 0.094 0.000 1.476 2.739 yes 
2.9 0.667 1 1 1.033 1.067 1.476 1.581 yes 
2.10 0.667 1 1 1.033 1.067 1.476 l. SBl yes 
2.11 -0.143 0 0&-1 1.345 1.810 1.440 -0.281 no 
DIFFEREJ\tE BETWEEN MEftNS 
()Jest! on 
Mo. Input 
1.8 90 90 80 90 90 ~ 
1.10 80 80 80 90 80 80 
Question 
Mo. Input 
1.12 30 25 30 30 30 30 
1.14 30 25 30 25 25 30 
Mo. of 
Responses 
6 
6 
Ko. of 
Rt.sponm 
6 
6 
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M1111t..r pP.r r.~trqllry ' per r~tPgory 
--------------------- .. 
------------------------
Stftooud 
80 90 
1 5 
5 1 
Nu11hP.r ~r r~ I r.gory 
25 30 
I 
3 
5 
3 
80 90 Km lied ian Mode IJP.vid ion Varime 
---- --------- -------~ 
17t BJt 8A.333 QO 90 4. 002 16.667 
83l m 81.667 80 80 4.082 16.667 
te!lt ~tatist ic: 7.. 87.8 
critir~l vftlue: 1.372 
signlflmt00.1level: yes 
' pP.r r~tP.gory 
St an~~r~ 
Zi 30 kode De vi at ion v~riance 
83% 
50% 
29.167 30 30 2.041 4.167 
27.500 27.5 25&30 2.739 7.500 
te!t statist lc: 1.195 
critical value: 1.372 
significant 0 0.1 !eve I: no 
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TEST OF EQUAL PROPORTICX\JS 
Qu~'?!:-3 t :i. on 1\I!::J. o·F l\lo. Ct .. i. tic a 1 
No. f':+:'!15p (::J n~;e1s ( ' nn , r.n· V ,;;~ l.t.H?. z 
agree') disagree'> 
1. . 4 6 5 1.63 
:1. . ~5 6 4 0.82 
:1. . 6 6 4 0.82 
. .., 
,.::. " :::; '7 7 2.65 
.. , 
. .::. . 12 7 1. :1..89 
'"' . .::. . 1.8 6 4 0.82 
""' 1 7 ... :. . 1 1.89 
.... 
., .. 'l. ~5 7 5 I., 1 :::r, 
..,. 6 7 ... :• . 4 0.38 
:3" 7 6 4 0.82 
~~ fl 1. :L 6 4 0.82 
.... 
•,,.\. :1.3 7 
3. 1 ~:; 7 
.,.. 
... ~. :17 7 
..... 
. .::1 • 1 r.;> 7 
~3 ~ ~;,~ 1 7 
I.J .• 5 7 
4. 7 7 3 0.38 
Ll·. 9 7 
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CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO KEY LENDING CRITERIA 
Agree Yea : 
vitll higher 
'loan Mo : 
Totals : 
Agree Yes : 
vith higher 
*loan Ho : 
Totals : 
Agree Yes : 
vitb higher 
repayMnt Mo : 
to incoM l 
Totals : 
EXPtiTID 
Agree vith higher 
repayaent to 
inco~~e ' 
Yes Ko 
3.333 1.000 
0.667 0.333 
Totals 
4. 333 : 
1.000 : 
------·-------------- -----------4.000 1.333 ' 5.333 : I 
--------------------- ----------
Agree vitb ~re 
leniency in 
lending criteria 
Yes Ko 
3.333 1.000 
0. 667 0.333 
Totals 
4.333 : 
1. 000 : 
------------------- ----------4.000 1.333 I 5.333 : • 
------------------ ---------
Agree vith aore 
leniency in 
lending criteria 
Y~s Mo 
2.667 0.000 
1.333 0.667 
Totals 
2.667 : 
2.000 : 
----------------- ----------4.000 0.667 I 4.667 : I 
----------------- ----------
Agree 
vitb higher 
% loan 
Yes : 
Ho: 
I 
OBSERVED 
Agree vith higher 
repay~~ent to 
incoae % 
Yes No 
4 
0 
Totals 
5 : 
1 : 
" I·--·--·-------·----- ---·-·--Totals : 
Agree Yes : 
vith higher 
' loan Ho : 
Agree 
vith higher 
repay~ent 
to incol8 ' 
Totals : 
Yes : 
Mo : 
Totals : 
4 
Agree vith aore 
leniency in 
lending cri teri~ 
2 : 
Yes Ko 
4 
0 
6 : 
Tot~ Is 
1 : 
I 
--------------------- __________ t 
4 2 : 
I 
--------------------- ----------) 
Agree vith wre 
leniency in 
lending criteria 
Yes Mo 
4 0 
0 2 
Totals 
2 : 
I 
------------------- ----------· 4 2 : 
I 
---------------------. ---
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CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO THE BELIEF THAT HIGHER RISK 
CLIENTS SHOULD PAY HIGHER RATES 
EXPtrTtll OBSDtVID 
Believe in principle Believe in principle 
that higher risk that higher risk 
clients :~hould pay clients should pay 
higher rates higher rates 
Yes No Totals Yes No Totals 
______ .., _____ ..., _______ ,.._ ... __________ 
-------------------------------
IX> charge IX> charge 
different Yes : 2. 667 1.000 3.667 : different Yes : 3 4 : 
interest interest 
rates No : 1.333 0.667 2.000 : rates No : 2 : 
---------Totals : 4.000 1.667 5.667 l Totals : 4 2 6 : 
I 
I 
--- ---
Believe in principle Believe in principle 
that higher risk that higher risk 
clients should p4y clients should pay 
higher rates higher rates 
Yes No Totds Yes No Totals 
IX> charge IX> charge 
rates below Yes : 2.667 0.000 2. 667 : rates below Yes : 4 0 4 : 
nor1al DOrta! 
rates Ho : 1.333 0.667 2.000 : rates Ho : 0 2 2 : 
......... ------------ ... --... -... ---------- --~------------------ ----------Totals : 4. 000 0.667 I 4.667 : Totals : 4 2 I 6 : I I 
------------------ ... __ ... __ ,.. __ 
--------------------- ----------
Believe in principle Believe in principle 
that higher risk that higher risk 
clients should pay clients should pay 
higher rates higher rates 
Yes No Totals Yes Ko Totals 
--------------------------------
-------.. -----------------·-
IX> charge Yes : 1.429 0. 000 1.429 : IX> charge Yes : 2 0 2 : 
rates above ra tea a rove 
OOrlal Mo : 3.571 1.429 5.000 : nona! No : 3 2 5 : 
rates rates I I 
Totals : 5.000 1.429 6.429 : Totals : 5 2 7 : 
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~ rate 
areas 
by risk 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
EIPtrl'ID 
Believe in principle 
tbdt higher risk 
clients should pay 
higher rates 
Yes No Totals 
--------------------------------
2.143 0. 000 
2.857 1.143 
5.000 1.143 
Believe in principle 
that higher risk 
clients should pay 
higher rates 
2.143 : 
4.000 : 
6.143 : 
Yes No Totals 
2.143 1. 000 3.143 : 
2.857 1.143 4.000 : 
Totals : 5.000 2.143 : 7.143 : 
~ believe 
~arket Yea : 
circuL'!tances 
prevent No : 
diff. rates 
Totds : 
Believe in principle 
that biglier risk 
clients sllould pay 
higher rates 
Yes Mo Tota Is 
3.571 2. 000 5.571 : 
1.429 0.571 2.000 : 
5.000 2.511 7.571 : 
~rate 
areas 
by risk 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
Yes : 
No: 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
OBSERVID 
Believe in principle 
tbdt higher risk 
clients should pay 
higher ntes 
Yes Mo Totals 
3 
2 2 
5 2 
Believe in principle 
that higher risk 
clients sllould pay 
higher ntes 
3 : 
4 : 
Yes No Tota Is 
2 3 : 
3 
--------------------- ----------Tota Is : 5 2 : 1 : 
~ believe 
~arket Yes : 
circuL'!tances 
prevent No : 
ditf. ntea 
Totals : 
Believe in principle 
that higher risk 
clients should pay 
higher rates 
Yes No Totals 
3 2 5 : 
2 
5 2 
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CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO THE BELIEF THAT MARKET 
CIRCUMSTANCES PREVENT DIFFERENT RATES 
lb charge 
different 
interest 
rates 
lb c~arge 
rates belo~ 
noraal 
rates 
lb charge 
rotes aoove 
nor~~al 
rates 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
I 
I 
Ho : 
Totals : 
ElPfrl'ID 
lb believe urket 
circuiStances 
prevent ditf. rates 
Yes No Tota Is 
2.667 2.000 4.667 : 
1.333 0.667 2.000 : 
I 
----------------. .,. ________ 
4.000 2.667 I 6.667 : I 
------------------- ..,._.,. _______ 
lb believe .arket 
circuastancBs 
prevent diff. rates 
Yes No Tota Is 
2.667 2.000 4.667 : 
1.333 0.667 2.000 : 
4. 000 2. 667 : 6. 667 : 
lb believe ~~arket 
circlliBtances 
prevent diff. rates 
Yes No Totals 
1.429 4.000 5.429 : 
0.571 1.429 2.000 : 
---------------------2.000 5.429 I 7.429 : I 
--------------------- ----------
lb charge' 
different 
interest 
rates 
lb charge 
rates belo~ 
llOrlldl 
rates 
lA; cha!1Je 
rates aoove 
oorul 
rates 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
OBSERVID 
lb believe ~~arket 
circulllltaoces 
prevent diff. rates 
Yes No Totds 
2 2 
2 0 
4 2 : 
lb be I ieve 111rket 
circutBhnces 
prevent diff. rates 
4 : 
2 : 
6 : 
Yes Ko Totals 
2 2 4 : 
2 0 
4 2 : 
I I 
---------------------·----------1 
Do believe ~~arket 
circutBhnces 
prevent dift. rates 
Yes No Totals 
4 
1 
2 5 : 
I 
I 
5 : 
2 : 
7 : 
Do nta 
areas 
by risk 
Do rate 
clients 
by risk 
res : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
Mo : 
Totals : 
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EXPEX:TID 
Do believe aarket 
circuiStances 
prevent dif t. rates 
res No To ta Is 
2.143 OoOOO 2.143 : 
20857 1.143 4o000 : 
____ .., ____ ... _________ ----------
5.000 1.143 I 6.143 : I 
--------------------- ---------
Do believe aarket 
circulll!tcmces 
prevent di ft. rates 
res No Tot a Is 
2.143 1. 000 3.143 : 
20857 1.143 40000 : 
50000 2.143 : 7ol43 : 
Do rate ' 
areas 
by risk 
Do rata 
clients 
by risk 
res : 
OBSrllVID 
Do believe aarket 
circuiStances 
prevent di ft 0 rates 
res Mo Totals 
3 0 3 : 
No : 2 2 : 4 : 
Totals : 
res : 
Mo : 
Totals : 
I 
---------------------·----------5 2 : 
Do believe ~arket 
c i rcul8 tdnces 
prevent di tt 0 rates 
7 : 
res No Totals 
2 
3 
I 
I 
4 : 
~--------------~----- ---------5 2 : 7 : 
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CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO WHETHER A BANK DOES RATE AREAS 
ON A SCALE ACCORDING TO RISK 
I» rate 
areas 
by risk 
lb rate 
anas 
by risk 
lkl rate 
lrt&S 
by risk 
Yes : 
lol 
Totals I 
Yes : 
I 
I 
lol 
lb cbarge different 
interest ra tea 
Yas Ho Totals 
--------------------------------
1.333 1.000 2.333 : 
2.667 1.333 4.000: 
I I 
I I 
---4.000 2.333 6.333 : 
----
lb cll4 rge ra tea be I ov 
noraal rates 
Yes lo Totals 
I 
I 
1.333 0. 000 1.333 : 
2. 667 1. 333 : 4. 000 : 
I 
------------j ---------Totals : 4. 000 1.333 : 5. 333 : 
I I 
---------------------·----------· 
lb cbarge rates aoove 
nonal rates 
Yea Ko Totals 
--------------------------------I 
I 
Yea : 0.857 2.000 2.857 : 
I 
I 
lol 1.143 2.857 4.000 : 
I 
I 
Totals : 2.000 4.857 6.857 : 
lb rate 
areas 
by risk 
lb rate 
mas 
by risk 
lb rate 
areas 
by risk 
Yes : 
lo : 
Totals : 
Yes I 
No : 
lb charge different 
interest rates 
Yes No 
3 
4 2 
lb charge rates be lov 
nona! rates 
Yes Mo 
2 0 
2 2 
I 
Totals 
I 
I 
2 : 
Totals 
--------------------- t ----------Totals : 4 2 : 6 I 
lb charge rates aoove 
noraa I rates 
Yes Xo Totals 
--------------------------------
I 
I 
Yes : 2 3: 
I 
I 
lol 3 4 : 
Totals : 2 5 7 : 
lA> cbarge 
rates bllov Yes : 
norul 
rates Mo : 
Totals : 
!).) rate 
areas Yes : 
by risk 
No : 
Totals : 
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EXPtrnD 
lA> charge rates aoove 
norwl rates 
Yes Ho Totals 
--------------------------------
1.714 2.000 3. 714 : 
1.286 1. 714 • 3.000 : • 
• 
• 
----3.000 3.714 6.714 : 
lA> rate clients 
by risk 
Yea No Totals 
1. 286 2.000 3.286 : 
1. 714 2.286 4. 000 : 
------------------ ----------3.000 4. 286 • 7.286 : I 
... _,.., __________ .,.__ ----------
lA> charge 
rates belov 
nonal 
rahs 
lA> rate 
mas 
by risk 
O~ERVID 
Yes : 
Yo : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
lA> charge retes aoove 
norlill rates 
Yes Ho 
2 2 
1 2 
3 4 
I 
.. 
lA> rate clients 
by risk 
Yea Ho 
2 
2 2 
Totals 
4 : 
3: 
7 : 
Totals 
3: 
4 : 
------------- -------3 4 I 7 : • 
---------------- ---
- 185 -
Appendix 5(xi) 
CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO WHETHER A BANK DOES RATE CLIENTS 
ON A SCALE ACCORDING TO RISK 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
~rate 
cl ieots 
by risk 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
EXPD:Tm 
~ cbuye different 
interest ntes 
Yes No Totdls 
--------------------------------
2.000 2.000 4.000 : 
1. 000 1. 000 2.000 : 
---3. 000 3.000 6.000 : 
~ chuge ntes below 
oorul rates 
Yes No Tohls 
2.000 1. 000 3. 000 : 
2.000 1. 000 3.000 : 
--------------------- ----------4.000 2.000 I 6. 000 : I 
--------------------- ----------
~ charge rates aoove 
nor1111l rates 
Yes No 
0.857 2. 000 
1.143 2.857 
2.000 4.857 
Totals 
2.857 : 
4.000 : 
6.857 : 
I 
------- ___ I 
~ rdte 
cl ieots 
by risk 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
~rate 
clients 
by risk 
Yes : 
No : 
Totdls : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
OBSERVED 
~ charge different 
interest rdtes 
Yes No Tohls 
--------------------------------
2 2 
3 3 
~ charge rates be lov 
norul rates 
Yes No 
2 
2 
4 2 : 
~ cbarge rates aoove 
oorul rates 
Yes No 
2 
3 
2 5 
4 : 
2 : 
6 : 
Totals 
3.: 
3 : 
Totals 
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CONTINGENCY TABLE RESULTS RELATING TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND PRICING MODELS 
Agree risk 
~easureaent 
IOdel would 
be valuable 
Agree 
pricing 
IOdel would 
be valuable 
Agree 
pricing 
IIOdel would 
be valuable 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes 
No 
Totals 
Yes 
No 
Totals 
EXPtx:TID 
Organisation aakes 
use of !lOde I 
Yes No 
0.714 5.000 
0.286 1.714 
Totals 
5. 714 : 
2.000 : 
1.000 6.714 : 7.714: 
Organisation ~akes 
use of W>del 
Yes No Totals 
-------------------------------
0.571 4.000 4.571 : 
0.429 2.571 3. 000 : 
---1.000 6.571 7.571 : 
Agree risk 
18d8Urei8Dt IIIOde I 
vould be valuable 
Yes No Mals 
--------------------------------
2.857 0.000 2.857 : 
2.143 0.857 3. 000 : 
-----5.000 0.857 I 5.857 : I 
Agree risk 
~easureaent 
IOdel vould 
be valuable 
Agree 
pricing 
lOde I vould 
be valuable 
Agree 
pricing 
aodel vould 
be valuable 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
Yes : 
No : 
Totals : 
OBSERVED 
Organisation 111kes 
use of lOde I 
Yel! No 
0 5 
6 : 
Organisation aakes 
use of IOdel 
Yes No 
Totals 
5 : 
7 : 
Totals 
--------------------------------
0 4 4 
2 3 
6 7 
Agree risk 
aeasureaent IOOe I 
vould be vllluable 
Yes No Totals 
--------------------------------
4 0 4 
2 3 
5 2 7 
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RISK - RETURN REPORT (EXAMPLE) 
2 
m 
5 ~ 
;:o 
~ 
:A 
PRODUCT/AREA RISK MATRIX j; 
CURREKT LOAH BAlANCES A R E A E X P 0 S U R E ~ 
+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------+ ~ 
AREA 1 : AREA 2 : AREA 3 : TOTAL 
·----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------·-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
LOAM TYPES : AHOUHT : X : AHOUHT l X : AHOUHT : X : AKOUHi : X 
+---------~------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------·----------------·----------------+ 
~ 
u 
LOll :PRODUCT A : 57,394,293 : 2.7X: 17,1l1,6ll : 3.8Xl 4,241,B49 : 1.21: 781666,973 : 3.7Xl 
P RISK lPRODUCT Cl : 5615211 786 : 2.71: 13,149,259 : I.OX: 1,455,798 : 1.11: 71 11251836 : 3.31: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------·---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
R :TOTAL LOW : 11l,9151879 : 5.3%: llil,181,989 : I.U: 5,&96,339 : ~.JX: 149,792,388 : 7.m 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
C1) 
~ Q. 
1-'• ...... 
X 00 
Ol 00 
........ 
!-'• 
a KEDIUII :PRODUCT B I 1551119,711 : 7.31: 218,555,514 : 9.9l! 657,1171961 : 38.31: I,B22,793,186 : 48.3¥: 
RISK !PRODUCT C2 : 21861,172 I I.!Xl 121625,896 I 8.6Xl 54,988,338 : 2.6¥: _ 71,47~,399 l J.U: 
D :PRODUCT Cl I 2~1 415 1 311 : t.U: 73,4771995 : 3.4¥: 132,446,298 : 6.2X: 231il,339,?114 : lii.BX: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------·-------------+----------------·----------------+ 
U :TOTAl liED l 182,396 1 68~ : 8.6%: 296,6591315 : 1l.9Xl B44 1SU,498 : 39.m 11l2l15981 .J87 : 62.tx: 
+----------------·----------------+---------------·---------------·-------------+----------------+-------------·----------------+----------------+ 
C HIGH RISK lPRODUCT C~ l S8,615,BSJ l 2.8Xl lli11446,918 : 6.U: 126,7771 443 l S.9Xl 3151931,286 : 14.BX: 
-------------t----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------·-------------+----------------·-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
T :TOTAl HIGH l 58,&851853 l 2.81: 131,4461911 : 6.11: 126,777,443 l 5.911 315,831,216 l 14.9Xl 
+----------------+-------------~·---------------+---------------·-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
DEFAULT lDEFAUlT l 18518611947 l 8.7X: 1851299,782 l 4.9¥1 51,2991914 : 2.U: J41,66B,653 : 16.Ul 
-------------·----------------+----------------·---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
lTDTAl l Sl9,778,U~ l 25.311 562,58718116 l 26.U: 1,828,316,685 : 48.JX: 2,1311 3821 154 : lii.U: 
t----------------+----------------·---------------+---------------t-------------+----------------+-------------·----------------·----------------+ 
PRODUCT/AREA RISK HATRIX 
GROWTH FOR KOHTH A R E A E X P 0 S U R E 
+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+------------------------------+----------------------------·----· 
A RE ~ 1 A R E A 2 A R E A 3 T 0 TAL 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
LOAH nPES : AKOUHT : X : AHOUHT : I : AKOUHT : X : AHOUNT 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------t-------------·----------------t----------------· 
LOY 
P RISK 
:PRODUCT A : 5121911 : 9.91: 119,393 : a.m 16,397 : 3.41! 649,299 : UX: 
:PRODUCT C1 : 392,995 : 9.71: 194 1359 : B.81: 14,414 : 1.U: 511,669 : UX! 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------· 
R :TOTAL LOU : 995,886 : 9.8%: 222,752 : 9.71: 31,319 : 9.61: 11 159 1869 : Ut: 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
0 11EDIUK :PRODUCT B : 1,339,364: 1.2%: 11879,1197: B.?X: 3,71? 1133: 9.61: 7,636,594: Ut: 
RISK :PRODUCT C2 : 14 1 235 : B.SXI SB,l92 : a.U: 1119,1?71 I -UX: <45,66Bl: -11. u: 
J IPRODUCT C3 : 124,44Bl: -B. !XI B : 9.91: 132,314 : 9.111 197,874 : Uli 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
u :TOTAL HED : 11929,159: 1.U: 1,929,399 : 9.7X: 3,741,m : 1.51: 7,699,399: UX! 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+---~------------+----------------+ 
C HIGH RISK !PRODUCT C4 : 395,929 : 9.7%: 3991 179 : B.lX: 63B,734 : &.51: 1,4161 732 : UX: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
T :TOTAL HIGH : 3951829 : 9.71: 399,179 : 8.31: 639,734 : 9.511 1,4161732 : B.SX: 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
DEFAULT :DEFAULT : 11832,296: 1.91: 185,195: 9.U: 294 1382: B.U: 21141 1862: 8.61! 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
:TOTAL : 4,9&3,179 : e.m 2,M&,S1o : a.sx: 4,897,676 : 1.5x: 12,417,27& : 1.6x: 
+------------+-----------+------------+---------------+----------- +----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
~ 
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LOY 
P RISK 
PRODUCT/AREA iiSK HATRIX 
GROWTH FOR YEAR A R E A E X P 0 S U R E 
+--------------------------------+-----------------------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------+ 
A R E ~ 1 A R E A 2 A R E A 3 T 0 T A L 
t----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
LOAN TYPES : AKOUNT : J : AMOUNT : X : AMOUNT : X : AHOUNT : X 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------·----------------+-------------·----------------+----------------+ 
lPRODUCT A : 5,175,311 : 18.U: 1,8119,41111 : 6.31: 194,247 : 4.8Xl 61378,958 : 3.91: 
:PRODUCT C1 : 31 697 1622 : 7.U: 6112,256 : 4.8Xl 178,781 : 14.81: 41 478 1659 : 6.7Xl 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------·---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
R :TOTAL LOY : 8,872,932 : 8.5Xl 1,611,b57 : 5.6Xl 373,128 : Ull lil,957,b17 : 7.3Xl 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
0 HEDIUK 
RISK 
lPRODUCT 9 : 1915251558 : H.U: 261513,m : 14.U: 19,139,867 : 3.U: 65 1 169,116 : b.8X: 
:PRODUCT C2 . : 11B,Il45 : 4.U: 485,611 : 4.i!Xl 1894,119!: -1.6Xl 1298,463!: -ii.U: 
D :PRODUCT CJ : U72 111Sll -ii.JX: 219,774: 11.31: 11 181,383: Ul: 1,229,a42: i.SX: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
u :TOTAL HED : 19,463,488 : 11.91: 27,2118,977 : 111.11: 1~ 1 42& 1 lll : 2.41: 66,a9B,b96 : 5.3Xl 
t----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
C HIGH RISK :PRODUCT C4 : S,i194 13ili : 9.SX: 5,617 1331 : 4.51: 6,569,251 : - 5.51: 17,3211,SB2 : 5.ax: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
T :TOTAL HI'H : 5,1194,311 : 9.5X: 5,617,331 : 4.51: 616119,251 : 5.5X: 17,l211,882 : 5.8Xl 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
DEFAULT :DEFAULT : 19,8271948 : 12.Ul 1,2481615 : 1.21: 1,973,173 : 4.U: 2l,i149,b37 : 7.21: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
ITOTAL : 53,258,&68 : u.u: J5,686,48i : &.ax: 28,381,683 : 2.8s: 117,J26,8JII : 5.8x: 
+--------~------·----------------+---------------+---------------+-------------+----------------+-------------+----------------+----------------+ 
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Appendix 6(iv) 
RISK HATRIX SUMMARY 
CURRENT LOAH 9ALAHCES A R E A 
+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ 
!AREA 1 !AREA 2 !AREA 3 !TOT~L 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ 
: 1 :2 !3 
LOU RISK 113, ?15, ~79 : 39, 188,389 : 5,696,839 : 149,792,Bi7 : 
5.3%: 1. 4X: ~.31: 7.U: 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+------------~ 
!2 :3 :4 
MEDIUII RISK I 182,396,684 : 296,659,385 : 344,5421 499 : 11323,5981 48Q : I 
a.~x: 13. ?X: 39.ax: 62.U! 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ 
:3 
HI~H RISK 
!4 
5B,m,B53 : 
2.8X! 
:5 
m,H6,?19 : 
6.U: 
126,i77,443 : 
5.n: 
315,938,286 : 
14.5%! 
-------------+----------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+ 
c :6 !6 !6 
DEFAULT 185,~6~ 1 347 : 1~5,299,982 : 51,299,?84 : 341,668,653 : 
T B.?X: 4.?%! 2.4%! 1&.n: 
---------+----------------+----------------+---------------+-----------+ 
TOTAL 
539,?78,463 : 
25.3%: 
562,587,986: 1,a2B1316,685 : 2,138,382,154 : 
26. u: 48. n: 11i. u: 
----------+----------------+----------------+---------------+----------+ 
+----------------------------------------+ 
!QUALITY MEASUREMENTS 
+---------------------------+------------+ 
:~YERAGE ~REA RATIH' 2.23 ! 
!AVERA~E PRODUCT RATIN' 2.48 : 
!AVERAGE ~REA/PRODUCT RATIH': 3.35 ! 
!PORTFOLIO SHORTFALL ~.S : 
!ARREARS AS X OF TOTAL 16.~1! 
+--------------------------+----------+ 
----------
CURRENT LOAN BALANCES 
AKOUHT I 
~·-------------·-:..·----· 
a 113,915,879 : 5.311 
12 212,577,573 : li.Bil 
tl 3681961,997 I 16.911 
14 974,989,489 l 45.Brl 
15 126,777,443 l 5. 911 
'' 
341,668,653 : 16.111 
f 
·•· ------------+-------+ lTOTALI 2,131,8821154 l 111.111 
._____+---------------+-------+ 
AREA RISK CATE&DRT 
------------------
CURRENT LOAN BAlANCES 
AMOUNT I 
+-----._·-------------+-------+ 
11 I 539,978,46~ l 25.311 
12 1 5621587,816 : 26. m 
13 . I 1,B2d1l1&1684 I 48.311 
~---------------+-------+ 
ITUTALI 21131,882,154 l 118.9%: 
f I -------.-----+·-----+ 
PRODUCT RISK CATEGORT 
-----------
. CURRENT LOAM BALANCES 
AKOIJNT X 
+--4---------+-----+ 
" 
I 78,666,973 l 3.711 
itt 71,125,93& : 3.311 
·II I 11122,793,185 I 48.111 
: it2 I 71,4151397 I 3.311 ltl 23113391914 I 11.811 
IC4 I 315,831,21& : 14.811 
liEF I . 3411661,653 I 16.111 
f I +-····• imAtt 2,131, aa2, ts• 1 111 • .111 
. I . ' I • .. ......... • 
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Appendix 6 (v) 
&ROUTH FOR MONTH 
AftOUMT 
+-----+---------------·-------· 
:1 985,886 I 8.811 
12 2,151, 911 : 1.111 
:3 2,355,537 l 8.711 
l4 4,331,421 l 8.411 
15 631,734 l 1.511 
l6 2,141,862 l 8.61: 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
ITOTALl 12,417,278 : 1.611 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
&RO~TK FOR MONTH 
ANOUHT 1 
·-----+---------------+-------+ 
11 4,9&3,178 : 1.911 
12 2,646,516 l B.Sll 
l3 4,817,676 : 9.511 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
ITOTAll 121417,271 l 8.611 
+-----+---------------+-------J 
'ROUTH FOR ftOMTH 
A"OUMT I 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
lA 648,m 1 1.811 
:c1 5111&68 I 1.711 
II 71636,594 I 1.811 
lt2 C4516&1H -1.111 
IC3 117,874 I 1.111 
11:4 1,41&1732 I I.Sil 
IDEF 211411862 I 1.611 
+--+----------.______. 
I TOT AU 1214171271 I 1.&11 
+ • I _ ........ ··~ 
+-----+---------------·-------· 
11 8,872!932 : 8.41: 
l2 21,&75,144 : 11.811 
l3 32,676,214 : 11.111 
' 14 25,1U,662 I 2.611 
15 6,6191251 I 5.511 
16 23,849,637 : 7.21: 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
:TOTAL I 111,326,831 : 5.8:: 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
bROUTH FOR YEAR 
A"OUNT 1 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
11 : 53,258,&&7 : 11. m 
12 l 35,686,481 : 6.911 
13 28,391,683 l 2.81: 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
lTOTALl 117,326,931 l 5.911 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
'ROUTH FOR YEAR 
AKOUHT I 
+-----+---------------+-------+ 
lA ·&,378,958 I 8.811 
:c1 4,478,659 l 6.1Xl 
IB 651 1&8,115 I 6.8%1 
11:2 (299, 4631 l -1.411 
lCJ 1,229,142 I 8.511 
IC4 17,321,883 : 5.811 
IDEF 231849,637 I 7.21: 
+-----+---------------+--------+ 
ITOTAll 117,326,831 I 5.811 
+---+-----+-----+ 
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Appendix 6{vi) 
RISK. AND RETURN "EASURE"EMTS 
'AREA 1 
A"OUNT Of 
POTENTIAL POTENTIAL 
BALANCE LOSS PROBAULITY LOSS Ri Re Ri• Res 
--------· ----------- ------
PRODUCT A 57,394,293 11,478,859 B.SX 57,394 1.1 I 8.1 8.8 
PRn&UCT C1 56,528,786 11,384,157 1.U 113,142 1.2 8.1 1.1 1.1 
PRODUCT B 155,119,712 38,779,928 1.2X 465,359 1.3 1.2 1.1 ·1.1 
PRODtJCT C2 2,861,172 762,979 1.51 11,445 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 
PRODUCT CJ 24,415,811 6,1i3,951 2.&X 122,179 1.5 8.4 8.1 &.I 
PRODUCT C4 58,615,853 15,288,483 2.31 m,m 1.6 1.5 B.l 1.1 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
354,917,617 83,718,357 1.3X 1,121,954 1.3 8.2 8.1 1.1 
AREA 2 
ANOUHT OF 
POTENTIAL POTENTIAL 
BALANCE LOSS PROBABILITY LOSS Ri Re Ria Res 
--------- ----------- -------·--
PRODUCT A 17,131,&31 4,257,988 ·1.21 51,895 8.3 B 1.1 1.2 
PRODUCT Cl 13,149,259 3,586,469 1.5X 52,597 8.4 1.1 8.1 . 1.2 
PRODUCT B 218,555,514 52,638,879 2.81 1,m,n8 8.5 1.2 1.1 1.2 
PRODUCT C2 12,625,896 3,842,664 2.3X 88!381 8. 7 6.3 B.1 &.3 
PRODUCT C3 73,477,895 23,512,926 2.5X 587,823 e.8 8.4 1.1 1.3 
PRODUCT C4 llli,446,9U 43,482,313 2.71 1,174,122 1.9 1.5 1.1 8.3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
457, 287,114 131,241,149 2. 3X 3,816,696 8.7 8.3 8.1 8.2 
AREA 3 
AMOUNT OF 
POTENTIAL POTENTIAl 
&A LANCE LOSS PROBABILITY LOSS Ri Re Ria Res 
--------- -----------
_____ ....... ___ 
PRODUCT A 4,241,849 1,138, 946 1.5% 16,96~ 8.4 e &.1 8.3 
PRODUCT Cl · 1,455,798 513,888 1.7X 8,735 8.6 8.1 8.1 e.~ 
PRODUCT B 657' 117,961 262,643,184 2.111 s,zso,B64 6.8 1.2 &.1 1.5 
PRODUCT C2 541988133& 29,628,624 2. 4X 494,895 e. 9 &.J 8.1 &.5 
PRODUCT CJ 132,446,288 58,864,981 2.7X 1,589,354 1.2 8.4 8.1 8.7 
PRODUCT C4 126, 7771443 67,614,636 3.11 2,828,439 1.6 8.5 8.1 l.B 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
977' 116,781 411,588,181 2.3X 9,395,251 1.1 1.2 8.1 1.7 
TOTAL 
A"OUHT OF 
POTENTIAL POTENTIAL 
BAUHCE LOSS PROBABILITY LOSS Ri Re Ria Res 
--------- -----------
----------
PRODUCT A 78,666,972 16,867,713 1.7X 125,453 &.2 8 8.1 8.1 
PRODUCT Cl 71,125,835 15,324,435 1.1X 174,373 1.2 1.1 1.1 B.& 
PRODUCT B 1,822,783;187 354,261,991 1.9X 6,775,811 8.7 8.2 8.1 &.4 
PRODUCT C2 71,475,398 25,226,267 2.41 594,721 1.a 8.3 &.1 8.4 
PRODUCT CJ 2Ja,339,984 88,481,858 2.61 2,299,257 1.1 B.4 &.1 8.5 
PRODUCT 1:.4 315,831,216 126,385,423 2.8X 3,554,196 1.1 8.5 1.1 8.5 
·--------------·----------
---·--------------------------------------------------
1,789,221,512 626,50,686 2.21 13,522,911 1.8 8.2 1.1 8.5 
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